

2E-78-299-8

DOS REVIEWED 03-Apr-2008: DECLASSIFIED FOR RELEASE IN FULL

LINER, M. / MAR 64 / MEA - ASH WEDNESDAY - US REACTION / BR REACTION
 ("Anglo-Amer Biffs Over Maa", World Today(Apr 64),pp.180-81.))

"Indonesia & the Phil.withheld recognition of new Federation after its establishment on 16 Sept and withdrew their Ambassadors from E.Lumpur.The Malaysian Govern.immediately severed all dip.ties with both countries.In Jak.one dramatic reaction was the burning & sacking of Br.Mab.This event produced strong US protest both in Washington & in Jak.The US Govern.also made it known that it would withdraw, at least for the time being, all new aid programmes for Ind. America's allies were notified that she did not see any purpose in convening a special meeting of EAS, at which several Govern.incl.that of Japan, had been expected to pledge abt.\$250 m.in credits to cover Ind.'s balance-of-payments deficit.The US action was reinforced by IMF's suspension of \$50 m.stand-by credit granted in July.It was indicated however that,apart from military supplies,the US would not discontinue current econ.assist.to Ind.,estimated to be running at between \$70 m.and \$80 m.*

US AND BRITISH ASSESSMENTS OF THE SITUATION

It seemed that US Govt.though angered by the happenings in Jak.felt that a compl.break with Soekarno might produce undesirable internal repercussions detri-

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mental to Am. interests. No Objection To Declassification in Full 2010/08/30 : HIA-R JONES HOWARD P
There no desire to take 2E-78-299-8 might work to a advantage of P.R. - which would let. protect from
further deterioration of ^{living} standards in Indo. On other hand it was considered impos-
sible, in the circumstances, to proceed with plans for stabilizing the Ind. econ., if only
because of the heated response expected from the Hs. of Rep. Foreign Aff. Com., which, the
previous August, had written into the Foreign Aid Authorization Bill a ban on further
econ. or military aid to Ind. without a public finding by the Pres. that such aid was vital
to US security interests.

Apart from the above measures, there was little to indicate that US Govt was considering
any radical change of policy towards Ind. There was still some expectation that, in spite
of furor over establishment of Msa, the US might, by continuing econ. asst., exercise some
restraining influence over Pres. Soekarno. It was apparently felt that the relatively
limited resources of the communist world would force him to look more than ever to the
West to provide for econ. needs. There was also the promise of Naphilindo to be ex-
ploited as a means of regional reconciliation and of furthering American interests.
It was to this end that American attention appeared to turn.

Foot note * New York Times, 25 Sept. 1963. BR VIEW: CONFIDENCE IN PS: INF U ECON AID

"The Br Gov. however, further galled by take-over of Br ec interests in Indo, no
longer placed any confidence in, or cherished hopes of, Soekarno regime. In its view
ec aid wld not only help Ind in continuing her oppes to Msa but wld also mean throwing
good money after bad; and Ind retreat in response to U.S. pressure was likely to be
no more than tactical. Br stopped what little assistance she was giving to Indo
under Col Plan & asked two Br firms working on mil projects there to withdraw their
technicians...."

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LEIPER, M. : MAR 64/ MSA - ANGLO-AMER TALKS FEB 13, 64 - AA DIFFS NARROWED
 (("Anglo-Amer Diffs over MSA", World Today(Apr 64),pp. 165-66))

"On 13 Febr. the British Prime Minister journeyed to Washington for talks with Pres. Johnson, and the joint statement issued after their discussion indicated that special consideration had been given to South East Asian matters. The Pres. reaffirmed the support of the United States for the peaceful national independence of Malaysia, while both statements expressed their sincere hope that the leaders of independent countries in the region would by mutual friendship and cooperation establish an area of prosperity and stability. The British Prime Minister afterwards declared that he was particularly pleased with the agreement reached in regards to Malaysia. During the BBC television programme Panorama on 17 Feb., he denied the existence of any Anglo-American split on the subject, while also revealing that Mr. Kennedy's visit to London had brought Britain and the United States closer together on the question.

"It appeared that the United States, possibly in association of the British military role in South East Asia and elsewhere, had become more willing to defer

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to British concern of the integrity of Malaysia. Sir Alec Douglas-Home was reported to have received assurance that U.S. support for Malaysia was in no way diminished by concern to save Soekarno from himself and from the Communists. It was not, however, particularly clear to what extent this might involve the U.S. in exercising more direct pressure on the Indonesian Government, should confrontation be reactivated. In return, the British Government agreed to look with greater favour on the concept of Malphillindo—hardly a concession in view of its immediate prospects, although its value as a facesaving device to enable Soekarno to modify his stand on Malaysia cannot be overlooked.

"For the time being, it seems that Anglo-American differences over Malaysia have been resolved. There is a temptation, however, to believe that they may only have been brushed aside. The United States, unlike Britain, is more concerned wholly with the immediate situation, is searching for a policy more generally applicable in the whole of South East Asia. While Britain has confirmed the United States of her determination to sustain the integrity of Malaysia, the U.S. Government cannot afford to adopt too rigid a posture, while some prospect remains of a regional association which would serve to stem communist advance. As the Times Washington correspondent recently argued: The U.S. sees Indonesia as an essential component with other South East Asia countries and India as a strategic counterbalance to China. The grouping could be non-aligned, but its existence is expected to prevent piecemeal Chinese expansion. The inadequacies of President Soekarno's Administration are admitted, but it is assumed not to be perpetual and meanwhile it must be suffered up to a point.

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LEIFER, MICHAEL, "ANGLO-AMERICAN DIFFERENCES OVER MALAYSIA" in THE WORLD TODAY (April 1964), pp.156-167.

Contents: General Amer & Br positions.

From Malaysia to Maphilindo incl differing A & B views of latter.

UN Determinations: Briefly summarize post-summit period.

Wash Wednesday: Summary w some analysis of differing US & Br responses and assessments -- esp. re PS & influs of econ aid.

Kennedy Mission: Amer motives & timing. Br reactions.

Johnson-Horne Talks (Feb '64): Some narrowing of A-A diffs re Msa.

EVAL. Tight summary of evolution of US-Br differences fr Summit onwards.

Sober but sketchy analysis.

REVIEWS: Br 1st Sec remark: 'a good summary of our position'.

Cf. Interview w. H.R. 18 JUN 64.

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LEIFER, M. / MAR 64/ MSA - KENNEDY TRUCE MISSION- AMER MOTIVES & TIMING
 (("Anglo-Amer Diff's Over Msa", World Today(Apr 64),pp.162-65))

TIMING: "The American decision to intervene diplomatically followed a visit by PS to PM in Manila fr 7 to 11 Jan. Ind Pres went, appar, to solicit support for intensif confron again Msa; in return, he offered assist over P ter claim to Sabah & the rerouting Indo trade tru the Ps. S received little satisfac on this score, however, & was reported to have left Manila somewhat disgruntled. Joint communique... , however, indicated he was again willing to pursue his ends thru negots; the two Press 'noted w regret tht present Mushawahrah(friendly consultat) incl only two of three signatories of Man Agrees, but expressed hope tht next Mush wld witness partic of all'. It was at this juncture tht Pres Johnson sougth to seize dip initiative. On 13 Jan it was announced in Wash tht Att Gen, Mr. RKen wld go to Tok to meet PS, who was to holiday there after a short stay in Cambod wh he visited on his way fr the Ps.

MOTIVES: "This announcement reflected growing Am.concern at the military situation in N.Borneo & a fear of conflict spreading* A letter sent by Pres.Johnson to the Ind.Pres.on 2 Jan. expressing concern at the state of aff. in N.Borneo,had had no visible impact at the time.A direct pers.approach was therefore to be made

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through a man who, tw-2E-78-299-81ously, had visited Jak. when the U.S. was seeking to mediate in the W. Irian dispute between Ind. and the Dutch. American anxieties over the likely escalation of the conflict in N. Borneo were probably aggravated by resolute statements made by the Br. Min. of Def., Mr. Peter Thorneycroft, whilst on a tour of Msa. early in Jan.; in one speech, he was reported as saying that full-scale war could result from Indonesian attacks on Sarawak and North Borneo. ** Very little perception was needed to appreciate that, if the conflict in Borneo got out of bounds, Msa. would probably make a req. for military assist. fr. Austr. and N. Zealand, both of whom were participants in the Com. Strategic Reserve in Mal. The US was bound to both Austr. and N.Z. by ANZUS Agreement of 1951 and could, therefore, find herself involved more directly in the dispute.

Footnote: * This particular question was reported as having been discussed at an unannounced meeting of the Nat. Sec. Council (N.Y.T. 14 Jan. '64)

** Daily Telegraph, 13 Jan. 1964.

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LEIFER, M. / MAR 64 / MSA - KENNEDY TRUCE MISSION- BR VIEWS; AA DIFFS
 (("Anglo -Amer Diff's over Msa", World Today(Apr 64),pp.163-65.))

Mr.Kennedy's Mission: "In Tokyo,Mr Kennedy was at pains to emph.his ltd role in the dispute & to insist tht any solution had tobe resolved & determined by the Asian countries acting alone.Pres.Sukarno was evidently most amiable with the Am. Att.-Gen. & appeared happy with this formula.The Br.Gov.,which would have liked recognition of Msa made a precondition of renewed negotiations,drew little comfort fr. what was construed as consistent Am.softness towards Sukarno.This was particularly the case when the Ind.began to adv.demands for withdrawal of Br.troops not only fr. Borneo but also from S'pore,as an integral part of any settlement - demands which seemed to find some measure of Am.support.Br.suspicious tht A.Kennedy was recreating the rold of Ellsworth Bunker,the Am.dipl.whose intervention led to Dutch withdrawal of armed infiltrators fr.N.B.Kennedy,apparently,didn't ask for this but implored Ind.Pres.to seek a solution at the conf.table,whilst making it clear that the fighting in B would have to stop bef.any meet.w.Msan rep.could be arranged.

The impression gained in L'don was tht Kennedy,like others bef.him,had become captivated by Sukarno's charm and tht the meet.signalled no hardening in Am.policy

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towards Ind. The Time No Objection To Declassification in Full 2010/08/30 : HIA-R JONES HOWARD P
necess. have interest -2E-78-299-8. off of Ind. "confr". For all tht, there wld be no re-
jection of their exist- are, which seems to reg Msa, for all its econ. vir-
tues & political sanity, as a lesser cause to supp agst larger purp .. sustaining

to Pres. Sukarno agst Ind. Communists."

