

3 Sept 1965

# The Pro-Communist Purge of the PNI

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### I. Summary

a. The campaign within the PNI to purge that large political party, originally founded by Sukarno, of moderate elements reached a spectacular overt stage on August 4 with the dismissal of seven of the PNI's top figures including its second and third ranking leaders. This purge was followed by a campaign of both intimidation and appeals for support designed to secure endorsements from Party branches and affiliates that has been at least partially successful. Two weeks later, after the initial trauma had passed, a series of provincial purges began.



DOS REVIEWED 03 APR 2008 SANITIZED FOR RELEASE IN PART

PAGES 4 AND 7

b. No Objection To Declassification in Part 2010/08/30 : HIA-R JONES HOWARD  
parts of P-2E-87-314-0' already been reported by telegram, and attempts to analyze some probable future developments in the PNI and other "nationalist" parties. It also identifies the leading figures in the new group of youthful pro-Communist followers of Surachman, the crypto-Communist PNI Secretary General, who has emerged as the Party's leading force under the protection and patronage of President Sukarno.

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## II. The PNI Purge of August 4

a. A PNI Central Leadership Council (DPP) plenum meeting on August 4 expelled 7 of the Council's 31 members including some of the most prominent names in the Party.<sup>1</sup>

b. The public announcement of the PNI plenum decision based the purge of Hardi and his associates partly on specific technical grounds and partly on general charges of "false Marhaenism." In the first category, it was noted that Hadisubeno, the PNI leader in Central Java, had been suspended by an earlier plenum on May 14 but it was pointed out that Hardi and Isnaeni had nevertheless signed a letter on May 28 authorizing Hadisubeno to undertake certain Party organization activities. They were also accused of writing a letter on August 3 refusing to attend the August 4 plenum on the grounds that the principles of musjawarah and mufakat would not be observed and of demanding that an extraordinary Party Congress be convened this year (The latter strategy of calling an extraordinary Party Congress to evict Ali Sastroamidjojo from Party leadership has been underway for some time, at least since January 1965 when PNI sources in Central Java discussed anti-Ali strategy with Embassy officers (A-598)).

<sup>1</sup> See Annex for list of those purged.



c. P-2E-87-314-0 caused of being "false Marhaenists" and the repeated public instructions of Bung Karno to purge "false Marhaenists" from the PNI were cited as a fundamental reason for the ouster.

### III. Advance Signs of the Coming Purge

a. As reported earlier, a purge of the PNI has been brewing for the past six months, ever since President Sukarno's first public demand in March that "false Marhaenists" be expelled from the PNI (A-755, A-7, A-94).

b. At first it appeared that the purge might be restricted to one or two provincial leaders in Central Java and Bali (although the fate of Hardi and other Djakarta moderates was even then highly questionable), but Hardi and Osa Maliki were plainly in deep trouble in the weeks immediately before the August 4 plenum as shown by their total absence from the PNI 38th anniversary celebrations on July 25 and 26 (Mohamad Isa, the third ranking deputy after Hardi and Osa Maliki, was also absent). Their names had already ceased to be mentioned in the PNI press by early July in spite of their prominence. Reports of statements by Hardi and Osa Maliki had been reported in the PNI press for more than a month after the May 14 plenum, however, even after the May 28 letter of Hardi and Isaeni which had encouraged Hadisubeno to resume political activity.

c. The Djakarta-based moderate leaders (unlike Hadisubeno) appear to have been vacillating ever since Sukarno's March speeches, if not since the November, 1964 PNI plenum when the PNI adopted an anti-BPS stand, and they continued to vacillate both before and after the May 1965 plenum. Some of them must have been more pliable than others, however, as the purge affected only some moderates, while others, like Subamia, defected to the Ali-Surachman forces. According to the PNI statement of August 4, Hardi and Isaeni went along with the "temporary suspension" of




Hadisubeno No Objection To Declassification in Part 2010/08/30 : HIA-R JONES HOWARD  
to Hadisubeno Y 28 encouraging a resumption of  
activity P-2E-87-314-0. In an August letter by Hardi and  
Isnaeni protesting their dismissal, they do not dispute  
this point so there may well be some truth in it (The  
text of this letter was obtained by [25x1]). Probably  
Hardi and the others defended Hadisubeno orally at the  
May 14 plenum but gave in when they found themselves in a  
minority. This would allow for different interpretations  
as to whether the decision was unanimous -- in much the  
same manner as the alleged "unanimous" Soviet Communist  
Party Central Committee vote that purged the "anti-Party  
group" in 1956.

