

FIRING LINE - PROGRAM #166 - GUEST: SENATOR BARRY GOLDWATER

BUCKLEY:

Senator Goldwater's least distinction is that he is the first gentleman to make a repeat solo performance on this program. When he was last here, in the wake of the 1964 Presidential campaign, the betting was that he and the movement he led had been finally anachronized. In due course, we have seen what we have seen, including the triumphant reelection of Mr. Goldwater, who returned to Washington escorted by a Republican President whose conceded election in turn it is quite widely ~~condemned~~ would have been unlikely but for the race of 1964. Senator Goldwater's position in the Republic is so widely known that only eccentric New York City publishers make the costly mistake of perverting it. He is a naturalist, photographer, aviator, geologist, businessman, radio operator, sportsman, humanist, orator and philosopher. His central theses are well known, so much so that he is acknowledged as the leading Conservative in the United States, which makes him ex officio the leading conservative in the world, the adventure in imperialism which I am glad to report will not need to be confirmed by Senator Fullbright's committee. The question has arisen, where will the Nixon Administration take us?...in foreign affairs, domestic affairs, in the conduct of government. I should like to begin by asking Senator Goldwater what did he have in mind when, last

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spring, he chided dissatisfied American conservatives who were critical of Mr. Nixon?

GO: Well, nothing but the same thought that I've always had when I've chided fellow conservatives who are acting as conservatives should. To put it another way, they're speaking their own minds. I was trying to remind them that we, as conservatives, can get no place if we want everybody to be exactly as we are. And if Mr. Nixon takes a position here that's a little bit to the left of their position, or a little bit to the right, they should look at the overall man and the overall philosophy before jumping on him, And I continue to make that plea. The alternatives are terrifying.

BU: Well, do ~~fx~~ you find considerable ~~dis~~ disappointment among, for instance, people who supported you enthusiastically in 1964, with the record of Mr. Nixon after the first six months or so?

GO: Oh, I find some of it, Bill, but I wouldn't call it overwhelming. I find it amongst the same people who find fault with me, or find fault with you, when we don't hew right up to their line. I think you have to look at Mr. Nixon's record in compartments, rather than overall, because I feel in the areas that are most important to the country he's doing an outstanding job.

BU: Well, would you enumerate those, Senator?

GO: Yes, I think in the Department of Defense, we are slowly but surely coming out of the near chaos we were in when MacNamara was Secretary of Defense. The morale of the forces <sup>is</sup> are up, the equipment is improving, and the whole overall operation of the Pentagon, I'd say, within another year, will ~~be~~ be back to normal and on the way up. And the Attorney General's office, which I think is very, very important, especially in these days, is under a man who is tough, who knows the law, likes the law, and will follow the law. Now, in the some of the domestic fields, I'm not overly happy, but on the other hand, some of these things you just can't change. 35 years of stateism you don't remove it over night. You make ~~effort~~ efforts to.

BU: Taking those in the order in which you bring them up, ~~xx~~ your ~~ref~~ reference to the MacNamara chaos, now, do you believe that President Nixon is revitalizing the Armed Services in the sense of making it clearer what our strategic burdens are? Or do you mean that he is making technical improvements of a kind that you applaud?

GO: Well, uh, the first part would be the important part right now. The technical improvements pretty much take care of themselves, as we go on. The trouble under



Defense so over-powerful that the military men just couldn't function as military men. Now, they tell you very happily that they are allowed to say something in the Joints Chiefs meeting. They are allowed to point out to the Secretary where they can save money. This is something they were never allowed to do under MacNamara. And the military men, and mind you we've paid a lot of money to educate them as military men, and they've devoted their lives to it, are now allowed a greater say in strategy, which is something that we are suffering for. I think when Lyndon Johnson writes his memoirs, if he ever does, that one of the major points in his he's going to make, not ~~in~~ defense necessarily, but in an attempt, would be to say that he relied wrongly on the advice of MacNamara.

BU: Do you think he is inclining in that direction now? Have you reason to believe that? Or do you simply assume that objective events will cause him to say this?

GOL: I have to think, knowing Lyndon Johnson as I do, that he realizes now that he listened to bad advice. It got him into trouble in the war, that he never got out ~~off~~ of, and which actually caused him to withdraw himself from the Presidential race. ~~He~~ I'll lay it (?) at one man, and that was MacNamara.

BU: Umhm. Well, do you think that we are seeing, in ~~Vietnam~~ <sup>Vietnam</sup>



the beneficial results of this return of authority to experts?

GO: Not yet. Because it hasn't returned to that point yet. After all, the President is the Commander-in-Chief. He has to make the overall decisions as to what strategy we will use. I've talked to the President about this. I've suggested frankly that we tell Hanoi and tell Paris that November 1st is coming up and that makes one year of the bombing halt, and if we aren't cutting bait or fishing by that time, we ought to start in on them again with a real, all-out, carefully planned attack. I don't think this will come about. I'm probably too hawkish, but had we done this years ago, the war would be over. I don't think, and I don't think the President feels that we can continue with these Paris talks in an unproductive way forever.