British reactions: "Mr Kennedy, during his visit to L'don, made no attempt to exagger-
ate the dipl. success of his mission, though he was hopeful of its results. He said on
arrival: "I never assumed, nor did I say in any reports to the Msa Pr. Min. or any other
leaders, tht Pres. Sukarno had given up his opposition to Msa.. What he has given up is
military confr. and mil. activities agst Msa, while this confr. goes on." Mr Kennedy's rep.
was received in L'don with tepid acclaim and much misgiving. In fact, his mission, which
had been arranged without the consult. of Br. Gov., served to bring to surface points of
diff. with Am. Gov. on the whole issue of Msa. Pres. Sukarno hadnot been seen to shift his
pos. & there was no doubt, in the eyes of the Br., that mil. confr. could be turned on like a
tap, as easily as it had been turned off. Temp. concessions, which lacked substance, were
regarded as quite unsatisf. As The Econ. complained: "Above all, the quest. is how far one
has to go in paying a price to Dr Sukarno in the hope of preventing his country from
"going communist" or, under his leadership, fr forming an alliance w. China. " It seems
tht ths members of Br. Gov. with whom ~~Mr Kennedy~~ Mr Kennedy
conferred were resolute in their attitude towards Sukarno; indeed, it is reported tht
they informed the Am. Att. Gen. that Britain was prepared to go to war, if necess. to uphold
her commitments to Msa.

The gen distaste at Kennedy's mediation was intensified by continued process of
expropriation of Br investm. in Ind. concurrent w. his visit to L'don. But the most dis-
turbng feature for Anglo-Am rel. was the rep. that "in an obviously inspired whispering
campaign he (Kennedy) is being accused of all manner of devious intent". The ~~annoyant~~
significance of Kenned

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NOT REVEALED UNTIL after the

-2E-78-299-8-

Kuala Lumpur June 25, 1964

Local press giving heavy coverage to summit breakdown, accusing Sukarno of complete culpability for collapse. Straits Times correspondent in Tokyo has filed allegedly verbatim account of final summit session, quotes Sukarno as saying "A thousand times not rpt no" to acceptance of Malaysia. Editorial same paper calls Sukarno two-faced, calling for peace publicly but in private determined to crush Malaysia. Referring to agreement for Asian conciliation commission, Straits Times calls proposal vague and in light Indonesian attitudes once again revealed to world, not rpt not worth the paper it is written on; commission could only recommend one solution, Indonesian retreat, and this certain to be rejected. In spite of everything, editorial concludes, Malaysian agreement to go to summit not rpt not a mistake; it demonstrated desire for peace, showed up Indonesian chicanery and convinced Manila of Malaysia's good faith, opening the way for early reestablishment of relations. Attention of world

1st of 2 cards



For rel's

Hsa

Hsa summit

Hsa

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should now ~~x~~ No Objection To Declassification in Full 2010/08/30 : HIA-R JONES HOWARD P
and UN ~~obvio~~-2E-78-299-8 ~~or~~ such a campaign.

Malayan Times reports Tunku enroute to Bangkok to brief Thanat on summit failure and arrange pull back Tahi observer teams from Borneo. Following Bangkok stopover, Tunku will fly to Alor Star to attend funeral of sister killed in automobile accident Saturday. Tunku therefore not rpt not expected comment further on summit breakdown until he returns to capital. Malayan Times editorial labels summit "Tokyo fiasco", stating problem back precisely where it was at time of Bangkok Foreign Ministers' Conference. Sukarno's refusal to cease hostilities during six month period conciliation commission would be working largely undermines basis for commission, making joint statement essentially a hollow formality. Editorial sees utility in summit; it demonstrated to Philippines Thailand and Japan how difficult it is to deal with Sukarno. Only conclusion Malaysians can draw is necessity to prepare for next phase of confrontation.

Malay and Chinese language papers similarly emphasize role of Sukarno as "summit wrecker", predicting any future talks as likely to fail as have these so long as Indonesian attitudes remain unchanged. Malay language Berita Harian editorial:

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2nd of 2 cards

Cont from local press --- June 23, 1964

claims Tokyo was moral victory for Malaysia because it contrasted before world justice Malaysia's position with manifest injustice of Indonesia's confrontation. Chinese newspapers take essentially same line, calling Sukarno chronic troublemaker and predicting further efforts settle dispute not rpt not likely to succeed while he in command.

Afternoon Malay Mail says summit failed, as many had predicted it would, because Sukarno not rpt not really prepared to negotiate. The Tunku revealed this to world by agreeing to all Sukarno's conditions, thus calling his bluff.



For rel's

Msa

Msa Summit

Msa

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Wire service of ABC Kennedy-Tunku telecast, which first appeared Manila press evening Feb 14, sparked critical Times editorial Feb 15. Previously recorded telecast was timed, perhaps deliberately, with conclusions Macapagal-Tunku talks. Tunku spoke very critically of Indonesia, something he would not have done perhaps if interview had been recorded after he heard Macapagal plead for understanding towards another hard-talking Asian, President of Indons. As it was, Kennedy-Tunku broadcast sounded more than a little incongruous, paired as it was in headlines with successful Macapagal mediation between Sukarno-Tunku. For present would seem more appropriate and useful solidify gains made during past week, both at PinonPach and Bangkok Conference. Latter was narrowly saved from collapse caused by hard line taken by both Malaysians and Indons --- latter have no monopoly on belligerence, it appears."

1st of 2 cards

Edit concludes: "warnings of disaster in case Malaysia dispute worsens have their place, of course, but can be overdone."

Foreign Relations

Msal Phil-press Msa-press Tunku Bangkok conf



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Three countries 2E-78-299-8 concerned are not acting as irresponsible as being made to appear by some quarters. It is understanding they will be allowed settle their differences among themselves. Why nag them when they already doing their best?"

Herald edit (see following tel) also alludes to telecast, but finds "there is apparent timeliness in observations aired other night over ABC. Kennedy sounded a new warning if Indon-GB conflict touches off war it would spread. More on optimistic side Tunku talked of success recent mediation efforts; nevertheless he left it implied that Malaysia would be left no choice but to fight if war should be forced upon her."

morning press March 16 features statement attributed anonymous US official Washington to effect US prepared reassure Malaysian leaders of US support for Federation. According to report US sees no inconsistency between supporting Malaysia while keeping open communication with Sukarno. No appeasement here, statement contends, only attempt to save Sukarno from Communism and from himself. Britain might prefer tougher US approach but since Kennedy trip to London, UK leaders said to be appreciative US efforts to reason with Sukarno. Only significant divergence US-UK views said to be on implications of possible future actions.

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(Can 4 Feb 15, 64) Times Editorial
 power, US fearful of Communist takeover, Brits convinced Indo
 Army would succeed Sukarno.

2nd of 2 cards

Straits Times editorial, commenting on above statement and
 calling for UN investigation latest evidences Indo sabotage
 and infiltration, terms US policy "increasingly incomprehensible"
Fears of Malaysians are not groundless it holds and latest
 US statement issued on eve Lee Kuan Yew visit (postponed)
 raises question; "Have the Americans learned absolutely
 nothing in their years of tribulation in Asia except how to
 alarm their friends."



Foreign Relations

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Barwick to press on ANZUS April 19 '64 3 182 cards
Question: In Manila, sir, you referred to the ANZUS treaty. If Indonesia attacked Australian territory on Australia support for Malaysia, then this would automatically mean the operation of the ANZUS treaty. Would you elaborate that a bit more?

Sir Garfield Barwick: Well, I think that I could repeat very nearly what I said. I said that the treaty expressly covered attacks on Australian military personnel or aircraft or ships in the Pacific area, and I also said that both Indonesia and the Philippines had been made aware of this fact.

Question: Has American been made aware of this?

Sir Garfield Barwick: Oh, yes, America is not in doubt about this. This is not a doubtful point.

Question: It is quite clear that America feels this is so?

Foreign Relations

ANZUS

ANZUS

Australia

US-1, 182

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"Sir Garfield 2E-78-299-8. ~~Yes~~

"Question: In the event of Australian engineers in Borneo being fired on, will we invoke the ANZUS treaty? Or is it too hypothetical at this stage?

"Sir Garfield Barwick: Well, when you say fired upon this is a question, by whom and in what circumstances. I don't think this is the sort of question you can answer out of the blue.

"~~Mr~~ Question: ~~Mr~~ By Indonesians.

"Sir Garfield Barwick: Well, if you make it into an Indonesian attack on our personnel then it would fall within the treaty.

"Question: Would it be necessary specifically to invoke the treaty or would it be applied automatically?

"Sir Garfield Barwick: Well, I don't know what you mean by automatically. The treaty says that the U.S. and the other members will take action. Then you have to get down to the detail of all this. There's nothing automatic. You can have an automatic obligation and that attaches automatically, but the activi

Continued from Barwick to press on ANZUS April 19, 1964
 "Question: Can we put it another way, sir. The Australian decision to send physical forces as announced yesterday, was that communicated to U.S. before action was taken?"



"Sir Garfield Barwick: The American knew of this. Yes.

"Question: This increases the chance of American involvement than in the Malaysian situation?"

"Sir Garfield Barwick: Well, I suppose it does. This depends very much on so many imponderables we can only say that it does.

"Question: Have the Indonesian authorities been quietly told that the ANZUS treaty does operate?"

"Sir Garfield Barwick: Oh, yes, they know. You know, this

Foreign Relations

Max

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Anderson

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"Question: Is this likely to have a restraining effect on them all, sir? A the consequences which flow from the latest Malaysian/Australian statement?

"Sir Garfield Barwick: Well, I would hope so. I mean you can observe that the course that the government has followed has been one of graduated response as it were to the situation and I have maintained diplomatic conversations with the Indonesians and have pointed out progressively where this all might end up. This of course, in a diplomatic way, but diplomats are there to avoid conflict, and this I have sought to do.

2E-78-299-8

Following ~~information~~ may be used in discussing April 20⁶⁴ 1st of 2
US and Soviet announcements of reductions in fissionable
material production with host government officials and with
the public: cards

As a result of continuing studies conducted by AEC and DOD
to determine production requirements for fissionable material
to satisfy anticipated military and civilian needs, it was
determined in December 1963 that certain cutbacks could be
made and still satisfy these needs. President Johnson,
in his January 8 State of the Union message, stated that
the US would shut down four of its plutonium production
reactors and reduce U-235 production by 25 percent. In his
January 21 message to the eighteen nation disarmament conference
(NADPC) in Geneva, the President cited these reductions and
urged that the Soviets take similar steps.

In February 1963 AEC and DOD advised that the US Could make

Foreign policy

disarmament

Johnson

U.K.
US
USSR

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an additional 2E-78-299-8nd of FY 1968, of 40 percent below the
is atotal cut, production level of July 1, 1964. Discussions were undertaken
with the USSR to determine whether Soviets might be willing
take similar step. President Johnson announced April 20 the
decision to implement this cut (see statement wireless fillegen
Chairman Khrushchev simultaneously announced that the Soviet
Union is halting construction on the plutonium production
reactors, will reduce substantially U-235 production for nuclear
weapons quote in the next several years unqte, and accordingly
will allocate more fissionable material for peaceful uses.

Both the US and the USSR informed theRDC of these steps

April 21 and all participants expressed great satisfaction with
the actions taken. The same day Prime Minister Douglas Home was
reaffirmed in Parliament an earlier UK announcement made in
January that the UK has virtually halted U-235 production for
mugnum weapons and is gradually terminating military plutonium
production.