c. In any event, the moderates continued to vacillate  
as witness a statement by Osa Maliki on June 4 saying that  
retooling was necessary and in accord with the Marhaenist  
Declaration and that false Marhaenists must be purged.  
Although never quoted in direct support of purging false  
Marhaenists, even Hardi spoke publicly of the need to  
replace "bad leadership with good" and in laudatory agree-  
ment to the idea that "Marhaenism is Marxism adapted to  
the situation and conditions of Indonesia," a line pre-  
viously rejected by the moderates in the PNI a year or  
two ago. Similarly, Isnaeni, the chief editor of Suluh  
Indonesia had been willing to go along with a conversion  
of his newspaper's line to that of virtual identity with  
the PKI as far back as mid-1964 and his opportunism and  
weakness toward pro-Communist pressures are personally  
known to officers of this and other embassies in Djakarta.

#### IV. Survey of Provincial PNI Reactions

a. There was an obvious effort from the beginning  
by the PNI press to cite endorsements of the purge by PNI  
branches and affiliates but the reaction has been spotty.  
It is hard to know how much weight to give to the public  
results, in fact, in view of the sloppiness of PNI organ-  
ization and policy execution. Some PNI extreme leftists  
who had hitherto been in the forefront of the purge cam-  
paign were either quite tardy with their endorsements or



the report P-2E-87-314-0 is systematic. Furthermore, press reports or endorsements sometimes cite an individual leader and sometimes merely report a decision or alleged decision by a particular branch which may actually reflect a decision by the entire leadership or by the top official only or even be nothing more than the convenient support of a single low-ranking official.

b. The following Provincial Chairmen are those whose endorsements of the purge have been both clear and have appeared in the PNI press to date: Karna Radjasa (Djakarta Raya), Abdullah Jusuf (North Sumatra), E. Dachjar (West Java), Suradji Djojopranoto (East Java), Abdulsjukur (West Kalimantan), and Gusti Putu Merta (Bali). Except for Merta, all of these men seem to be strong supporters of Ali Sastroamidjojo and Surachman. As for Merta, he had supported the Bali PNI's sharp conflict with the PKI and Governor Sutedja earlier this year but has reportedly been cowed into conformity with Djakarta of late. His endorsement of the Hardi purge seems especially significant in view of the fact that Bali was previously the only area other than Central Java in which the regional PNI was actively opposing Communist encroachments.

c. In addition to the Provincial Chairmen mentioned above, endorsements have been claimed for several provincial PNI commands in which no names are given or where PNI leaders are identified in only a general way that obscures their exact position and authority. Many endorsements have also been claimed from smaller PNI units at the district (Kabupaten) or city level or from the branches of PNI affiliates (youth, women, etc.) at all levels.

d. The disorganized method of reporting in the PNI press, probable slanting and occasional outright falsification, and the fact that many new endorsements will continue to flow in after this report is finished make it impossible to analyze the data systematically. Clear-cut



statement P-2E-87-314-0 dual PNI leaders can probably be taken as an indication that such individuals actually do support the purge or have been intimidated to such a point that they are now committed to the Ali-Surachman leadership. Each endorsement begets new endorsements while there are naturally no public voices in support of Hardi. If a PNI official speaks out against the purge orally, his voice is not heard in the press unless and until such time as he himself is purged for his opposition.

#### V. The Lesser Purges

a. Aside from the ouster of the seven top leaders on August 4, a purge campaign has developed at lower levels. There are two facets to this campaign; first the routine "election" of left-wing leaders at regularly scheduled conferences of lower Party organs or mass organization affiliates and, secondly, direct expulsions or suspensions of accused "false Marhaenists" at special plenary meetings called for the express purpose of purging recalcitrants.

b. In the first category, "routine" changes were already made in the PNI Central Java youth and trade union organizations in the late spring which probably favored the left. Since little or nothing is known of the views and positions of such low-level figures, one cannot be categorical that these changes favored the left. The fact that PNI leaders from Djakarta such as Surachman strongly attacked false Marhaenists at such meetings and that a Presidential message demanding purges was read to the Central Java Pemuda Marhaenist conference indicates that new appointees were probably from the left, however, and this inference is strengthened somewhat by the subsequent attribution to these groups of statements favoring the purge of "false Marhaenists" in general and of the Hardi group in particular.