BU: Well, do you believe now, in retrospect, that the bombing actually did diminish American casualties and was worthwhile in terms of slowing up the enemy?

GO: The limited bombing that we were allowed to do did protect American lives, in that we were about 75% successful, I would say, in denying supplies to the enemy. And if you do that long enough, eventually the enemy quits. Now, had we been allowed to follow the advice of our ~~joint~~ Joint Chiefs, and other strategists

we would have bombed Heiphong, and we would have  
have bombed  
threatened to/~~bomb~~ other points in the North, and  
I think that the country would have quit a long time  
ago. Now, they've built up as a result of this bombing  
halt, they have built up more supplies behind the  
than they've  
demilitarized zone~~xxxxxx~~ ever had before. In fact,  
reconnaissance photographs show a very ~~xxx~~ ample abundance  
of supplies, enough so that a lot of us are fearful  
that they may some day launch a real attack and this would  
not be easy to contain.

BU: And your understanding is that it was Mr. MacNamara who  
suggested these inhibitions to the President?

GO: Well, it's not my idea, it's my knowledge that he did.  
In fact, it was under Jack Kennedy that the decision  
was made to enlarge this war. He sent some 16,000  
troops over there after one of the visits of MacNamara  
and General Taylor. And these troops were told to shoot  
back. Now, when you shoot back, you're in war. Up to  
that time, our boys were there as advisers. And they  
were not allowed to shoot back, so to speak, but when  
you give orders to troops like that, then you're in war.  
And that's the point that Kennedy made his big mistake  
and then Johnson followed on by not deciding to win ~~xx~~ the  
war at the same time he decided to wage the war.

BU: ~~xx~~ Umhm. Senator, what do you think of the proposals

made by a number of people--I think, for instance, of Herman Kahn, and Major Stewart--who say that a conventional war in Vietnam isn't going to work for us...That you gotta fight counter-guerrilla tactics of the sort that we used, successfully, in Malaya, or rather the British, and that the essential mistake was in regarding what's happening in South Vietnam war as something against which old doctrines were applicable?

GO: Well, I have to agree with that. That's the Thompson theory,

BU: Yeah.

GO: and it's in that fine new book of his, where he points out that Mr. Nixon, President Nixon has two forks in the road. I think we made a mistake when we put ground forces in, this is when we started to fight a conventional war, on ground that our troops and equipment were not trained or ~~not~~ built ~~to~~ <sup>fight</sup> on, ~~WW~~ We could have in my opinion won this war by aerial attack, both Navy and Air Force, and ~~not~~ <sup>left</sup> the guerrilla fighting to the Vietnamese army. But it was a question of stopping supplies, and when you deny the enemy supplies, either ammunition or food, or ~~reinforcements~~ reinforcements, you deny them any of those three, he can't fight long. We made rather feeble efforts, but successful efforts to stop these supplies, and now for almost a year, we have not



been able to stop them. So, I would agree that you can't now fight this as a conventional war, but you can fight it as a conventional, ~~strategic~~ strategic air war, with tactical air filling in wherever it's needed to help the South Vietnamese forces.

BU:q

And reduce American casualties (BOTH TALKING SIMULTANEOUSLY)

GO:

Yes, I think the President has a very good formula on reducing personnel over there. I don't think too many Americans realize what it is, As the South ~~Vietnam~~ Vietnam Divisions, I think they have 18, as they become battle-wise and battle-ready, we will withdraw a like number of men. Now, their ~~division~~ division is not the strength of our division. There's a difference. But roughly two of their divisions would be 25,000 of our fighting men, and if this happens, if the formula is continued, and I think it will be, I think we'll see a very substantial reduction in the exposure of our young men to battle death over there. This doesn't mean that we're going to bring home the Navy or the Air Force in a big hurry, but you're not exposing a lot of people to possible casualties in the air or the sea. The great ~~bulk~~ bulk of the men are back (?) <sup>backed(?)</sup> in It 's the same thing ~~with~~ with the ground forces. I doubt <sup>we</sup> that/at any time have oh over 75,000 troops committed or ready for battle. The rest are all back-up; but once

then  
we can remove these men from danger, I think/that we  
can at the same time, and then if we have to go on with  
an air war that can cause such damage to the enemy that  
they can't continue.