The US cutbacks will go into effect over a period of several
years. The first of the four plutonium reactors will be closed
down in July 1964 and the total reduction in plutonium

2nd of 2 cards

Continued from: Following information - - - - - April 20, 1964
production will be approximately 20 percent. The Soviets have not stated the production capacity of the reactors which were under construction so that no quantitative estimates can be made of the effect of this action on the Soviet program. Likewise, the Soviets have not stated precisely what their cutback will be in U-235 production for weapons.



Although the US has made proposals in the area of fissionable material production cutoff for many years, this is the first time that the Soviets have made any move in this direction. The US and Soviet announcements represent a coincidence of policy based on mutual interest. By bringing production into line with need US hopes to reduce tension and slow down the nuclear arms race while maintaining necessary military strength. This measure is not disarmament but it could lead to further steps eventually involving actual disarmament.

Foreign policy

disarmament Johnson

UK
HIC
USSR

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Pres Sukarno utilized two-hour speech to May Day

gathering at Sports Hall to prepare audience for May 3
 issuance of commands to crush Malaysia volunteers. ~~Malaysia~~
 President announced that he would speak to mass rally of
 volunteers on Djakarta's Merdeka Square 9 AM Sunday morning
 Djakarta time. He noted that he had promised at mass rally
 April 13 (Embtel 2134) he would issue commands to volunteers
 as soon as he received Funku's reply to his remarks. "Now,"
 he said, "it is clear what Funku's attitude is. His answer



is clear and I will give my command to volunteers May 3."

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maker" and ~~of promising~~ to turn country over to Communists.

He asserted, however, that he would not give country to anyone one group, whether nationalist, religious or Communist but to all revolutionaries whatever their label and that this conception embodied in word "Masakom." This statement and President's repetition of Masakom theme for following ten minutes accompanied by loud and steady chanting from audience, "We want Masakom!"

President then launched into long ridicule of foreign press and ~~publishing~~ magazine Whisper, which, he stated, was American magazine he had just seen, ~~Whispering~~. Magazine purportedly showed picture of Sukarno with scantily-clad

movie act;

(Continued - 1) Presiden Sukarno - May 1, 1964
had been superimposed on other picture and that this was
typical of the evil tactics of imperialists who had found
it impossible crush his politicon, crush love of Indo people
for him, or crush his solidarity with Indo people.



Tunku will be completely crushed, Sukarno said, and
Indo people, who growing more and more numerous, will crush
power of imperialists and colonialists. "Down of our victory
already visible!"

President proceeded reminisce on history of May Day
and labor movement and drew audience's attention to

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18 hr hours per day without ever seeing him. Capitalist exploitation, he said, worked people to death and only small percentage of fruits of labor given to workers. "This is capitalism," President said, and system only changed through unity and struggle of workers who opposed capitalist system. He said that socialism is one of basic principles of GHI and Indonesia one of states which will struggle to destroy capitalism, imperialism and colonialism. "If there were no capitalism, there would be no Tunku with British imperialism squatting atop him... We oppose imperialism wherever it is found and we will give aid to struggle of people of Malaya and North Borneo." He

emphasized

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(Continued - 2) President Sukarno - May 1, 1964
 that capitalism was evil and imperialism was evil, and
 reminded listeners he had recently ordered intensification
 of struggle to crush Malaysia and that he would give details
 of his commands in this regard May 1. Indo was flag bearer
 of New Emerging Forces, and giving help to people of Malaysia,
 Sarawak, Sabah, Singapore, etc. was matter of
 principle.



President then closed speech by leading audience
 in singing Internationale.

Prior to President's speech, several other speakers

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2E-78-299-85

(Continued - 3) from: Ines Sukarno utilized
 being, not carried, and one ~~REPRESENTATIVE~~ representative, in
 which proved magnetic speaker; Laila Ahen did

May 1, 1964

not. Except for Sukarno, SOMBI's Njono received
 greatest audience number acclaim. At termination of
 celebration, foreign invitees including Japanese diplomats
 and parliament members, Mexican Ambassador and Elco
 diplomats left first; then crowds and US Labor Attache,
 latter uninvited. No parades or other public demonstrations
 followed celebration.



Thailand, Gen.
 Foreign Relations
 Subd. 1
 Summary

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Subject: 2E-78-299-8 **Execution of Approved Programs.**

FOR MISSION DIRECTORS FROM BELL.

9 May 1964
As part of our continuing efforts to improve the efficiency of AID operations, I should like to direct the personal attention of Mission directors to the need for prompt execution of programs and projects.



Top management officials in this agency, both in Washington and overseas, have been placing greater emphasis this past year in improving the accuracy and reliability of judgements to undertake or not to undertake projects and programs. This emphasis has produced good results. During the coming year I believe we all can and should devote comparable attention to the speed and efficiency with which projects and programs are executed once the decision to undertake them has been made.

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Accordingly 2E-78-299-8 units for achieving prompt and effective methods and ensuring execution of approved programs and projects. Among the points to be checked are the following:

1. Each mission should have a clear cut and well defined program of monitoring implementation activities, which insures that responsibility has been placed on specific individuals for carrying through each program and project, and that significant problem areas are promptly brought to the attention of the mission director.

2. Each mission should have a clear-cut, well defined system for working with borrower grantees to insure that they are vigorously pursuing the execution of programs and projects for which they are responsible. Missions should be sure, for example, that time schedules are set for each state of the implementation process even before agreements are signed; and that any departures from such time schedules are known and followed up once the project is underway. In this connection note requirements of MGS 1242.1 and 1261.1 on capital projects and MO 1322.1 on technical assistance with respect to implementation.

2E-78-299-8

(Continued from) Subject: Prompt Execution of Approval Programs, May 9, 61
 assure that borrower grantees promptly submit disbursement requests and that such requests are processed quickly.

3. Missions should establish tight time-tables for translating loan authorizations into loan agreements in order that actual work can get underway at the earliest possible date after program decisions are taken, and so that a significant portion of program and project execution can occur within the fiscal year of approval.



4. Each mission should establish a review committee or other arrangement to insure that special attention is given to slow-moving or lagging projects. Definite time schedules and deadlines should be established to insure deobligation or cut-back of slow-moving activities in all appropriate cases.

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I request all these lines in 2E-78-299-8: few months, in order to insure maximum progress on projects in the present fiscal year and to insure that the best possible system for follow-up and execution will be fully effective throughout fiscal year 1965.

To avoid any possible misunderstanding, I want to emphasize that I am not repeat not, asking you to commit or to spend funds hastily or imprudently. I am asking you to do whatever is necessary to execute projects and programs as rapidly as possible consistent with responsible management of the foreign assistance program. I would welcome suggestions you might wish to make so that we can all benefit from your field experience.

3 Dec 1964

Tunku made statements on two important aspects foreign policy in Parliament today. (1) Regarding Chicom admission to UN, said he favored it now and had before but not if it meant expulsion of Taiwan from UN. Said that price too high to pay. Turning to establishment GRC Consulate here, Tunku said he had requested despatch of commercial representative to Kuala Lumpur in order expedite travel and trade between two countries: ~~MM~~ New consul was only that, nothing else. Opening of Consulate thus in no way implied recognition nor did it signify establishment diplomatic relations. Same facilities would not be offered Communist China, Tunku said, recalling his 1959 meeting with MCP leader Ching Peng which convinced him communists not to be trusted. No mission from Peking of any sort would be permitted he concluded.

(2) Referring to POW issue, Primin said matter still under cabinet study and outlined background of note to Djakarta via Bangkok requesting that GOI clarify status its captured ~~prisoners~~

Foreign Policy

UN

Primin

1964

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"volunteers". If ^{2E-78-299-8} reply asking investigation by international Red Cross ~~-----~~ as "state of armed conflict exists within terms of the Geneva Agreement", Tunku said, adding cabinet studying implications of this. Malaysians captured are clearly traitors and will if convicted be shot, but status Indos captured still unclear.

7 Dec 1964 Surabaya

Please inform Ambassador soonest that lightning raid against USIS took place at about 1:35 p.m. this afternoon. It is reported that about two thousand leftists groups participated and destroyed and burned a large number of books and damaged one vehicle. Situation still tense. Have been advised to stay away from premises for time being since demonstrators are still in area as soon as situation permits will make assessment of damage and report more fully. I intend to protest most virorously as soon as I can contact highest authorities here.



For Relations

US-Indo

demonstration

USIS

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2E-78-299-8

sharp price increases here past several weeks causing public complaint. Gervani women's organization demonstrated at Governor's office December 9 to demand lower prices. Pemuda Pantjasila youth group December 6 announced that since no repeat no positive action had been taken by authorities to reduce prices they would themselves under take action against speculators, including search of warehouses for hoarded commodities. Press also carrying much comment on quote mad prices. Unquote papers generally charge manipulation by traders, particularly in sugar. Communist daily Marian Harapan also blaming quote former members banned parties unquote and counter revolutionaries. Local authorities announced December nine that regional Kotoe request to central Kotoe for additional sugar supply granted and three thousand tons sugar will be shipped here soonest. According Consulate sources rice rose from two hundred to over three hundred rupiahs per kilo since mid November. Same period sugar went from 300 to 650, corn meal



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80 to 150, coffee 1,000 to 2,000. Sharp price increases also
reported in cement and textiles.

2E-78-299-8

Midan, Dec. 14, 64

Rumors impending demonstration against USIA and Consulate current here and I phoned police General Sujono early this morning to ask if anything in fact brewing. He gave me unequivocal assurances no rpt no violence will be permitted. Indicated that if any demonstration does take place it will likely be tomorrow. Noted our police guard reduced today and asked if he considers it adequate. He assured me he watching matter closely and matter well in hand. He also advised me to receive peaceful delegations. Later this morning Consulate received letters from Front Pemuda and PKI High School organization, IPPI, requesting I receive legations. I received IPPI delegation of five a. noon delegation read resolution condemning Congo rescue mission and asked that resolution be passed to Embassy. Text by pouch. Short conversation followed in which I tried explain facts Congo rescue mission. Front Pemuda requested that I receive delegation of fifteen tomorrow. I agreed received delegation of five. Police and Governor's office so informed. In light Sujono

Foreign relations

demonstrations

over
US-Indo
Sumatra

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assurances I do -2E-78-299-80 not believe we need expect any
serious trouble at this time rpt at this time.

Medan 14 Dec 64

2E-78-299-8

15 Dec 64
 Youth Front demonstration went off without incident. Police on hand in large numbers since early morning. When demonstrators appeared police in battle dress moved out with fixed bayonets to block street several hundred yards from Consulate. Police estimated crowd at 2,000. I received delegation which read front statement attacking US policy Malaysia, Viet Nam, Laos Congo and Johnson Wilson communique. Statement called for break in diplomatic relations, take over all US and Belgian property, boycott US and English films, retooling UN, and closing USIS. Text by pouch. I in turn attempted read US statement on Congo rescue mission to delegation but they unwilling listen to entire statement. Short conversation ensued in which I stressed US desire peace, friendship all nations, humanitarian nature Congo rescue mission. Demonstration broke up shortly after delegation left. Large police guard still on Consulate grounds.