c. IP-2E-87-314-0 <sup>at meeting of the PNI trade union,</sup> the Kesat Marhaenis or KBM, in late July also strengthened the left although the KBM was already largely under leftist control ever since the split of the old KBKI in 1963.<sup>2</sup> The new KBM General Chairman was Bachtiar Salim Haloho, who appears to be one of Surachman's group of young pro-Communist hatchet men (The right-wing PNI source for FND 1936 claimed that a "desperate" Ali Sastroamidjojo had suffered another blow when his left-wing candidate had been defeated by Bachtiar Salim Haloho for the PNI chairmanship. The source was in error, however, as Haloho has consistently been one of the most extreme advocates of purging "false Marhaenists" in recent months and has otherwise shown himself in his numerous public speeches to be a leading hatchet man of the PNI's extreme left wing). The KBM Secretary General, also a Surachman extremist and a personal enemy of Hadisubeno (A-7), continued in this secondary office.

d. The August 4 purge of Hardi was followed first by the expulsion of four Central Java PNI figures, all of whom were close supporters of Hadisubeno and three of whom were particularly vulnerable because they had comprised the Hadisubeno delegation that confronted Ali Sastroamidjojo on March 17. They are listed in a 25x1 procured statement of defense by the Hardi faction as: Drs. F. Sutrisno (former Chairman III of the Central Java PNI), Umar Said<sup>3</sup>

<sup>2</sup> The former Minister of Labor, Ahem Erningpradja, attempted to use the KBKI, which he then controlled and which was then the official PNI union, in an unsuccessful attempt in 1963 to wrest leadership of the PNI from Ali Sastroamidjojo. Ahem was expelled from the PNI as a result. Part of the KBKI went with him while the left wing became the KBM, the new PNI union.

<sup>3</sup> His name is also spelled Oemarsaid. In an earlier document (see A-7) he was listed as Chairman III rather than Chairman IV. Which version is correct is hard to know. This sloppiness with titles is characteristic of the PNI since similar variations have been noted in the pages of Suluh Indonesia in respect to other PNI figures. In such cases, one can only wait for a consensus to develop.



(former C. No Objection To Declassification in Part 2010/08/30 : HIA-R JONES HOWARD  
(PNI lead ~~Java, and Sumatra~~ PNI leader in  
Kudus). P-2E-87-314-0 three comprised the delegation that  
confronted Ali. It is noteworthy that only two of the  
five or six top positions in the Central Java PNI leader-  
ship (DPD) under Hadisubeno have been purged thus far.  
Presumably, the national leadership finds reason to believe  
that some of these Hadisubeno supporters will soften or are  
softening under pressure and can be salvaged for the cause  
of "genuine Marhaenism" a la Bung Karno.

e. Sukarno and the PNI leadership seem prepared to  
press for conformity in Central Java with considerable  
resolution if need be, however, Suluh Indonesia reported  
on August 28 that 12 additional Hadisubeno supporters had  
been suspended from regional leadership posts in the PNI  
including the two top leaders of the Semarang PNI organi-  
zation (Gunawan Permadi and Broto Sardjono) and ten other  
leaders at the district (Kabupaten) level.

f. In West Java, the PNI was once right wing since  
this is the area that spawned Hardi and Osa Maliki. Osa  
Maliki's transfer from Bandung to the exalted position  
of Chairman II of the national PNI after the 1963 PNI  
Party Congress opened the door to new working level leader-  
ship in Bandung, however, and the present PNI leader there,  
E. Dachjar, seems to be thoroughly committed to the domin-  
ant Surachman-Ali wing of the Party. Supporters of the  
old right-wing leadership apparently remained, however,  
who were unwilling to save their positions by joining in  
a howling endorsement of the pro-Communist takeover of  
the PNI. The West Java PNI expelled one D. V. Sugilar  
as the West Java PNI First Secretary<sup>4</sup> and confirmed an

<sup>4</sup> There is a difference in terminology between the PKI and  
PNI. In the PKI, a "Secretary" at any level is top man.  
In the PNI, there are several "chairmen" at each level who  
are superior in rank to the secretaries. The number of  
chairmen at the provincial level is usually four or five  
followed by two or three secretaries. The First Chair-  
man is top man in the province and the power of a First  
Secretary seems to be less than the other chairmen al-  
though this is not absolutely clear and probably depends  
on the circumstances in each province.