BREAK

BU: Senator, I made a proposal that I'd be interested in  
your reaction to, which is that so far as I'm able to  
understand, and your figure of 75,000 people who are  
actually engaged in combat, seems to support it, ~~xx~~ it  
would be perfectly feasible at this point for the  
President to declare that only volunteers will be sent  
to the front in Vietnam. My reckonings are that there  
would be more than enough volunteers who would undertake  
that duty, and that under the circumstances we would  
simultaneously succeed in breaking the back of much of  
the opposition which is divided, as I understand~~xx~~ it,  
in two parts. One, general opposition to the war,  
but more particularly opposition to being ~~xxxx~~ oneself  
forced to kill people in a war concerning which we feel  
morally insecure. Now, does that make sense to you as  
a concrete proposal?

GO: I sure know what you're getting at. But as long as we  
don't have a voluntary military, and I'm all for trying  
this, I don't know how you can say to a military force  
made up partially of draftees and partially of volunteers,

only you fellows who want to stick your ~~xxx~~ necks out are going to have to do it. Uh, I have great faith in the American fighting man, but given that alternative I don't if there'd be a great scamper to get up front.

You know,

BU: Well, do begin with, to begin with, ~~xxxxxxxxxxxx~~ your entire professional

army would have to go wherever it~~x~~ was sent. And that

GO: Well, that's true.

BU: I'm talking only/to begin with about oh approximately 55%

~~55%~~ of the people in uniform, and of those 55%, 48% , 49% ~~xxx~~ never get into combat anyway. A lot of them ,

are in the, we have a s many people, as you know, in the European theatres~~xx~~ as we have in the Vietnamese theatre.

50,000

We have ~~50,000~~ people in Korea, 50,000 people in Japan.

So, that since the chances are very slight to begin with that you'll ever be sent to Vietnam in a fighting capacity, wouldn't it be easy to draw from a pool of people who are (a) professional (b) who say if my country's fighting in Vietnam, I'm prepared to fight in Vietnam. And wouldn't we have more than enough people, actually to wrestle with the combat problem there?

GO: I think at the outset you would. But turnover is a great problem. These men can't stay on the ground fighting over there ~~xxxx~~ over prolonged periods of time. It's different than, even Korea with their extreme cold,



~~fix~~

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where you had hard ground. It's different than World War II where you had hard ground and you could survive in frontline conditions for as long as two or ~~the~~ three months. Over there, some of these men fight four days and they're off four days, because there in the water.

What I'd worry about, Bill, would be the effect it would have on the very ~~happy~~ people you would hope you would silence. I think they'd take up some other cry.

BU: Oh, I don't doubt, I don't doubt that the dissatisfactions that have paralyzed the campuses, and so on and so forth, are, have nothing whatever to do with the realization of any ~~discernible~~ discernible objective. I do think, though, that enough ~~ex~~ individual people feel so strongly about fighting in Vietnam, that they would be appeased.

GO: Well, of course, they have a, there's an outlet, there's an out for that, I should say, you can become a conscientious objector.

BU: No, but they're not, in order to be a conscientious objector, you have to object to the use of force, and these people don't necessarily

~~BUK~~ GO: You have to object to

BU: object to the use of force, they object to using it there.

GO:q Well, they have to object on moral grounds, religious

grounds.

BU: Yeah.

GO: And I can't, I think those are the only two grounds that you could object to going ~~xx~~ out to defending your country if it meant killing somebody else. This is one of the unfortunate things about this war. It's not a slogan war. It's not Remember the Maine, or Make the World Safe for Democracy, or Remember ~~xxxx~~ Pearl Harbour. This is just another one of those Sneaky Pete wars ~~xxx~~ that we got into, like Korea, and there's no great patriotic surge on the part of the overall population to get the thing over with. Many people don't understand it. I've implored our mutual friend, Bill Fullbright, many times, during the course of the debate on military procurement, to let the American people know just what we're involved in ~~xxxxxx~~ the matter of promises to other countries, not that we might go to war, but we will go to war. In fact, I asked the President, the last I visited with him, to, at the proper time, go before the American ~~people~~ people, and say now here's what we're up against, folks, we've got 44 treaties we got a total of 56, but 44 that sort of commit us, and 17 of those, as I read them, say we will go ~~xxx~~ to war. Now, once we know the attitude of the President, regardless of who he is, as to our commitments, are we

going to keep these treaties, ~~xx~~ or are we going to ignore them, I think we'd accomplish two things. We in ~~xx~~ the Congress could act more wisely/ on appropriations for military purposes and so forth, and the American people could look forward and say well, we have some potential problems and get themselves ~~xxxxx~~ steeled for it. I'm amazed in talking at colleges and adult groups that when I mention ~~these~~ these treaties the eyes pop open and the ears flap, because they've never heard of implored them. I've ~~xxxxx~~ ~~xxxxxx~~ Fullbright to reopen the hearings of a public nature, so the public can know, and the President, so that the people can understand his position on the commitments in these treaties.

BU: Well, Fullbright says among other things, that he finds it hard, physically, to lay his hands on the documents, talking on some of the documents, obviously, I'm not ~~xxxxxx~~ about publicly ratified treaties; but understandings.