Foreign relations

M8a

demonstration

Congo

US-Indo
Sumatra

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SINGAPORE, DEC. 15 (AP).-- A Royal Australian Navy minesweeper broke up what appeared to be an attempted Indonesian landing on Singapore Sunday night when it shot up two of three launches approaching this Malaysian island state.

At least one Indonesian was killed and four others were wounded when the Australian ship fired back after two of the speed boats opened fire with light automatic weapons, according to the first official report.

The third motor boat was last seen heading back toward Indonesia, the report added.

Further details were not immediately available.-AP



Foreign relations

Msa

Msa-military

*Singapore
Australia*

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Dec. 17, 1962 E-78-299-8

For are portions of general debate speech touching on Malaysian problem.

Respect for Natil sovereignty and territorial integrity all member states are ~~some~~ cornerstones UN system. Source of deep concern to NZ that charter has been openly flouted by another member state in adjacent region. Past two years has seen growth of lawless doctrine that every form pressure can be justifiable instrument of policy to bring about dismemberment and collapse another member state. Considering principles on which UN is based, there are very serious implications for all nations, particularly smaller ones, in policy of confrontation which Indo continues pursue, flaunting "crush Malaysia" label.

Real tragedy of situation is it benefits no one, least of all Indo. Confrontation embitters relations among nations, arrests urgently needed economic development, undermines stability of large part

Foreign Policy

UN Msa

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sub-continent, No Objection To Declassification in Full 2010/08/30 : HIA-R JONES HOWARD P-
who would prefer 2E-78-299-8. peace with neighbor, and creates precedent
which could threaten peace in many parts of world.

Peaceful solution in best interests all concerned. Use or threat
of force can solve nothing. Proposal for AA commission with
responsibility for reaching settlement commends itself to us;
most important, accepted by both GOM and ~~HEHE~~ GOI. Only obstacle to
further progress is failure of GOI accept condition rightly
laid down by GOM, namely: That GOI cease all acts hostility.
Such conditions places no onerous burden on Indo, prejudices no
issue, no more than any sovereign state would expect. Urge GOI
turn back from policy of armed intervention. Interests of both
parties, whole area and UN itself, We demand that Indo and
Malaysia compose
Malaysia compose differences and that Indo respect Independence
and territory Malaysia.

management -2E-78-299-81ts. Soda said ~~we~~ had already announced action to people and in interest safety of American staff, takeover team must be installed/ immediately. Lundberg pressed point and Soda said Lundberg should take it up with team which would be GIN Flexible UNGTH. As Soda made several references to safety of American staff, I asked him if he meant that GIN could not guarantee security American staff. He denied this was his meaning, then repeated that Americans must cooperate with GIN takeover team in interests their own safety. Soda also repeated several times that this not rpt not nationalization but only takeover of management function. Asked if Goodyear trade of estates now cancelled, Soda and assistants laughed heartily,

said trade is off and Goodyear ~~will own~~ ~~own~~ ~~not~~.

Soda promised send me copy GIN order at 1400 hours this afternoon. Will send text when available. FOR DEPT: Request substance be passed head offices Goodyear and US Rubber.

MECAN 1-2E-78-299-8 1945

I accompanied us ~~manager~~ manager Aleksa and Goodyear Manager Lundberg to see Minister of Plantations Seda this morning of February 26. Seda read decree signed by Subandrio which stated GOI taking over management of American estates immediately. Decree says ownership rights of American companies recognized. Seda said he would leave Indonesian management team behind to run plantations. He interpreted GOI order as not rpt not nationalization action. He said order means GOI will run American plantations under contract with American owners. Contract to be worked out later in Djakarta. On my personal and unofficial advice, Lundberg and Aleksa stated they understood order and had to accept it since it came from central government. However they wanted it understood they reserving all their legal rights and they not rpt not surrendering any interest in their property. They also stated they must refer matter to their home office and to their government for further consideration. Lundberg asked if he could continue manage his estate pending drawing up of contract between GOI and companies for

Economic
FOR POLICY
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-2E-78-299-8

Managers US estates and I met them. Take over team and Governor North Sumatra this morning at their request. They informed us that take over ceremonies, including naming of new Indonesian managers, will take place tomorrow on both US Rubber and Goodyear estates. All management authority is to be surrendered at that time to new managers.. From that time forward American personnel are to assist and advise only as requested by new managers.. American managers not xpt not to be permitted to countersign for disbursement funds. Take over team stated all marketing arrangements and financial procedures would continue as is for the time being. However telegram from Minister Plantations Seda arrived during meeting cancelling temporarily any further loading and export of US Rubber cream latex. Reason given was necessity prevent export to British or Malaysian port. US Rubber manager Aleka pointed out all his latex going to New York, but he was told immediately halt his exports regardless. This order does not affect Goodyear. Takeover team informed Goodyear Manager Lundberg that Wingfoot estate is still Goodyear

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property but No Objection To Declassification in Full 2010/08/30 : HIA-R JONES HOWARD P
Although not 2E-78-299-8, this is area of wingroot occupied by
private Indonesian firm Nipais in anticipation estate trade
which now cancelled. Take over team told Lundberg they would
let him know when to come to Djakarta to negotiate contract for
new relationship between GGI and American owners. Asked by
Aleksa how long services of American staff required, team replied
this depends on how quickly and effectively transfer of management
authority can be carried out. Take over team asked managers to
trust them and not xpt not try to exercise any kind of control as
representatives of owners. Team guaranteed security and
protection for Americans. First act of new managers to be
inventory of estates. Take over team stated fate of American
owned, Indonesian managed Kuala Gungung estate still undecided
for time being it is to be controlled by newly appointed take
over Indonesian manager of US Rubber. I understand from old
Kuala Gungung manager however that his estate sold two days ago and
is no longer American property. Will have details this trans-
action later. Aleksa informed me in passing that since February
15 about five thousand acres his estate have been planted in
banana trees by squatters who trying to establish claim to land
in this way. Local authorities have begun to react to these
incursions however and yesterday 68 persons arrived for
such III illegal planting. I will attend ceremonies marking
take over of N

No Objection To Declassification in Full 2010/08/30 : HIA-R JONES HOWARD P

1965
In Alor Star April 13, Tunku said, according to press, that Malaysia would welcome despatch of Afro-Asian troops to help defend country against aggression. Said he aware Afro-Asians did not like GOM defense treaty with UK but Malaysia had only 20,000 troops and could not protect itself. If Malaysia stood alone, surely Indonesia would crush her. "How can we discard defense treaty unless Afro-A ians send us troops and rally to our defense?", Tunku concluded.



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VIENTIANE, APR. 22. -- NORTH VIETNAM IMPLICITLY ADMITS ITS SUPPORT OF THE PATHET LAO, A LAO NEWS AGENCY REPORT DECLARED IN TODAY'S LAO PRESSE. THE ARTICLE CITED A STATEMENT MADE BY NORTH VIETNAM PRIME MINISTER PHAN VAN DONG AT OPENING CEREMONIES OF THE TENTH ANNIVERSARY OF THE BANDUNG CONFERENCE TO THE EFFECT THAT ALL NATIONAL LIBERATION MOVEMENTS IN ASIA, AFRICA, AND LATIN AMERICA HAVE THE "SPIRITUAL AND MATERIAL SUPPORT OF THE VIETNAMESE PEOPLE."

OBSERVERS IN VIENTIANE, THE ARTICLE SAID, NOTED THAT THIS ASSURANCE BY NORTH VIETNAM OF MATERIAL SUPPORT FOR SUCH MOVEMENTS IN AN "UNDENIABLE ADMISSION OF THE AID BROUGHT BY THE COMMUNIST NEIGHBOR OF LAOS TO THE PATHET LAO."

THE SAME OBSERVERS ALSO POINT OUT THAT THIS ADMISSION CONTRADICTS THE NORTH VIETNAMESE PREMIER'S STATEMENT CALLING FOR "STRICT APPLICATION OF THE GENEVA ACCORDS." LAO GOVERNMENTAL CIRCLES ARE ONLY SLIGHTLY SURPRISED AT THIS CONTRADICTION, THE ARTICLE CONTINUED, BECAUSE THEY ARE ACCUSTOMED TO THE FALSE CHARGES MADE BY THE HANOI AUTHORITIES REGARDING THE "SO-CALLED CORRECT APPLICATION OF THE GENEVA ACCORDS." THEY ARE SURPRISED, HOWEVER, THE ARTICLE

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Vietnam policy

65

CONCLUDED, THAT

PUBLICLY AND IN 12E-78-299-8

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ADMITTED ASSISTING THE PATHET LAO.

No Objection To Declassification in Full 2010/08/30 : HIA-R JONES HOWARD P-

2E-78-299-8 PG ONE

TENTH ANNIVERSARY

1965
 FOLLOWING ESSENTIAL WORDING STATEMENT ISSUED APRIL 28 BY PRESIDENT MACAPAGAL:

"TEN YEARS AGO, REPRESENTATIVES 29 AA COUNTRIES GATHERED AT BANDUNG CONSIDER PROBLEMS COMMON INTEREST. MANY THOSE COUNTRIES WERE JUST STARTING ENJOY RIGHTFUL PLACE IN FAMILY NATIONS. FULLY AWARE PROBLEMS CONFRONTING THEM, THEY ADOPTED SET PRINCIPLES AND GUIDELINES WHICH WERE FORMULATED IN FINAL COMMUNIQUE. AMONG OTHER THINGS, COMMUNIQUE REITERATED FULL SUPPORT FOR FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES SET FORTH UN CHARTER AND DECLARED COMMON DETERMINATION AA PEOPLES ALLEVIATE THEIR ECONOMIC CONDITIONS AND IMPROVE THEIR POLITICAL OUTLOOK.

"TODAY, AS WE ASSESS ACCOMPLISHMENTS THAT CONFERENCE, IT GRATIFYING NOTE THAT FROM HERE 29 COUNTRIES MEMBERSHIP HAS GROWN TO MORE THAN 60, (GARBLED PORTION WILL SERVICE ON REQUEST) NUMBER NOT ONLY IN SHAPING DESTINY AA AREA BUT ALSO IN FOCUSING ATTENTION TO ITS PROBLEMS IN RELATION TO WORLD AS WHOLE. THIS IS ONE POSITIVE ACHIEVEMENT BANDUNG CONFERENCE.

For notes



10th Bandung Philippines

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"THUS, CONFER

UNDERSTANDING2E-78-299-8 EAST AND WEST. HOWEVER, TASK THAT MEMBERS
HAVE ASSUMED UPON THEMSELVES TO DISCHARGE IS FAR FROM COMPLETE.
INTERNATIONAL PEACE HAS YET TO BE ATTAINED. ISTUATIONS NOW
EXIST IN CERTAIN AREAS THAT ARE CLEAR AND PRESENT THREAT TO
WORLD STABILITY.