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order of P-2E-87-314-0  
Jatma Ibiputra. Sugilar was also Chairman of the West Java KBM and Jatna Ibing Noorsadiputra was the KBM Secretary. They were subsequently expelled from the KBM as well. Suluh Indonesia of August 23 made it clear that the ground for their expulsion from the PNI was a refusal to sign a resolution endorsing the ouster of the Hardi group in Djakarta. The new KBM leadership elected immediately thereafter was announced in Suluh on August 24.

g. East Java followed with a purge of local leaders. The provincial level leadership in East Java had already been captured by the left-wing group in 1963 but right-wing leadership remained in some of the affiliated mass organizations and in district (Kabupaten and city) branches of the PNI itself. The East Java PNI board assembled in the mountain resort of Selecta near Malang less than a week after the President's Independence Day speech and quickly announced purges of "false Marhaenists" from some local branches and affiliates. Eleven individual PNI local leaders were expelled, apparently because of an unwillingness to endorse the purge of Hardi, Hadisubeno and the other national right-wing leaders. The East Java branch of the PNI Islamic affiliate, the Djamiatul Muslimin, was suspended as was the Surabaya branch organization of the PNI itself. This plenary session was to lead to a larger regional Party Conference at Tretes on August 28-29 which may either result in additional purges or will provide a basis for consolidation if the rest of the East Java PNI district leaders have been sufficiently cowed to acquiesce in the PNI's new look.<sup>5</sup>

h. The PNI cultural affiliate, the Lembaga Kebudayaan Nasional (LKN) or "National Culture Society," which has had

<sup>5</sup> According to Suluh Indonesia of September 1, the East Java PNI Conference at the end of August elected a new board headed by S. Moeljono. The reasons for dropping Suradji Djojopranoto as Chairman I were not given but Moeljono has been the most radical East Java spokesman of the East Java PNI as noted elsewhere in this report.



a pro-Communist membership in recent years, also expelled three members of the Djakarta Raja branch as "false Marhaenists" on August 24. One was accused of having been a supporter of Asem Erningpradja in 1963 which is indicative that even old deviations may be dredged up as grounds for dismissal in areas, such as Djakarta Raja, where the leftist control is particularly thorough and entrenched. Similarly, the Pemuda Marhaenis, the seedbed of the new Surachman clique, has even been reported to have carried out purges at the kampong level.

i. Other post-August 4 shakeups announced thus far are the separation of seven members of the GMNI (PNI university students) in Makassar, a purge of the LKN of West Java on August 27 and a purge of two subordinate PNI officials in the Subang district of East Java, also on August 27.

#### VI. The New PNI's Young Hatchet Men

a. At the PNI Congress at Purwokerto in August, 1963, Bung Karno supported Ali Sastroamidjojo behind-the-scenes but he also rather strangely demanded that the PNI develop a younger generation to take over the Party. At the time--in that far-off age before Indonesia started its last precipitous march from alleged neutralism toward a Communist or neo-Communist identity--Sukarno's words were taken to mean a slap at Ali and hopefully as a portent of support for the PNI right-wing around Hardi. Sukarno meant something else, however. The "young PNI" that he has supported and encouraged is a clique loyal to the pro-Communist Surachman and Ali is useful to it as a venerable and folksy figurehead. Surachman himself now appears to be the dominant force in the PNI with an importance at least equal to that of Ali. His rise as a public spokesman for the PNI has been especially notable since the beginning of the current year and his pro-Communist political stance is clear from his public speeches. Several Indonesian sources have claimed to know that he is a secret member of the PKI whose early career was spent in the PKI youth arm, the Pemuda Rakjat (A-843).



b. <sup>P-2E-87-314-0</sup> ~~young gang of hatched men has~~ also emerged singly into the open as the public outcry against "false Marhaenism" has developed in the period following Sukarno's lectures to the PNI cadres last March. With Surachman, they have rushed around the country speaking to PNI branches on the evils of "false Marhaenism," the need to follow the Marhaenist teachings of Bung Karno, the Marxist nature of Marhaenism, etc. and otherwise appearing in the forefront of the revolutionary struggle. They resemble very much such other professional youth leader types as Sukatno of the PKI and A.J.C. Barus of Partindo in their vituperation and their cockiness. The identities of the principal members of this rising group are:

1. Zaini Mansjur (aka - Mansur). .Mansjur is the General Chairman of the Gerakan Pemuda Marhaenis, the PNI youth group, and is also the head of the official GOI-sponsored Youth Front. He is better known than some of the other young PNI leftists and his extensive public record has been one of consistent enthusiastic cooperation with the PKI on both internal and external issues and of rabid support for the purging of moderates from the PNI.