BU: Well, he shouldn't have any trouble, they all pass through his committee, or his predecessor/s committee.

BU: Well, he points for instance to whatever it is ~~xx~~ that was signed between

~~xxx~~ GO: Thailand?

BU: Yeah. They won't even let it out of the Pentagon.

~~EX~~ GO: Well, this kind, I'm not worried about the Thailand agreement, I'm worried, if I'm gonna be worried, I'm



worried about our commitments to the ~~Nax~~ NATO countries, that ~~xxxxx~~ say we'll go to war, if you're bothered. No if and's, but's about it. The other treaties carry some rather loose language that we will help, we will do everything within our ~~xxxxxx~~ Constitutional processes which gives us a lot of leeway. I don't know if there have been any commitments,

BU: Even with Earl Warren gone? (LAUGHTER)

GO: Well, his ghost lingers on. I'm not worried about commitments in Thailand. We have some 55,000 men in Thailand. Now, these are Air Force types. Naturally, ~~xx~~ only a small percentage fly, but the rest of them keep the birds flying. And the Thai Army is protecting us. Now, what are we going to do if the Communists come on down south in Thailand - ~~thxxx~~ they're up north -- pull and do we ~~xxxx~~ all our boys out immediately, or do we stay and try to protect our equipment and men, and in so doing we're, in effect, helping the Thai. I think that Senator Fullbright should realize this. He's been exposed to these things long enough. There's nothing new about it. We probably have similar agreements wherever we have Air Force bases around this world.

BU: Well, I think, it seems to me plain that Senator Fullbright would be anxious to interpret any treaty in such a way as to look for means of withdrawing from its implications,

because, although he wasn't a very conspicuous critic of Foster Dulles, during the fifties, he has become one. He has become sort of a neo-isolationist. And under the circumstances would tend to withdraw. But, do I understand you to be saying that any measure by President Nixon at this point which would give an individual the right to opt out of military or rather front service in Vietnam, would have the effect of endangering the public attitude towards treaty commitment?

GO:

Well, frankly, I have to say that I hadn't thought of this idea. I hadn't heard it before you mentioned it. As one who's had quite a bit of experience in the military field and in personnel I rather doubt, off hand, that it would work, but now if you'd get at this thing at pieces, for example, the average Air Force man that goes overseas, the worst he's ever going to be subjected to in Southeast Asia might be an occasional rocket attack. The Navy man, so far, unless he's a pilot, has been subjected to nothing. So, you leave it up to the foot-soldier and the Marine, and in those two services they are subjected, a portion of them, ~~xxx~~ to combat casualties. Probably the Marines suffer a greater percentage than any branch, because a greater percentage of the Marines actually see front action.

BU: And the Marines has been traditionally a volunteer service.

GO: A volunteer service, and they resist the draft very strongly. Now, what it would do to the Army, I don't know. It's true that many of our men are professional. In fact, we've pretty well gutted the professional forces in Europe to send them into Southeast Asia. Our forces are numerically strong, but professionally weak, in NATO and equipment-wise weak.

BREAK

BU: Senator, you touched a moment ago on the dissatisfactions among the youth. I'd like you to comment on the fact that a number of young conservatives, ~~xxxxxxx~~ among them people who supported you in 1964, and ~~xx~~ people who would have supported you in 1968 if you had run, are attracted to a brand of libertarian anarchism, of which you have read, and some people understand that to be the final distillate of conservatism. I happen to think, of course, that this is untrue; but how would you account for their progress towards what is in effect anarchy? Philosophical anarchy.

GO: Well, first, let me say that I don't believe that the overwhelming majority of American youth can be put in that class. I don't think anyone ~~xxx~~ in this country, with the possible exception of you, has talked before more colleges than I have. And I've watched this



development in a very interested way. I've watched the decline of the liberal, the decline of the acceptance of the so-called liberalism of the thirties and forties, and fifties, I think it's decadent, I think it's dead, it's or/about dead. I've felt, as I've told you, for many years that the average young person, when he gets down to thinking about it, will think more conservatively than he will along the so-called liberal line. Now, I don't deny that there are those people in colleges who well they call it the New Left, who associate themselves with libertarianism and in turn can equate libertarianism with conservatism. And I've found this to be true in talking with students. And my oldest son, who's in the Congress, has been devoting most of his time to this problem, and he finds the same thing. That when ~~xxx~~ you express yourself as a libertarian~~ix~~, as wanting to do your thing, as the new expression is, this is no different than what you and I have been preaching all of our lives, we don't want an oppressive all-powerful government telling any of us what to do. And these young people, I think even, I think they're more rabid in this determination to stay away from it than we have been. Now, they leave the conservative school of thought when doing their thing is accompanied by any means of doing it. Now, the conservatives, you and I talk chiefly, if we think about it, about the freedom of the

individual, and the dignity that goes with that freedom, and the fact that we don't want an oppressive government telling us ~~xx~~ what we have to do with our money, with our talents, with our communities, with the things that you and I do. But we as conservatives have never resorted to mayhem to do our thing, and that's the parting point; but I don't think, well, when you realize ~~xx~~ we have 2500.-

BU;

Do you believe in extremism in behalf of liberty?