XX

"PHILS, AS ONE OF 29 ORIGINAL MEMBERS BUANDUNG CONFERENCE,
HOPES THAT 10TH ANNIVERSARY THAT HISTORIC EVENT WILL BE OCCASION
FOR ALL AA PEOPLES REDEDICATE THEMSELVES TO TASK CEMENTING BASES
OF GENUINE DEMOCRACY IN WHICH RIGHTS AND FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS
ALL MEN WILL BE RESPECTED.

APRIL 31 12E-78-299-8

MINFONAFF RELEASED AT 5:30 PM TODAY FOLLOWING STATEMENT CONCERNING WITHDRAWAL FOMMIN THANAT KHOMAN FROM BANDUNG ANNIVERSARY CELEBRATIONS:

1st of 2

"THE GOVERNMENT OF INDONESIA INVITED GOVERNMENT OF THAILAND, AS PARTICIPANT IN FIRST ASIAN AFRICAN CONFERENCE WHICH WAS HELD AT BANDUNG IN 1955, TO JOIN IN THE COMMEMORATION OF THE TENTH ANNIVERSARY OF THE SAID CONFERENCE.

"AS A GESTURE OF FRIENDSHIP AND HIGH ESTEEM TOWARDS INDONESIA, THE HOST COUNTRY, AND TO RE-AFFIRM ITS FAITH IN AND ADHERENCE TO THE PRINCIPLES AND SPIRIT OF BANDUNG THE GOVERNMENT OF THAILAND DECIDED TO SEND A HIGH-LEVEL DELEGATION HEADED BY FOREIGN MINISTER THANAT KHOMAN TO ATTEND THE ABOVE-MENTIONED COMMEMORATIVE CELEBRATIONS.



"HOWEVER, WHEN THE ACTUAL CELEBRATIONS TOOK PLACE, THE DELEGATIONS OF COMMUNIST COUNTRIES AND THOSE WHO SUPPORTED THEM CONNIVED TO MISUSE THE COMMEMORATIVE CEREMONIES TO THEIR ADVANTAGE BY RAISING THE QUESTION OF VIETNAM AND BY ATTEMPTING

For policy

10th Bandung

Thailand

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TO WIN APPRO 2E-78-299-8 AIR POLICY OF AGGRESSION AND FORCEFUL
EXPANSIONISM ~~REPUBLIC~~ THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM, WHICH AMOUNTS
TO NO LESS THAN EXTENDING A REGIME OF COLONIALISM TO BE
EXERCISED BY COMMUNIST NORTH VIETNAM OVER SOUTH VIETNAM.
IF SUCH A POLICY WERE TO BE IMPLEMENTED, IT WOULD BE IN
FLAGRANT CONTRADICTION WITH THE STATE PRINCIPLES AND SPIRIT
OF THE BANDUNG DECLARATION.

IN THE ACTUAL PROCEEDINGS, IT MUST BE NOTED WITH DEEP
REGRET THAT WHILE THE DELEGATE OF COMMUNIST NORTH VIETNAM
WAS GIVEN FULL OPPORTUNITY TO EXPOUND HIS VARIOUS
VIEWPOINTS, OTHER DELEGATES INCLUDING THAT OF THAILAND WERE
DENIED EQUAL OPPORTUNITY TO PRESENT THE VIEWS OF THEIR
GOVERNMENTS WHICH ARE IN DIRECT OPPOSITION TO THOSE
EXPRESSED BY COMMUNIST DELEGATES AND THEIR SUPPORTERS.
THIS STRATAGEM APPEARED DESIGNED TO GIVE THE IMPRESSION TO
THE OUTSIDE WORLD THAT ALL THE DELEGATES PRESENT AT THE
MEETING, IF ANYTHING, HAD GIVEN THEIR TACIT ENDORSEMENT TO
THE VIEWS AS PRESENTED BY THE NORTH VIETNAMESE DELEGATE.

"THE THAI DELEGATION, AND INDEED THE THAI GOVERNMENT, CANNOT
SUBSCRIBE TO THE VIEWS EXPOUNDED BY THE NORTH VIETNAMESE
DELEGATE, STILL LESS TO THE POLICY AND ACTS OF AGGRESSION,
TERRORISM AND IMPERIALISTIC EXPANSION COMMITTED BY COMMUNIST
NORTH VIETNAM AGAINST ITS NEIGHBOR, THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM,
WHICH ARE CONTRARY NOT ONLY TO THE TERMS AND SPIRIT OF THE
~~DECLARATION~~

2E-78-299-8

Continued from: A

of ~~IN THE ACTUAL PROCEEDINGS, IT MUST BE NOTES WITH DEEP~~ 2nd of 2

THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS AND TO THE INTERNATIONAL LAW AND NORMS AS RECOGNIZED AND OBSERVED BY CIVILIZED NATIONS. ON THE CONTRARY, THE THAI GOVERNMENT RECOGNIZES THE RIGHT OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM TO DEFEND ITSELF AND TO ASK FRIENDLY AND TRUSTWORTHY NATIONS TO HELP IN RESISTING AND REPELLING THE AGGRESSORS. FURTHERMORE, THE THAI GOVERNMENT FIRMLY HOLDS THAT THE FREEDOM AND INDEPENDENCE OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM ARE ESSENTIAL, EVEN VITAL, NOT ONLY TO THAILAND'S OWN FREEDOM BUT TO THAT OF OTHER FREE NATIONS AS WELL.

BANDUNG DECLARATION

"LIKEWISE THE THAI GOVERNMENT AND NATION CANNOT SUPPORT THE POLICY OF "CRUSH MALAYSIA" SINCE MALAYSIA IS A FRIENDLY NEIGHBOR OF THAILAND AND MANY OTHER ASIAN NATIONS.

"FOR THESE AND OTHER REASONS, THE THAI DELEGATION COULD NOT ACCEPT TO BE BOUND, TACITLY OR EVEN BY IMPLICATIONS, BY WHAT HAD BEEN SAID UNILATERALLY AND EXCLUSIVELY BY CERTAIN DELEGATES

For policy

1st Bandung
Thana

Thailand

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WITHOUT PROPER
THESE VIEWS TO

2E-78-299-8

THEIR OPPOSING OPINIONS, IT, THEREFORE,
DECIDED TO WITHDRAW ITS PARTICIPATION IN ALL FUNCTIONS AS
FROM THE AFTERNOON OF SUNDAY, APRIL 18."

2E-78-299-8

INTERVIEWED BY _____ UPON HIS DEPARTURE FOR KOREA APRIL 26, 1965
 TUNKU REPORTEDLY SAID FOLLOWING:

1. HE HOPING AND PRAYING SUKARNO WILL DECIDE GO TOKYO "SO WE CAN TALK PEACE," BUT NOT "CONFIDENT" THAT TALKS WOULD NECESSARILY BE SUCCESSFUL. WHEN ASKED IF HE INSISTING ON CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES, TUNKU REPLIED IN NEGATIVE AND REPORTEDLY SAID THAT NATURALLY WHEN TALKS HELD EVERYBODY WOULD EXPECT HOSTILITIES TO CEASE TO SHOW INDO SINCERITY. TUNKU SAID HE PREPARED WAIT IN TOKYO FOR SUKARNO "ANY REASONABLE TIME, BUT NOTED HE SCHEDULED ATTEND COMMONWEALTH PM'S CONFERENCE THIS SUMMER. IF THIS INTERFERED WITH HIS MEETING SUKARNO AT THIS TIME, HE SAID, HE PREPARED MEET HIM AT LATER DATE.

2. THE "LULL" IN FIGHTING ALONG BORDER IN BORNEO "HOPEFUL SIGN."

3. WITH REFERENCE TO DJAKARTA PRESS REPORTS, TUNKU SAID IT "MISCHIEVOUS BIG LIE" THAT MALAYSIA ABOUT TO ESTABLISH DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH ISRAEL. TUNKU DESCRIBED THESE REPORTS AS INDO

For. rel's Hlaa



Tunku
 H. A. - summit's

Msa

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EFFORT TO CRE
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KNOW," TUNKU 2E-78-299-8 SAYING, "WE HAVE NO INTENTION OF SETTING UP
DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH ISRAEL OR HAVING ANYTHING TO DO WITH HER."

4. PHILIPPINES BEING EXCLUDED FROM PROPOSED TOKYO TALKS BECAUSE
"THIS IS QUARREL BETWEEN INDONESIA AND OURSELVES."

2E-78-299-8

April 28, 1965

General Mokoog Inta installed this morning as Mandala Roman One Commander for Sumatra. During ceremony, Air Force Minister Dani referred to Malaysian offer direct discussion between Tunku and Sukarno in Tokyo. While stressing need for continued readiness in face imperialist threats Dani stated possibility exists for talks which could lead to peaceful settlement. He did not assert as usual that Malaysia must be crushed. Dani specifically mentioned American imperialism as threat to Indos, state "American imperialists now wildly bombing people in North Vietnam." Dani stressed need for gotong rojong cooperation among armed forces and between people and armed forces, repeatedly referred to Pantjasila as basis of state, said the NASAKOM comes from Pantjasila. Dani spoke in his capacity as chief-of-staff for Mandala command. Ceremony completed with military parade and fly past by jets and propeller aircraft.



For rel's
Military

M.P.A.

How rel's
One Dani

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4/4/65
Headlines April 28 recount details of new Indo attack in Sarawak, reported to be biggest in last nine months. Operating in company strength with heavy mortars and mm machineguns, according to press accounts, Indonesian regular troops attacked hilltop position held by British paratroops well within third division near Balai Ringin, suffered casualties of 4 four dead, one wounded, British paratroop casualties one dead, five wounded.

Box item next to Straits Times account reports Dep Primin Razak's reaction. He quoted as saying latest Indo incursion would not rpt not affect chances for peace talks with Sukarno.



*Military
For. rel's*

Msa

*Msa - mil
Msa - summit*

Sarawak

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2E-78-299-8

MEDAN 5 MAY 1965

All Sumatra General Mokoginta recently broadcast order of day stressing need for unity and ordering halt to all conflicts and quote "phobias" unquote within community. Order of day addressed to civilian population as well as to Military. Mokoginta stated new Mandala command is amalgamation all National revolutionary forces, both Military and civilian. Provincial military commander General Darjatno in separate speech on anniversary seventh infantry brigade stated that Indonesian army is Nasakom army, He observed that army consists of Nationalist elements, religious elements and communist elements and is thus based on Nasakom with antjasila as its ideology



Military
Pol Parties

PKI

Sumatra

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2E-78-299-8

5 MAY 1965

Bourguiba in interview Newsweek just carried AFP says:
 Numerous countries see only American aircraft in the
 sky in Vietnam and not the subversion on the ground. Fact
 of matter is that legally constituted government in
 South Vietnam asked for American Aid because there are
 people in Vietnam who do not want to see Communism
 installed in their country. I have always found it
 curious that the US, which has aided so many new nations
 to attain their independence, should be treated as
 imperialist. Where would a country like Indonesia,
 for example, be without the support it received from
 the US in its struggle for independence?