2. Bachtiar Salim Haloho. Bachtiar Salim Haloho was promoted from Deputy Secretary General to General Chairman of the Kesatuan Buruh Marhaenis (KBM) in late July. He has been a frequent public advocate of purging false Marhaenists during the last six months and clearly appears to be a member of the youthful leftist clique that has been assembled by Surachman.

3. John Simon Tiranda. Tiranda, the Secretary General of the Gerakan Pemuda Marhaenis, is a crypto-Communist youth leader who may even be a professional Communist agent. He has led Indonesian youth delegations to Communist



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youth me P-2E-87-314-0<sup>1</sup> as the WRDY. Accompanying a youth  
delegation to the Embassy on August 9, 1964, Tiranda  
made a strong protest when he was prohibited from bring-  
ing a camera into the Embassy, and was later observed  
directing a Harian Rakjat photographer to take pictures  
of Embassy officers. He has been a leader of the verbal  
assault on "false Marhaenists" during recent months.

4. Sufyar Rasmitaputra. Chairman I (the chief  
deputy to Zaini Mansjur) of the Gerakan Pemuda Marhaenis  
and also a member of the Department of Education of Cadres  
of the national PNI Secretariat. One of the first after  
Sukarno to lash the "false Marhaenists," he has gone  
particularly far in linking the purge of "false Marhaenists"  
to preparation for entering the "socialist stage" and he  
was the author of the ominous early statement, made shortly  
after the President's April demand for purges that "the  
PNI does not need a large number of members supposing that  
the majority of those members consists of false Marhaenists."

5. Martiman. Martiman is Secretary General of  
the KBM and was long its leading spokesman. Like Haloho,  
he has consistently attacked "false Marhaenists" and his  
reported attack on Hadisubeno early this year (before  
Sukarno's March speeches) made him anathema to the PNI  
moderates. The fact that his deputy, Haloho, was jumped  
to KBM General Chairman over his head may have been  
occasioned by a belief that Haloho would be slightly more  
palatable to that large body of opportunistic or fearful  
moderates who have been nominal supporters of Hardi and  
Hadisubeno whom the PNI pro-Communist leadership undoubtedly  
hopes to separate from the more courageous anti-Communists.  
Furthermore, Martiman seems to be of much lower intellectual  
caliber than Haloho (see A-126 concerning Martiman's unin-  
telligible gibberish).

6. Bambang Kusnohadi. General Chairman of the  
GMNI, the PNI's university student affiliate and also one  
of the 31 members of the PNI's Central Leadership Council,



Kusnohadi No Objection To Declassification in Part 2010/08/30 : HIA-R JONES HOWARD  
last six P-2E-87-314-0: would identify him with the assault on "false Marhaenists" but he has long been regarded as a member of the PNI's far left wing. Kusnohadi is an official of the Department of Higher Education and Science. After Tojib Hadiwidjaja, a right-wing military officer, was removed as Minister of this Department in August, 1964, Kusnohadi was promoted to Vice Assistant Minister and issued a statement indicating his task would be to increase the amount of political indoctrination undertaken in Indonesian schools. He is also the head of the "Education and Student Affairs" Directorate of a cooperative association called "Kosgoro." The Chairman of Kosgoro, Brigadier General Isman, once cited Kusnohadi to an Embassy officer as an example of a Communist who had been taken into Kosgoro in the hope of subverting him, and in the process of developing a proper "Nasakom" image for Kosgoro. Isman, who since has become Ambassador to Cairo, was in that instance seeking to downplay the role of several Communists who had infiltrated his Murba-oriented organization.

7. Lucien Pahala Hutagaol. Hutagaol, a member of the Presidium of the GMNI, is chiefly known now for his concurrent position as Chairman of the Indoctrination Section of the PNI Secretariat. As such, he has been one of the most visible circuit riders for the attack on "false Marhaenism" and he is obviously a rising figure in the PNI.

8. Drs. Suwoso. Suwoso is Chairman III of the Gerakan Pemuda Marhaenis as well as Deputy Secretary General of the KBM and he was promoted to be Deputy Secretary General III of the national PNI on August 3. He had previously been working for Surachman in the PNI Secretariat before this last appointment, however, and he was a frequent spokesman for the PNI national leadership at regional functions.

9. Asikin. Asikin was recently appointed a Deputy Secretary General of the KBM and has made one of the most vicious speeches thus far against the Hardi-Hadisubeno faction.



peasant  
for Sura

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11. Husein Rendusara. A member of the Information and Propaganda Department of the PNI Secretariat who has been a frequent spokesman for Surachman.