Ex GO:

I still believe in that. I think that, I think that when Aristotle first made it, it was a helluva good statement, and I think when Socrates made it it was good, and I think when Goldwater made it it was good — misunderstood. But I'll stand by it. The fact that we have 2500 campuses in this country, and I think you can count less than 25/<sup>campuses</sup> where we've had trouble, and when you look at the campuses and realize, like Berkeley, I think 600 out of 80,000 students cause the trouble and another 700 who aren't even students, I think you begin ~~xx~~ to realize that the young people have actually been abused in that the media have depicted the youngster as being wildeyed and willing to tear down to get what they want. I don't find that's true in the vast majority of young people.

BU:

No, I quite agree with you; but I am not talking about

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the majority of young people, or even about the majority of conservatives, I'm talking about minority of conservatives who understand conserv-, American conservatism to be off its track. They reason as follows: that we are slowly becoming establishmentarianized; that our willingness to go along with the Nixon's of this world, with the Pentagons, with the Military, et cetera, ~~and~~ et cetera, make us ~~xx~~ perhaps unwitting, but no less so, auxiliaries of this ~~xx~~ engine of conformity which is coming to dominate us all. Now, as I understand the difference between the libertarian anarchism and conservatism, is that conservatism believes in freedom but understands the nature of quotes public responsibility. Public responsibility being for instance to keep the goddam Communists away from this country, which involves concerted ~~considerable~~ effort, it ~~xx~~ involves things like taxation and Pentagons and so on. Now, here is where the Carl Hesses of this world seem to be departing very radically from us. They not only want a volunteer military, but they are edging over beyond it, they want a volunteer taxation, which is certainly ~~x~~ Utopian but it is not for this world, is it?

GO:

No, there's only two things that we have to do, actually, under our Constitution, we have to serve our country and we have to pay taxes. And if ~~xx~~ you made



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them both voluntary, I think the tax would win. It's hard for me to understand Carl. Of ~~xx~~ course, we've been very close for many, many years. I ~~xxx~~ consider him to be a very brilliant man. ~~xxx~~ I found this libertarianism bug starting in on him about a year or so ago, but I haven't seen him in a good many months. In fact, I haven't seen him in over a year, so I don't know just what he's up to now. This could well be the New Left who would embrace the muscles of Fascism to accomplish getting their thing done. Now, they might be critical of the conservative who says, well, Nixon's new Welfare Program is not what we like, but do we like any welfare program, and if we do, what is it we like? We know that we know the one we've been working under for 30, 4 or 5 years hasn't worked. And it's been, ~~xxx~~ its results are really disastrous, We haven't produced anything from it. It has to be something new. And you remember when my economic adviser, and your friend, Milton Friedman, suggested the negative income tax, I was shot at from every quarter of the globe. But when you analyze it, and if you did it Milton Friedman's way, ~~the~~ <sup>a</sup> conservative could buy it. So, when we say

BU: Would you call the Moynihan plan, the, Mr. Nixon's proposals, really a development from the Friedman plan?

GO: No, no. No, I don't think you could, because you see,

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the Friedman Plan would eliminate other forms of welfare.

BU: Sox~~x~~ would the Moynihan plan, wouldn't it?

GO: Well, but it adds more people. And this would, could cut the cost of welfare in half and still serve the people ~~xxxxxx~~ that need serving. It might have, the Friedman plan might have been ~~xx~~ the start of the Moynihan Plan, I've never talked to him about it. But we have to do something. In other words, as a conservative I recognize we have some 8½-million people, maybe a few more, who are a block of people in this country who either, because of physical reasons, or mental reasons, or personal reasons, can't work or won't work. And we cannot ignore these people. I think the conservative, I think, believes more thoroughly in taking care of people than the liberal. <sup>w</sup>e'd rather see it done at <sup>w</sup>a closer level, but it not having worked, let's find something that will work, and at the same time we keep the pressure on to see that what will work does not become more, does not become another great power in the hands of some bureaucrat. It does~~xx~~ not ~~de~~ deprive the individual receiving this of the warmth that charity or help should bring him. It's not just a cold piece of paper~~xxx~~ that you get from your government once a month. So, as a conservative, I'm willing to go along

with the Nixon Plan. I want to see what will happen. It's better than anything we've had. Now, the ~~gaxk~~ Carl Hess ~~is~~ type of conservative, I think, would say cut the whole damn thing off. We don't need it. Forget it. Well, you're not going to do that to 8½-million people. And these are, it's been many, many programs-

BU:

I think you'll probably ~~xxxxxx~~ recognize this, but ~~xx~~ even so they are disposed to fight a theoretical battle, and I think that even in theory they are wrong. ~~Because~~ Because it is theoretically wrong to <sup>cop</sup> ~~xxx~~ out, and in my judgment, this is what the New Left desires to do... Without, ~~That's~~ of course, taking into account the consequences of course during that, which would mean/an instant dictatorship of some form or another.