Vietnam
Policy

Arab

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-2E-78-299-8

*Kuala Lumpur**1965*

Press reports Jan. 10¹⁹⁶⁵ speech by Tun Razak at Kuantan, in which he announced plan for selective arming of vigilantes in remote coastal areas as soon as arms available. Said GOM intends give arms training to 40,000 men in local defense corps, and announced national defense fund (now totaling two million Malaysian dollars) would be used purchase "patrol boats and planes."

Queried on hot pursuit doctrine, Razak reportedly replied "although we have right to pursue enemy into its territory under UN Charter, we have to think of strategy and consequences of such a move. It is easy to make war but think of the consequences and suffering it may bring to the people and the country."

Foreign rel's
Military

HSA*Tuen Kee**Malaysia*

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12/8/2
 Attorney General's recent discussion at Chequers carried by all London papers but in secondary position because of African news. No editorials. 27 Jan '64



Daily Mail says "There is still a wide gap between Britain and Americans over whether President Sukarno can be trusted to keep any pledge..." Mail also has snide cartoon showing President Johnson talking on phone to Attorney General saying "I'm glad Sukarno has found our weapons and guerrilla training useful to his boys in Borneo, and...give those British hell about these buses for Castro..."

Times says British have welcomed first results of Attorney General's visit to South East Asia, but officials seemed inclined to await both the realization of cease fire and more detailed information reconference before looking further.

Guardian has general story sketching Attorney General's visit

For. Rel's Msa

Bob Kennedy

US - Indo
 U.K.

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and says "It is by Mr. Kennedy **is a lasting settlement to be reached.**"

Express headline says "Sir Alec unconvinced. British Ministers furious over Indonesia, as Kennedy hears straight talking."

Paper says U.K. made plain her doubts that any settlement could be achieved with Indonesia. Express says ministers questioned the outcome of the conference he managed to arrange, on the grounds that Sukarno is likely to use it as a means of forcing unfair concessions from Malaysia.

Telegraph has general story but in column "London day by day" reporting Chequers talks says "But with British forces now so widely deployed Mr. Kennedy could scarcely fail to hint to Sir Alec that a settlement in the Far East could not come too soon."

Herald story also expresses British fears "About what happens next" saying "They fear that the price Sukarno may demand to sit down at a table and talk about a lasting settlement will be too high for Malaysia to accept."

Mirror says "Malaysia cannot make any concessions to Sukarno at conference because guerrilla war in North Borneo is purely and simply a case of Indonesian aggression."

2E-78-299-8

Jan. 27, 64 (Cont-1)

2nd of 2 cards

Times also carried report that HHS had asked Attorney General for U.S. assistance in Cyprus peace keeping, with an article datelined Washington speculating that similar request by U.K. Embassy must have implied suggestion that U.S. provide troops.



For. rel's

Msa

Bob Kennedy

US. Indc
U.K.

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GRANT, B. FEB 64// MSA - AUSTRALIAN POL: POST-SUMMIT I : HARDENING LINE
((Indonesia (Melbourne Univ Press, Melbourne, 1964), pp.164-165.

1. 14 JUL MENZIES reaction to PS 10 JUL renewal of confrontations:

Returning fr London, MENZIES to press re Aus defense commitments:

'Now that Msa becomes a fact, the time arises when we have to determine what we are prepared to do.' He was criticized by SUBAN for 'provocation'.

2. 26 AUG SUBAN to SHANN: Suban advised Shann after a meeting on 26 Aug that Indo was interested in implementing the Manila agreements & the Minister made a press statement in wh he sd he understood Aus gov 'wants to help seek the best sol to Msa issue'.

3. 12 SEP BARNICK VISIT TO DJAKARTA:

Sir Robert Menzies, returning from London, stated at a press conference, in relation to Australia's defense commitments: 'Now that Malaysia becomes a fact, the time arises when we have to determine what we are prepared to do.' He was critised by Subandrio for 'provocation'. The summit meeting in Manila was held, the three leaders adopting the Haphilinde declaration, but Indonesia did not drop confrontat ion. Subandrio advised Shann after a meeting on 26 August that Indonesia was in-

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2E-78-299-8
But when Barwick v-
the Malaysia Day celebrations on the 16th, he gave the clear impression that Canberra
was no longer interested in 'solutions'. During his visit the results of the United
Nations' ascertainment - an effective clean bill of health for Malaysia - became
known. Barwick told the Indonesian leaders that Australia would choose Malaysia in the
event of a choice being forced by Indonesia. (He also apparently knew, or strongly sus-
pected, that an Australian election was pending; he made it clear to Indonesian leaders
that any Australian government which tried to do more than his had done to accommodate
Indonesia's point of view would risk defeat at the polls.) The delinency that Barwick
had shown in Manila was not now in evidence. He spoke bluntly, even critically, to Su-
karno and Subandrio. On leaving Djakarta he told a press conference that he had made
clear to Indonesian leaders 'the possible repercussions upon Australian opinion of con-
tinued Indonesian intervention in the affairs of neighbours'.

On 25 September, Menzies made a 'definitive' statement to Parliament on Malaysia,
which included the following key sentence:

If, in the circumstances that now exist, that may go on for a long time, there
occurs, in relation to Malaysia or any of its constituent States, armed invasion
or subversive activity - supported or directed or inspired from outside Malaysia -
we shall to the best of our powers and by such means as shall be agreed upon with
the Government of Malaysia and the United Kingdom in the defence of Malaysia's
territorial integrity and political independence.

Foreign affairs and defence, with emphasis on Australia's 'grave responsibilities' in
South-east Asia, were the central themes in the Menzies government's campaign for the
precipitately-called elections of 30 November 1963. It won an unmistakable vote of
confidence.

-2E-78-299-8



GRANT, B; FEB 64 // MSA - AUSTRALIAN POL: CAUTIOUS SUPPORT OF MSA - JAN/MAR 68
 ((Indonesia, (Melbourne Univ Press, Melbourne, 1964), pp.162b-163b))
 Popular suspicion of Indo; Tange Wash mission; consultations in Canberra; cautious
 mil support for Msa; setting for Barwick Eafe initiative at mediation.

Australian opinion had been generally favourable to Malaysia from its beginnings
 in 1961. This had been encouraged during 1962 by Indonesia's apparent lack of com-
 com. By the end of the year, however, the Brunei revolt had opened up a possibility
 of active Indonesian opposition and the Australian government was faced with the
 prospect of trying to maintain friendships in the opposing camps. Popular suspicion
 of Indonesia was revived, which was not comfortable for a government with a working
 majority in the House of Representatives of only one. After the holiday period had
 been properly observed, Australian diplomacy began to apply itself to preventing a
 clash. On 14 February 1963, the secretary of the External Affairs Department, Sir
 Arthur Tange, went to Washington, without official explanation, but with the ge-
 nerally understood purpose of seeking U.S. diplomatic help in restraining Indone-
 sia. President Kennedy made a declaration of American support for Malaysia, hither-
 to assumed. After Tange's return to Australia, a series of conferences took place

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in Canberra attended 2E-78-299-8 of the Imperial General Staff (Sir Richard Hull) who flew out from London, and the British commissioner-general for South-east Asia (Lord Salkirk) from Singapore. Australian diplomats were recalled from Asia.

The high commissioner in Kuala Lumpur (Mr. T.K. Critchley), well-known and liked by Indonesian leaders in Djakarta for his role as Indonesian nominee on the United Nations' Good Offices Committee, stopped at Djakarta for informal talks with Sukarno and Subandrio on his way to Canberra.

Compared with definite British military commitments on Malaysia, Australian statements at this time were cautious. On 28 February, the government announced that Australian forces would remain in Malaya after the scheduled Malaysian birthday of 31 August but when the Malaysian prime minister, Tunku Abdul Rahman, announced on 10 March in Malacca (where the Commonwealth brigade is stationed) that the British and Australian governments have pledged to support us in the event of war resulting directly from Indonesia's policy of confrontation toward Malaysia' he was forced to make a hasty apology. He claimed to have said only: 'Australia is a member of the Commonwealth and has openly said that she supports Malaysia. She too would rally to our help.'

2E-78-299-8

Apr. 17 '64 / Msa-ANZUS TREATY - AUSTRALIAN VIEW OF US OBLIGATIONS

((Aus For Minexstaff Barwick : AE Rpt of his press conf.))

CANBERRA - Barwick to press upon arrival at Sidney Apr 17 after ~~XXXXXX~~ Manila SEATO meetings: B said ANZUS treaty expressly covered attacks on Australian mil. personnel, aircraft and ships in Pacific area, including Borneo and treaty would be invoked as a matter of course. Indo. attacks on Aus. personnel would "fall within the treaty". / Asked if other members could take action automatically, B replied: "There is nothing automatic although you can have an automatic obligation" B. said Indo and Phil aware of ANZUS coverage and "Amer is not in doubt about it" Added US had knowledge prior to official announcement that Australia planned send more troops to Msa. // Sydney Morning Herald continued its report: "The Aus step probably could increase the chances of greater Amer involvement. When I saw Dr. Sukarno last Sep. this was made plain, B said. Sukarno said he knew he would be opposed by the British and by us and by the Amer. This is not a case in which Indo did not know." // Aust had warned Indo that Aus participation Msa crisis would increase, B said. We have tried to make that very plain to Indo at diplomatic level in the hope that it will deter it from a very dangerous course."

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2E-78-299-8

GRANT, B. FE 64 // NSA -- AUSTRALIAN MEDIATION: BARWICK AT MAR 63 ESCAPE MEETING
 ((Indonesia (Melbourne Univ Press, Melbourne, 1964). pp.163-164;

Sir Garfield Barwick used the occasion of the Escape meeting in Manila in March to introduce, in a series of private discussions with Subandrio, the proposition that Australia could help Indonesia - if it were interested - to satisfy its hunger over Malaysia. These talks were a delicate exercise in diplomacy. They were not recorded; Subandrio was alone and Barwick was accompanied by the Australian Ambassador in Djakarta (Mr. K.C.O. Shann). It is unlikely that a full version of the discussions will ever be available, although they represent an important event, backed as they were in Manila by Australia's application for regional membership of Esafe, in the development of a more confident attitude by Australia toward its role in South-East Asia. In effect, Barwick took up a suggestion by the president of the Philippines (Mr. Macapagal) for a meeting between Malaya, Indonesia and the Philippines, on the assumption that the Indonesian government would be prepared to accept an appearance of consultation of this kind to enable it to 'get off the hook' on Malaysia, the hook being its support for the Brunei rebels and loss of face in not being consulted by Kuala Lumpur. Australia was undertaking, on the assumption of

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GRANT, B. FE 64 // MSA -- AUSTRALIAN MEDIATION: BARWICK AT MAR 63 ESCAPE MEETING
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its good relations in 2E-78-299-8W, to bring Malaya to the party, despite British opposition. Subandrio's job was to convince Sukarno. Warwick's performance at Manila impressed diplomats, including the British, who were not happy about its intention.

GGP subversion 2E-78-299-8ms. Under Manila such consultation necessary." According article he "revealed that up to now USA has not received official confirmation of GDI-GDI acceptance cease-fire agreement."