12. Nursalim Rendusara. A Deputy Secretary General of the Gerakan Pemuda Marhaenis and another frequent public supporter of the purges. Presumably, he is related to Husein Rendusara.

13. Bagin. Secretary General of the PNI cultural affiliate, the LKN.

14. John Lumingkewas. An ex-youth leader who is a member of the Central Leadership Council (DPP) of the PNI. Lumingkewas has consistently been identified with pro-Communist positions and is another frequent spokesman against the Hardi group.

15. Karna Radjasa. As Ali's son-in-law, a member of the DPP and leader of the PNI organization in Djakarta Raja, Karna Radjasa consistently supports the Ali-Surachman faction and is a rising figure in the Party. He is probably not a Communist but simply a loyal follower of Ali.

c. These men and some of the recently prominent PNI spokesmen in the provinces like Tarwia Sutendy in West Java (Chairman II there) and Moeljono in East Java (Chairman III there) are far more in the public view now than most of the nominal top PNI leadership. Only Ali Sastroamidjojo and Surachman appear more in the public eye as representatives of the PNI (except possibly for Ruslan Abdulgani, whose image is more that of a government spokesman than a PNI figure).





a. Several PNI leaders who were not identified in the past with the Ali-Surachman wing of the PNI have not been purged apparently because of their willingness to participate in the removal of their former colleagues or at least to remain silent. This group is typified at the national level by Mohamad Isa (Chairman III of the PNI), Ruslan Abdulgani (Chairman IV) and Subamia (Chairman V). The latter two are still partially protected by their ministerial rank in the Government.

b. Ruslan Abdulgani is the most vulnerable of these figures on the basis of his record in the first half of 1964 when he was a leader in the early phase of the anti-Communist "Sukarnoism" movement but he has been working overtime to ingratiate himself with Sukarno and the Communists since the Lembang Conference of the PNI in November, 1964 (A-499 of January 5, 1965). He is currently the most active supporter of the purge among the three "chairmen" named above, and is otherwise trying to demonstrate his revolutionary credentials in such ways as demanding purges of neo-BPS newspapers. Ruslan stated publicly that he had taken advantage of a recent trip to Europe to explain the purge of the Hardi group to PNI leaders who are serving as Indonesian Ambassadors abroad (Manai Sophian in Moscow and Sarino Mangunpranoto in Budapest). Since a knowledgeable Indonesian source had previously told the reporting officer that Ali is trying to have Sarino recalled as a counter to Hadisubeno's moral authority in Central Java, it is likely that Ruslan's main task was to sound Sarino out on his willingness to cooperate. Sarino is a former chairman of the Central Java PNI and is perhaps the only person with the stature to rival Hadisubeno in influence among Central Java PNI cadres.

c. Subamia, on the other hand, has not publicly discussed the purge. This appears to be more the result



of a will P-2E-87-314-0. The PNI leadership to spare him from an intricate and unpleasant task than any show of courage on his part. Subamia has been very prominent as a background figure and shaker of hands at PNI ceremonial occasions thus helping to make the purge appear more legitimate and widely supported.

d. Mohamad Isa had completely disappeared from view, in a manner similar to Hardi and Osa Maliki, during the PNI anniversary celebration and he continued to be absent from public view until Suluh Indonesia carried two separate reports of his activities on August 28. One of these activities was to preside over a purge of 12 Central Java PNI secondary leaders accused of being followers of Hadisubeno, thus making this one-time moderate an open hatchet man for the pro-Communist leadership in Djakarta.

e. A contributory factor to the current positions of these men is that all three are high-ranking PNI representatives in the Government. Ruslan Abdulgani is a Coordinating Minister, Subamia is a Deputy Chairman of Parliament with the concurrent rank of minister and Mohamad Isa is the PNI representative on the Supreme Advisory Council.



f. Provincial examples are less easy to detect since one knows little or nothing of the past of most provincial spokesmen for the PNI left. There is little doubt that many former "moderates," time-servers, opportunists and cowards are also switching to the Surachman-Ali bandwagon in the provinces too, however. The endorsement of the Hardi purge by the Bali PNI leader, Merta, is one example of this phenomenon that is known.