GO:

Well, I think Frank Meyers in his book deals with this very well, in that the conservatives are great in number. I think ~~xx~~ the hallmark of the conservative, and I think it's a good hallmark, is to be an individual. Now, most working conservatives are willing to give a little bit here and there, knowing that they're not going to win the war overnight, but they've got to win a battle here and there, and I think we've won a ~~xxxxx~~ remarkable battle in the last four years. We've seen the American people turn against centralized government. That was my whole theme. That's the



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reason I got into politics. That's been done. N<sup>O</sup>w, where do we go from there. Do we allow ourselves to be lured by the New Left into violent action to dispose of some of the things that you and I, as conservatives, don't like? Or do we go through the normal processes, ~~xxxxxx~~ recognizing that it's probably been 50 years in the ~~am~~ making to get this government in the bad shape that it's in relative to its Constitutional purposes and the dollar, and everything like that. We haven~~xxxx~~ to fight too, and we have to work with these young people, we have to listen to them. I think they've got some great ideas. As I tell them, Lord, it's not my generation that's gonna save this country, it's these youngsters with 16 elections left in them. I'd settle for about four, maybe five.

BREAK

END OF PART I

BEGINNING OF PART II

BU: Mr. Leskase, of the Washington Post.

LE: Senator, returning to the issue of Vietnam. I understand ~~as~~ you ~~would~~ would make what ~~as~~ you describe as a real all-out attack on North Vietnam, an air attack, if there were no progress toward peace before November 1st. <sup>That</sup> ~~This~~ would be an ideal timetable. What do you mean by a ~~national~~ real all-out attack? Would this be an attack on the population of North Vietnam?

GO: Well, first I would make the threat. Now, the Hanoi Government knows very well that we have the strategic and tactical airpower to do anything we say we want to do. If we propose the destruction of Heiphong, ~~or~~ or breaching the ~~breaching~~ of the dykes of the Red River to flood their rice paddies, and we convince them that we would do it, I don't think we would have to do it. But if we had to do it, we would do it, and I don't think the war would last very long. I don't ~~think~~ think this is going to happen. As I say, I'm probably a little more of a hawk than the average hawk.

LE: What do you think is going to happen, sir?

GO: Well, we were talking just during the interview about the dilemma that Mr. Thompson, who handled the Malayan Communist situation for the British, finds the President in that he has two forks in ~~xx~~ the road. He can pull out, which we won't do, or he can get set for a forever war, which we can't do. So, <sup>Mr. Nixon,</sup> /President Nixon, I think has to find a ~~third~~ third fork, which I feel is the main road of battle. In other words, we made, if we made a mistake going into that war, we ~~we~~ should have pulled out immediately. We've been in it now eight years, ~~or~~ or nearly 8 years, We're getting no place in Paris, that we can see, we are training more and more of the South Vietnamese to fight, so that I think in following

that, maybe if we don't have ~~xxx~~ the armed forces out within a year, we could have them out within two years that's one way it could go. We could say, well, it's your war, boys, you fight it. But we'd have to leave airpower there for a while, because they have no airpower of their own yet. And we'd have to leave seapower there for a while. I think it's a very tough decision. Frankly, I'm glad I'm not the President to have to make up my mind at this stage of a very, very badly fought war. Not from the military standpoint, but from the Commander-in-Chief standpoint and the Secretary of Defense standpoint, of whether or not I'm going to go into an all-out ~~xxx~~ attack. I don't believe the Red Chinese would ever get into this war. They can't. They want no part of it. It would be Hanoi against us. And I'm not worried about Russia. Russia's big worry is Red China. So, I would not worry about doing it, but I'm glad it's not my decision to make.

BU: Mr. Jones/ is also from the Washington Post.

JO: Given the real divisions that exist in a country, I wonder ~~xi~~ if you could describe in your travels recently what feedback you get from the people ~~xx~~ you talk to? Would they support any action of the President at this ~~xxxx~~ time whether it's a resumed bombing halt, uh,



GO: I think so.

JO: Almost anything?

GO: I wouldn't want to bet on it, but I've noted a change in the attitude of people in the last three or four months. There's not as much anti-Vietnam as there was. There's a feeling of we're loaded with a war, let's all help. Let's get this thing over with. I don't think you can go by the polls. I think we have to get rid of this war.