Regarding Phil Sabah claim "Lopez warned no definite agreement had been reached in Cambodia. He stressed following problems must be met before acceptable solution shall be reached. (1) GGP will submit memo to GDI outlining legal basis claim; (2) Tanju will refer matter to people and officials in Borneo; (3) GDI will accept consular jurisdiction ICI."

Elsewhere in press Herald edit titled "summit success hinges on H-Suharno talks" states "that Suharno will agree to holding new summit is of course foregone conclusion. Indication by Tanju that he would go to summit without preconditions makes new summit a virtual certainty. Problem will be in bringing about reconciliation between two leaders at conference. No sense going to summit if some assurances possible success not first obtained; this where forthcoming Macapagal-Suharno talks come in to serve vital purpose. Macapagal understood to be carrying to Suharno three point formula, which Tanju had agreed consider; (1) GGP-GDI agree welcome Malaysia; (2) GDI agrees hold plebiscite in Sabah and Sarawak; (3)

2E-78-299-8

Bulletin Feb 2E-78-299-8, account Fenses Lopez revelations during Feb 14 press conference: "second Bangkok tripartite Ministerial Conf scheduled for Feb 25 dependant on continued observance ceasefire. Arrangements on enforcing ceasefire now in effect, only question of disengagement remains to be settled. Formula on disengagement has been referred to GCI-GM govts, word expected within few days. Truce has to be fortified and this necessarily involves on Macapagal, as mediator, to hold early talks with Sukarno. It not merely appropriate but necessary for Macapagal to meet with other Hapilindo member after meeting with Tanke."

1st of 2 cards

There had been no prior consultation on ministerial level with Indones regarding GCI-GM move establish Consular offices. Macapagals Djakarta trip will enable him workwarth with Sukarno re this move."

More provocative Monday account, apparently based same press conf. quotes Lopez as stating: "GCI must first consult GCI before

Foreign Rel's

Msa



Phil claim! Macapagal Bangkok conf! Phil.

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2E-78-299-8

2nd of 2 cards

Continued from: Bulletin Feb 15, 64

On question "shambles" Phil efforts mediate US-RKE dispute, Bureau account of Feb 14 (Refembtel, NUTAL), complemented by substantially similar AP (Hartmanbeusch) account carried Bulletin and Monday this morning.

According all papers Macapagal will report tonight to congressional leaders on his talks in Phnom Penh.



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2E-78-299-8

Tunku began ~~was~~ ⁶⁴ touring with two speeches heavily attended in near-by rural constituencies March 14. Following of interest as probably "tone setters" alliance campaign: (according press accounts of speeches)



1. Re Indonesia Tunku stated alliance was only party which could safeguard sovereignty integrity country against Indo expansionism. He had gone Manila Tikyo "in search peace" but experience had shown "Sukarno does not want peace. He is jealous of Malaysians prosperity and high standard living and therefore wants crush us." Tunku quoted, "I do not want to see him again." He asked "All citizens Malays Indians Chinese give full support call for volunteers." Though Malaysia had "firm" friends, "We will need full support people."

2. Tunku said opposition interested only in gaining seats. Did not care for people. Had no "concrete" policy. Had done nothing in Parliament further wishes of electorate. Had

Foreign Relations

11sa ↑

Msa elections ↓ Tunku ↓

Malaysia

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No Objection To Declassification in Full 2010/08/30 : HIA-R JONES HOWARD P-
voiced fee charged so 2E-78-299-8 cont with wanting bring country under
control Indonesia. "If Indonesia ever took over Malaysia people
would suffer greater hardships than under Japanese."

3. Referring to "Mr. Lee Kuan Yew's party," Tunku stated,
"Party not so strong really. Pap had supported Malaysia and
fought hard for Singapore's entry into Malaysia and that why
it was so successful." Tunku quoted further, "Pap wants teach
us what is good for us and what is bad. What Pap really wants
is to displace MCA." Tunku declared, "They say they want
join UMNO but we don't want them" (Press reported this greeted

With large cheers by audience). UMNO would - - - "Solidity"
by MCA with whom it had worked "so harmoniously" to bring
about "Peace, prosperity and unity among people."

Tunku accompanied by alliance candidates who will stand
in constituencies. Press reported Tunku "was full of cheer
and looked picture of fitness."

-2E-78-299-8

(CONTINUING FROM PREVIOUS PAGE) (NOT FOR PUBLICATION)

XXX-6 (FOR S.E. ASIA POSTS) (130)

8 April 1964

(FYI ONLY, EXCERPTS, WASHINGTON STAR ARTICLE BY AP, APRIL 8,
HEADED: MALAYSIA SAYS IT CONSIDERS BORNEO CEASE FIRE AT END).

KUALA LUMPUR, -- MALAYSIA'S PRIME MINISTER SAID TODAY HE
CONSIDERS THE CEASE FIRE WITH INDONESIA AT AN END THE GOVERNMENT
TELEVISION STATION REPORTED.

TUNKU ADBUL RAHMAN SAID BRITISH AND MALAYSIAN TROOPS IN
MALAYSIA'S BORNEO TERRITORIES WOULD STRIKE ACROSS THE BORDER
INTO INDONESIAN BORNEO IN CASE OF ANY LARGE-SCALE CONFLICT...

For
Military

Msa



Msa-mil

Msa

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MR. RAHMAN I

No Objection To Declassification in Full 2010/08/30 : HIA-R JONES HOWARD P

-2E-78-299-8

BORDER CLASHES IN THE LAST WEEK IN WHICH MALAYSIAN SECURITY
FORCES CLAIMED SIX GUERRILLAS WERE KILLED...

THE FOREIGN MINISTRY SAID IT IS GIVING COMPREHENSIVE REPORTS
TO U.N. SECRETARY GENERAL U THANT ON THE BORNEO SITUATION AND
ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF THE CEASE FIRE AND BORDER. MR. THANT
HAS EXPRESSED CONCERN OVER THE SITUATION BUT THE U.N. HAS
SHOWN LITTEL INTERST IN BECOMING DIRECTLY INVOLVED.

(END FS MATERIAL NOT FOR PUBLICATION). ITEM

4/8/64 RB

No Objection To Declassification in Full 2010/08/30 : HIA-R JONES HOWARD P

2E 78 299 8

2E-78-299-8

Prime Minister ~~Malaya~~ press conference on return from SEATO meeting and tour SEA countries published on April 27 '64. Conference said to have attracted more newsmen than any Prime Minister Holyoake has given.

1st of 2
cards



1. Visit Indonesia: According Wellington Dominion Prime Minister commented that invitation to Pres Sukarno to visit New Zealand extended in 1955 and 1959 and he had simply renewed invitation. Although did not expect President Sukarno come New Zealand in measurable future, Prime Minister sincerely hoped he would do so as more he saw of way of life in democratic countries better it would be. He stated that despite some NZ newspaper criticism his visit Djakarta he convinced it worthwhile. He dismissed as without basis press reports that UK and Australia were not in sympathy with his Indonesian trip and emphasized that he did not go as intermediary for any other country. He expressed hope to President Sukarno that once Malaysian election over there

Foreign Relations

New Zealand
MIA

44-38861-1051
SEATO

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would be possible from discussions. He said he also made clear he wanted see withdrawal Indonesian forces from border Borneo States and that NE and Allies were ~~not~~ purposeful. Prime Minister stated NE not at war with Indonesia and diplomatic relations between two countries friendly.

2. SEATO meeting: Prime Minister stated that SEATO was very successful and not "falling apart" as some suggested. He noted there some misunderstanding re SEATO meeting and pointed to communique which supported by all members although France reserved position re Vietnam. Asking rhetorically how success of SEATO to be judged, he said it significant there had been no armed attempt against or real Communist infiltration of territory covered by treaty. When asked in event military action required under treaty whether would be unanimity among members taking part, Prime Minister stated there no need for unanimity in such event.

3. Aid to Malaysia: Prime Minister stated military assistance to Malaysia will consist of equipment worth pounds 250,000 and pounds 300,000 in form training Malaysians, principally Army and Air Force personnel, over two-year period. He said some equipment to

2E-78-299-8

Continued from: Prime Minister Holyoakes ----- April 27, 1964 204/2
 liaison officer already sent Malaysia to work out details.
 Stating assistance considerable and worthwhile considering
 size and capacity New Zealand, Prime Minister denied earlier
 press reports from Djakarta that he had discussed with President
 Sukarno quantity aid offered Malaysia and noted exact value
 NZ offer published prior his visit Indonesia. In reply
 question on Malaysia joining SEATO, Prime Minister stated
 Malaya had opposed it and no pressure put on Malaysia to join.



Foreign Relations

New Zealand
MSAMalaysia
SEATO

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2E-78-299-8

Press says as saying re Manopagal summit proposal:

12 May 64

"I am out for peace, that while a summit is being convened Pres Sukarno and his henchmen are planning to crush Malaysia. Before I can reply (to Manopagal invitation) I would like to see Mr. Lopez and find out if there is sincere desire on part of Pres Sukarno for peace. Last thing I want is war."



Same story cites Antara report from Djakarta which quotes Chaerul Saleh as telling regional leaders of national front, if Tunku willing attend another summit meeting without pre-conditions it means victory for Indonesia." He reportedly added that whether with or without summit meeting Pres Sukarno's action command to crush Malaysia should be carried out.

Noting latter reported remark by Chaerul Saleh, Straits Times editorial warns GOM to view summit overtures with

For info

Msa ↑ Msa-press ↑

Msa summit ↓ Ch Saleh ↓

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great caution
proposal, whi 2E-78-299-8 ~~SECRET~~ unclear, appears call for start of
withdrawal Indo guerrillas simultaneously with beginning of
summit. This described as not rpt not new formula but
"step back" from Lopez formula, to which GOM advised to
stick.

2E-78-299-8



May 14, 1964

Bangkok Post this evening quoted Thanet as expressing following views in response request for comment on Lopez trip Djakarta and KL:

"Mr. Lopez has been trying for long time to arrange 'summit' meeting on this matter. What is important, in my view, is not whether it is possible to arrange summit or not. What is important is settlement of dispute between Malaysia and Indonesia. Settlement...may be reached at summit, but hope of success remote as long as attitudes and views as wide apart as they are at present. Even if it is possible to arrange summit, no certainty it will be more successful than the two which failed.

"In my personal view settlement of dispute or alleviation

12. 10. 5 11. 4

Lopez

Phil
Thailand

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2E-78-299-8

of current tension keep two parties closer?...What divides them is problem presence volunteers or guerrillas as in North Borneo...in this matter he's trying to bring about...a compromise settlement. I do not know whether both sides will approve of this; in near future there will be consultations, but I cannot make any revelations at this stage. We must present our proposal to the parties for consideration first....

Even if it is possible to arrange a meeting, it will be a meeting which will not bear any results like previous meetings, Therefore, we in Thailand are concentrating on efforts to get both parties closer together on this question of volunteers... if this succeeds, meeting at summit or at any other level to settle political issues may quickly follow and may even to settle political issues may quickly follow and may even lead to final settlement of the dispute between the two countries."