#### VIII. Conclusions and Future Prospects

a. The right-wing of the PNI is being systematically destroyed as a coherent overt political force. The leaders

of the No Objection To Declassification in Part 2010/08/30 : HIA-R JONES HOWARD  
control P-2E-87-314-0 ty from the pro-Communist forces that  
are destroying them but such an outcome does not seem  
likely in view of the blows they have already sustained,  
the momentum of the campaign against them which portends  
their further liquidation as a political force and, most  
important of all, the fact that Sukarno himself is sup-  
porting and probably is masterminding their demise. Their  
potential for counter-attack is now being further reduced  
by the mounting, during the week after Sukarno's August 17  
speech, of a campaign to turn them into "unpersons" by  
linking the Hardi group to "subversives," "counter-revolu-  
tionaries" and "foreign imperialists." Since the threat  
of state trials of opposition elements for treason and  
subversion have become increasingly explicit in the state-  
ments of high judiciary officials as well as the leftist  
press, this kind of name-calling will no doubt be regarded  
as an ominous sign by many PNI moderates.

b. Hadisubeno's professed belief that the purges  
of his followers from their Party positions changes little  
seems either excessively naive or, more likely, is a  
measure of desperation and courage designed to inspire  
his followers to keep up their resistance and not desert  
to the enemy camp. The moderate PNI leaders are in much  
the same position as the Masjumi, PSI and Murba before  
them; they may continue to exist as individuals and even  
maintain some kind of network for furtive contacts for a  
time but the Sukarno regime will certainly not allow them  
to continue to exist as an overt organized political group.

c. Sukarno's campaign to purge the PNI has again  
demonstrated his commitment to the Communization of Indo-  
nesia under an umbrella of Nasakom verbiage. The writer  
has held during the past year and a half that Sukarno was  
gradually attempting to convert the "nationalist" and ul-  
timately the "religious" elements of Nasakom into images  
of the PKI but that he would then play off these several  
Communist-like elements against each other to maximize



his own No Objection To Declassification in Part 2010/08/30 : HIA-R JONES HOWARD  
process P-2E-87-314-0. The PNI itself as an effective force  
and may indicate that Sukarno is primarily interested  
in destroying centers of opposition to the PKI, is ultimately committed to the PKI alone and does not really care if the PNI is crippled as an organization in the process. No doubt the PNI organization and label will continue to be used to channelize non-Communist elements to the extent possible into an emasculated structure that will make them useful to the Communist cause. In any case, the main result of the purge in actual fact is to remove a legal and legitimate opposition to the PKI, especially in Central Java.

d. The odds still seem slightly greater that Sukarno is not completely beholden to the PKI but is only trying to build several Communist-like groups. However, it is also at least possible now that he has consciously selected the PKI as his intended ultimate successor and intends to destroy its opponents without caring particularly whether other new Communist-like rivals are built up as countervailing forces. This is a purely technical question from our viewpoint, however, as the political stance will be sufficiently similar whether there is one PKI under one Sukarno or three or four PKIs (whatever their names) under one Sukarno. All of this is not to say that Sukarno will automatically be successful since the natural political inclination of the country is still not Communist and the Army and other groups like the Moslems have yet to be fully harnessed. They are committed for the present to Sukarno but Sukarno has much to do yet to guarantee the transference of his full authority to another man or group of similar views after his death.

e. As for the PNI itself, the purge will ultimately increase the possibility for a merger with the Partindo Party, which was born as a dissatisfied left-wing child



of the P by Suluh P-2E-87-314-0 in an editorial of August 14. Suluh said: "The crystallization that was most tremendous in the body of the PNI/Marhaenist Front seven years ago, that is when people who were not satisfied with the PNI established Partindo (again), is now a thing of the past since last week. The suffering that entered the body of the PNI and also beyond the PNI is already beginning to vanish." Sokoguru Revolusi, another PNI paper, warned on the other hand that some groups outside the PNI were trying to encourage rash steps by the PNI and creation of differences where none exist. Sokoguru called this "excessive leftism." It seemed to fit some of the comments in the Partindo paper, Bintang Timur in regard to "false Marhaenists" in the PNI.


f. It is doubtful that such a merger will occur for some months, however, if it occurs at all, since the first task of the PNI will be to attract a middle group of opportunists and bandwagon riders from the erstwhile Hardi-Hadisubeno camp and a too-early marriage with the crypto-Communist, Baperki-dominated, Partindo might repel some people at a time when the images of Hadisubeno and Hardi are still bright within the PNI. The road of collaboration and opportunism must begin slowly so that men can rationalize each step of cowardice as necessity and each step of necessity as a demonstration of honor and true belief.