JO: How do you think this administration would deal with very strong demonstrations in the cities and on the campuses, if the President took some action and there were a great deal of opposition?

GO: Oh, I don't think there's going to be any great demonstrations ~~thxxxx~~ on the campuses that can't be contained by the local people.

JD: A few tanks.

~~EX~~ BU: A few tanks. (LAUGHTER)

~~EX~~ GO: A few tanks. No, ~~walk~~ remember we have a civil rights law that in part says that it's illegal to cross a state line to engage ~~xx~~ in or promote ~~xx~~ a riot. And I think you ~~xx~~ could ~~grab~~ grab most of these SDS professionals under that law.

BU: We've got a Chicago trial, don't we (?)

GO: Yes, we have one coming up, ~~xxx~~ yes. And while I'm

not close to the Attorney General I ~~thx~~ think he's enough of a follower of the law to use any law he has and I think that this law will be used more and more, if they insist on organized travelling riots. I'm not worried about this on the campuses. I think what happened here at the American University last year, or earlier this year, is a good example of what will probably happen, ~~if~~ the good guys are gonna get in the act. The white hats are gonna ~~throw~~ throw the black hats off the campus. I don't make that reference in an ethnic way, but in the movies, the good cowboy always wears the white hat, and the bad one always wears the ~~black~~ black hat. That's when you come in late you can tell

BU: That was a close one.

Mr. Chickering is from National Review .

CH: Sir, I'd like

GO: What

BU: Sir?

GO: What paper was that?

BU: Uh, National Review. (LAUGHTER)

CH: I'd like you to comment on a proposition that I have. I wonder if the problems in Vietnam don't in effect reflect this country is going through a great identity crisis now. That in fact we may have been spoiled

by our successes, and that people tend to prosper in the face of adversity, and having prospered ~~us~~ much as we did after World War II and during the Fifties, that maybe we haven't reached the time when desperate for the kind of adversity that exhilarates people, we haven't in a sense created our own, and have turned back in on ourselves, which, I'm wondering, if maybe this may not happen to all civilizations, that they have failure built in to them, because they become spoiled by success and ~~xxx~~ then they have to create their own failures really to continue uh stimulation,

BU: Well, Lyndon Johnson would help us on that score wouldn't he?

GO: He sure would. ~~xxx~~ Well, I think, uh, that that part of your hypothetical situation is correct when you say that all governments have built in failures. History proves this. And I think we're being tested right now, as to whether ~~xxx~~ we're going to survive. However, I don't think that Vietnam is an expression of this. If I were to try to put my finger on any one thing it's the fact that America, United States, is now the world leader, and we have been ever since World War II. And we historically have been a very docile, a very separated country. I think if it were left up to a vote in this country that the majority would want to



become an ~~isolationist~~ isolated country again, with the walls built high. But I suggest that we can't do that, whether we like it or not, because the moment we do that there's only one power in the world who could become the world power and that~~xxx~~ would be Russia. Then her great opponent would not allow this, ~~xxx~~ and that's Red China and we'd be in the start of World War III, where we would be fighting again along side of Russia, against a common enemy. I think it's much better if we'd try to get the American people to understand what we are. This is one of the reasons I suggested to the President that he in a fireside chat, if you may, talk to the American people about our commitments overseas and what they might entail. I think the average American has tremendous pride in his country and this I think could help to restore it.

CH:

Somebody suggested that there might be in fact less opposition to the war on the campuses if Nixon were to increase our commitment of men there from 500,000 to 2,000,000. Dr. Bruno Beitelheim has suggested that one of the great reasons, psychological reasons, for revolts on the campuses is psychological guilt on the part of students who know they should be drafted but in one way or another they'll get out of it. But that if you had 2,000,000 men there, that would eliminate that. Do you think there's anything to that?

GO: No, I think if ~~any~~ anything his argument should be more along Mr. Buckley's idea of a volunteer ~~group~~ group. And I speak as a former military person. I wouldn't want ~~xxx~~ a reluctant tiger behind me. And if a draftee doesn't want to be drafted, I wouldn't feel too safe with him up front, but if he's a volunteer, that's the fellow that I'd like to have alongside of me.

BREAK

BU: Senator, in the few minutes we have left, I'd like just to mention the other category that ~~xx~~ you listed as an important area of Nixon achievement, which is the Attorney General who knows the law and is disposed to enforce it. Would you comment on the southern dilemma, where every other day it seems the Attorney General or Mr. Finch or somebody is changing ~~gx~~ the integration rate in the schools in one direction or another, giving at least an impression that the law is either not settled or that the philosophy behind the law is something concerning which there are vast differences among Mr. Nixon's ~~xxxxx~~ assistants. I think that the key to your question is the inference because actually I don't think that they're doing anything outside of the law. I believe that integration is proceeding at a better rate in many places in the South than it's proceeding in the North. I've felt that

Go:

integration is as much a problem in New York City as it is say in Old Atlanta, and Old Atlanta is taking care of it. I think he's trying to apply the law in a wise way that will cause the least disruption. That's about as far as I can go on this. I haven't talked with him about it, in fact I haven't visited of the with any/critics of his seeming position. But it doesn't seem an unusual position, because he's following the laws.