g. After this period of consolidation within the PNI, the main obstacle to merger will be the bureaucratic one of finding enough positions to satisfy both the old "Nationalist" crypto-Communists of Partindo and the new Surachman clique. This will cause some difficulty but it should not be an insurmountable problem if Bung Karno is around to manipulate the strings. To Sukarno, such a merger would serve to unite all "Nationalist" or "Nas" parties of Nasakom into one. The only other "Nas" party, the small Army-backed but Communist-infiltrated IP-KI,



could h: No Objection To Declassification in Part 2010/08/30 : HIA-R JONES HOWARD  
Chairman P-2E-87-314-0 karno stooge and fellow-traveller,  
Mrs. Aminah Hidajat and since the most openly anti-  
Communist elements were already purged by Presidential  
decision in late 1963. This would be a blow at the  
Army, of course, but a glancing blow of the sort that  
the Army has been willing to accept. It would also set  
a powerful precedent for a "simplification" and "crystal-  
lization" of the five "religious" parties.

For the Ambassador:



Mary Vance Trent  
First Secretary of Embassy





P-2E-87-314-0

I. August 4

1. Hardi

Chairman I, DPP - PNI  
(Also General Chairman  
of Gerakan Pamong Rakjat  
Marhaenis - Also Chair-  
man of the Organization  
Dept of the PNI)

2. Osa Maliki

Chairman II, DPP - PNI  
(Also Chairman I of the  
Djamiatul Muslimin Indo-  
nesia)

3. Mohamad Isnaeni

Deputy Secretary General  
DPP - PNI (Also Chief  
Editor of Suluh Indonesia)

4. Sabilal Rasjad

Member of DPP - PNI (Also  
General Chairman of the  
Djamiatul Muslimin Indo-  
nesia)

5. Mohamad Achmad

Member of DPP - PNI

6. Karim Moh. Duriat

Member of DPP - PNI (Also  
General Secretary of the  
Gerakan Pendidik Marhaenis)

7. Hadisubeno Sosrowerdojo

Member of DPP - PNI (Also  
Chairman I, DPD-PNI of  
Central Java)

II. August 7

1. Drs. F. Sutrisno

Chairman III, DPD-PNI,  
Central Java



II. At P-2E-87-314-0<sup>nt.)</sup>

2. Umar Said

Chairman IV, DPD-PNI,  
Central Java

3. Sugeng

Chairman I, DPT-PNI,  
Tjilatjap

4. Sutopo

Chairman I, DPT-PNI,  
Kudus

III. August 21 (West Java PNI)

1. D.U. Sugilar

Secretary I, DPD-PNI,  
West Java (Also Chair-  
man I, KBM of West Java)

2. Jatna Ibing Noorsadi-  
putra

Secretary, KBM of West  
Java

IV. August 22 (East Java PNI)

1. Thadji Pranoto

A PNI leader in Modjokerto

2. Moh. Hasjim

Chairman I, DPT-PNI, Sura-  
baja

3. Darmansjah

A PNI leader in Surabaya

4. Maratais Siregar

" " " " "

5. Abdullah Martak

" " " " "

6. Wisnu Wardana

" " " " "

7. A. Mutlik

" " " " Modjokerto

8. Adji Pranoto

" " " " "



IV. August 28-31, 1965 (Central Java PNI) (Cont.)

- |                   |                          |
|-------------------|--------------------------|
| 9. Soerono        | A PNI leader in Surabaya |
| 10. N. S. Gaetu   | " " " " "                |
| 11. Hadi Bin Hadi | " " " " "                |

V. August 28

12 officials of the Central Java PNI:

- |                    |                           |
|--------------------|---------------------------|
| 1. Gunawan Permadi | Chairman, PNI of Semarang |
| 2. Broto Sardjono  | Secretary, " " "          |
| 3. Sastrosuparno   | A PNI leader in Bojolali  |
| 4. Darmokusumo     | " " " " Djepara           |
| 5. Nursaid         | " " " " Wonosobo          |
| 6. Suwatio         | " " " " Purwokerto        |
| 7. Kromo Lawi      | " " " " Pekalongan        |
| 8. Sumarno         | " " " " Kebumen           |
| 9. Reksodihardjo   | " " " " Purbolinggo       |
| 10. Mahmudi        | " " " " Semarang          |
| 11. Sjamsul Bahri  | " " " " Purworedjo        |
| 12. Sastrosuwignjo | " " " " Tjilatjap         |