BU: Do you spare yourself the ordeal of reading the editorials in the Washington Post?

GO: I read the comic section of the Washington Post.

BU: Mr. Leskase.

LE: I don't write either the editorials or the comics, but don't you think that delays in integration can provoke as much disruption as rushing integration.

GO: If there's actual delay. I'm not convinced that there is.

LE: Well, don't you (BOTH TALKING SIMULTANEOUSLY) in 1969,

GO: There's no law about bussing. I think this is a terrible mistake, trying to move people around to create a so-called proper balance. It's opposed by the blacks and the whites. And if you have a neighborhood that's all black, I don't think you should mess it up by putting whites in it. If you have one that's allwhite, I don't think you should disturb it by bringing blacks



in. In other words, this is being worked at, it's not going as fast as any of us would like to see it, but if we listen~~xx~~ to the average ~~xx~~ eastern newspaper, the only problem left in ~~xxx~~ integration is in the South. This isn't true. There's terrible problems in New York, New York City, and Chicago, and Detroit, all of the big cities have this problem.. If you want working, to see it really ~~workxxxxxx~~ get out in the hinterlands, and look at the smaller towns where they've never had these problems.

~~xxx~~ ~~xxx~~ LE: I don't ~~xxx~~ think anyone denies that the problem exists in the North as well,

GO: Yes they do.

LE: even ~~xxxxx~~ eastern newspapers. But I think that the problem, or the argument comes over speed both in the South and in the North, and where the early emphasis was on the South, and where in the South you're dealing with a smaller ~~xxxx~~ problem in most school districts, you're dealing with New York City or Chicago, it is easier, to deal with an integration plan, it is easier ~~xxx~~ for the guidelines to be followed, to be put together and put into practice, and I think also that under the Title I program there is adequate money theoretically at least to ~~xx~~ provide equal education in a situation which is not 50-50 integrated or anything

approximating that. But the Title I program is not always being followed through.

GO: Well, Mr. Finch is using it. I ~~ax~~ know a lot of districts in the South that have been denied money, and it may seem strange to you, but I was the first Congressman to ever suggest that approach.

BU: To suggest what approach, Senator?

GO: That we deny a school district money that does not follow the law. This was way, way back in 196-, I think it was '63 or '64.

BU: Having in mind the acceleration of integration.

GO: Yes, if you're gonna have it controlled Federally, you're gonna have Federal funds, you can say to these districts, do it as the law says or you won't get Federal funds.

BU: Well, isn't this what Mr. Leskase is talking about?

GO: Yes, that's ~~xxxxx~~ true. And Mr. Finch is doing this. Not only in the South but in the North, and also in the West, wherever the problem comes up. <sup>B</sup>ut the, I think that the Attorney General is following the law. What surprised me a bit, frankly, was when the critics of Mitchell raised such a howl, when he wanted to extend the equal voting rights to all the States. I can't ~~xxxx~~ agree that they have voting abuses just in the South. I think ~~xxx~~ of a County named Cook, in Illinois, that could certainly have the civil rights

bill applied to it, but they're free of it. In other words, what's good for the South seems to be bad for the rest of the country, and I think if it's good for one section it has to be good for the whole.

BU: Mr. Jones.

JO: Given the Northern situation in the cities where you're in segregated by race ~~and~~/neighborhoods. You do not approve of bussing. What would you propose? Huge educational parks?

GO: No, what they've, first of all, in New York City, I think I'd tear all the schools down and build some good ones.

BU: Throw in the city while you're at it. (LAUGHTER)

GO: What? Well, I lived in New York for a while, and I ~~think~~ was just as critical of ~~xxx~~ ~~xxx~~ their shortcomings during the depression as I am today. It's not an easy thing. Frankly, there's times I don't think New York City can be governed. But here's an expert that decided to try. I think if you provided proper facilities in which students ~~regardless~~ regardless of their race or their color, would like to go to school, that's ~~xxx~~ your first step, if this means tearing down blocks to make playgrounds, fine and dandy. I'd hate to raise a kid in New York City, with all due respect to you who have been raised up there. You don't have room to wiggle up there. Of course, I'm from a country that's got a lot of room,



and I think if you start by building good schools  
you'll entice good teachers, and you'll get the students  
interested in going to school.

BU:

very much,  
Thank you, Senator, ~~Barry Goldwater~~ and thank you,  
gentlemen of  
ladies and gentlemen, ~~of~~ the panel,

THEME

END OF PART II

END OF TAPE