2E-78-299-8



May 15, 1964

Straits Times this morning carries front page story with **Djakarta** dateline quoting **Subandrio** as saying Indonesia would "continue to send volunteers into Malaysia regardless of whether or not rpt not summit talks on the Malaysia issue were held." Quoted remark reportedly made following **Sukarno-Subandrio** meeting sometime Thursday.

Same newspaper comments editorially on proposed summit meeting, describing Phil proposal as "slapdash". GOM advised to consider proposal cautiously and in effect to adhere to old Lopez formula. Following steps to summit suggested:

(1) Agreement in principle on withdrawal Indo guerrillas;

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(2) Political talk of withdrawal and ~~summit level to discuss details~~ 2E-78-299-8 terms for political settlement;

(3) Summit meeting when and if withdrawal completed and political talks have progressed enough to suggest there reasonable prospect reaching political settlement at summit.

2E-78-299-8

At 9:45 PM Junku Abdul Rahman via Radio Malaysia addressed his nation and stated inter alia "this morning I been informed by an independent source that Philippines wish to have another summit meeting between leaders of three countries to resolve whatever differences we have and I am one who up bent on peace, goodwill, friendship for our neighbors. Idea is good, but before I can agree, or even consider proposal, I wish to be assured that whatever decision is reached every effort will be made to honor it. Secondly, that they will normalize diplomatic relations between us, and initiative must be taken by them as they were first to break off diplomatic relations with us. Thirdly, Indo must undertake to stop any aggressive actions, direct or indirect, and all troops concentrated on border of Sarawak must be withdrawn.

"These assurances are least Malaysia can ask and it is my hope they will be given, readily and willingly. If

For ref's

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**this is done & 2E-78-299-8ld be no more clouds loomed over
SEA, and we can all join hands in friendship again to work
for peace and prosperity of our region."**

I, 2E-78-299-8

Oct. 5, 1963

1st of 4

(1) Is "new state", so conceived by founders, envisaged as such by Cobbold report which recommended its establishment, fact that formation resulted not only from acquisition additional territory and sovereignty transfer but formal termination juridical existence Malaya, its major component, makes it new state.

(2) Tunku signed Manila Accord on behalf Malaya, statement therefore that Malaysia accepts obligations of former Federation would result in an equivocation. It is new capacity as successor to Brits in N.Borneo that new Federation requested by GOP agree to definite procedure for settlement Phil Sabah claim.



II. RECOGNITION

For. policy MSA

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(1) National is overriding fact on hold recognition under advisement (citing para 12 Manila Accord, stressing "final outcome" wording)
(2) Our does not challenge SYG conclusions, but takes exceptions manner in which survey conducted and report prepared.

(3) Reservations this respect registered with SYG, but GOP has refrained from further steps in UN out of deep regard for SYG position and difficulties under which he had to discharge mandate.

IV. REPORT AND ASCERTAINMENT

(1) Terms of ascertainment called for fresh approach, complete compliance with UNGA res 1541(IV) and that observers of three countries should witness operation. These three essential conditions not fully complied with.

(3) Envisaged time table calling for four to six weeks drastically reduced to two days which rendered impossible

M2E-78-299-8

Memorandum dated 11 Oct 5, 1965

2nd of 4

"complete compliance and fresh approach." UN working teams, within these crippling restrictions labored under further handicap of small size in relation vast territories, and had to rely heavily on previous Brit procedures and findings. Extent this reliance clearly shown in carefully prepared and documented Phil observer report.

(4) Fact that Files/Indos able witness only last days of ascertainment was substantive and unjustified modification Manila agreement.

(5) GOP cannot set aside findings own observers or close eyes to failure UN working teams implement faithfully terms Manila agreement. Michelmore himself said ascertainment did not even approximate scope of a gallup poll.



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(6) Evidence 2E-78-299-8 report prepared with utmost haste, less than care and objectivity normally expected of UN document.

V. BRITISH ACTIONS (These portions given major play Manila press with such banner-heads as "UK wrecked Manila Pact", "Hit 'sabotage' of Mapbindo", "Lopez blames UK for mess."

(1) Main responsibility failure UN teams fulfill SYG mandate rests with Brits.

(2) Having made unprecedented decision allow UN personnel survey conditions its non-self governing territory, Brits either tried to nullify or render it meaningless. Completely unwarranted dispute over observers gives grounds for suspicion that trap deliberately set for Indos/Phils so they compelled reject UN findings and by implication question SYG decision thus putting two countries at odds with UN. This old imperialist tactic divide and rule. No colonial power has ever of own free will and volition relinquished dominion over another country or

2E-78-299-8
 loss and ~~x~~ or camouflage its former power and influence. In extreme cases, plants mines and time bombs before leaving, booby-traps of suspicion, dissension and conflict among those left behind.

VI. MAPHINDO

(1) Malaysia crisis constitutes first real test capacity three Maphindo countries overcome differences and prevent them from hardening to permanent hostility.

(2) Maphindo has suffered damage at hand of those who don't and never did like it. With patience and faith vision and energy we shall rebuild Maphindo stronger and and more stable than before.

VII. PHIL FOWPOLICY

For policy MSA



Philipp

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(1) Phil role ^{2E-78-299-8} ~~relationship~~ that of mutual friend,
fraternal interloper, faithful interlocutor, as it
remain today.

(2) Regarding Malaysia choice not simply between Indos
and Malays. On ~~low~~ level national interest choice between
course which would have been virtual abandonment Sabah
claim and one that would keep it valid and subsisting.
On level regional interest choice between course which
would have sown seeds enduring hatred among three Malay
countries and have destroyed Maphindo and another that
would temporarily estrange three, while reducing Maphindo
to state of suspended animation hence capable of
reactivation. On level universal interest, choice between
decision that would have made us party to confrontation
together with possibilities inviting intervention outside
powers and one that enables us to help in moderating
explosive situation and discouraging intervention which
would make SEA cockpit of new war.

(3) Choice has not been between Indo and Malaysians but
between either of these alone and both of them together.
We continue place our faith in Maphindo.

Malaysia (Can't - s) Oct. 5, 1967

4th of 4

(4) Some accuse us of treading Indo line, but this springs from familiar habit colonial mentality that if Phil foreign policy differs from US must perforce be that of another country. It is desirable and possible for us to formulate Filipino foreign policy in origin and motivation, out and shaped to measure of our true and enduring national interest. If happens to ~~xxxx~~ coincide with US, Indos or even USSR, what does it matter? Only test of foreign policy is correlation with known national interest and with declared goals of state



For. policy

MSA

Philip
Moe

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2E-78-299-8

Following is ~~complete~~ story AP's William Ryan filed following his interview with Tunku October five: Oct 7 '63

"As leader of Malaysia sees it, Free Sukarno must be stopped from trying seize more territory.

"And way he can be stopped says Prime Minister Tunku Abdul Rahman of this fledgling nation, may be 'to bring home to people of Indonesia need for overthrow of the diabolical type Govt.'

"It has done nothing for Indonesian people except bring them misery, misery and more misery," he told this reporter Saturday. 'They must be encouraged to fight against unjust Govt which does not fit in with modern ideas and modern civilization.'

"Sukarno, leader of nation of 100 million, has vowed to do away with Malaysia, union of former British states with total population of ten million.

"Before Malaysia will come to terms, Sukarno, said Tunku,



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Indonesian chief and destroy its 12E-78-299-8 Indonesian party is largest in world outside Communist ruled countries.

"Crisis has been burgeoning between Malaysia and Indonesia ever since Malaysians broke diplomatic relations with Sukarno's govt and Govt of Philippines, because two refused to recognise new nation. Malaysia was born September 16.

"Tunku, man who exudes serene self confidence, pulled no punches in his discussion of President Sukarno, as for Philippines, he said he was at loss to understand its position.

"He said Philippines Govt committed itself to accepting findings of Secretary General U Thant of United Nations. Whose survey subsequently found that people of Sabah (North Borneo) and Sarawak favored Malaysia.

"They (Philippines) refused accept UN findings, "He said, 'although they had undertaking to do so. From beginning they had no intention at all of honoring UN report."

"But Tunku reserved his acid comments for Indonesians. He contended that Indonesian annexation to Malaysia was a direct

result of 2E-78-299-8

ness attack on India last fall, When Tunku denounced Peking and launched 'save democracy' drive to help Indians.

Oct. 7, 63

"Chinese were very angry with me, " he said, 'and Indonesian mounted its opposition against Malaysia as result of my stand on China-India.

"Sukarno would say he is not influenced by Communists, but it shows up when Indonesians try reach agreement with me he says he is not under Communist influence, but he gives into them all time.

"I would not mind meeting him (Sukarno) but it must be on my conditions, he must break away from Communists. Otherwise, under Communist pressure, any agreements that are reached will be dishonored.



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When Sukarno did No Objection To Declassification in Full 2010/08/30 : HIA-R JONES HOWARD P-1
come to terms with 2E-78-299-8' must stop acts of aggression and he must discredit Communists. He doesn't have to ban them or take aggressive action against them, so long as he discredits them. So far as I am concerned, Communists are main issue."

"This toughened the terms already laid down by Tunku, including demand that Indonesia halt aggressive actions on Sarawak border, that Indonesia and Philippines adhere to agreements reached at conference in Manila in August, and that they normalize their relations with Malaysia. Indonesia terrorists have been operating in Sarawak, and Philippines claim North Borneo. Both are parts of Malaysia.

"Crisis involved Britain, Australia, and New Zealand, all pledged to Aid Malaysia. In addition, the US Seventh Fleet operates in South China Sea. All this tends to give this Southeast situation an ominous outlook. But, said Tunku "I am not afraid of world war coming out of this. First there is split between Russia and China. Second, China has no navy and air force to support Indonesians. Also the Americans are around here. Indonesia is in no condition to go to war. If any country was at war in condition in which Indonesia is now, it would be suing for peace. Indonesia has nothing to fight

No Objection To Declassification in Full 2010/08/30 : HIA-R JONES HOWARD P-1

2E-78-299-8

Oct 29 1962

Phil Embassy issued press statement yesterday announcing that Phil diplomatic note which "puts the Phil terms for resumption of relations on a formal basis" had been presented same day by Phil Consul Lopez to Fomin Thant for transmission to Malaysian Government. Two requisites are: (1) Malaysia as new state should assume obligations and responsibilities of former Fed of Malaya including commitments made under Manila agreement.



(2) Malaysia will enter into an agreement with Philippines for peaceful settlement. Phil claim to North Borneo and on procedure for such settlement.

Statement noted that two requisites had been communicated informally by Lopez to Dato Ong, Malaysian Ambassador UN, 1st month in NY, that Thant transmitting note on behalf Phils and that Malaysian reply expected through same channel.

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Statement aim on trip to **2E-78-299-8** condition recognition, Thanat and Lopez are exploring possibility informal Fomin talks in Bangkok soon.

Emerging from long conference with Lopez yesterday, Thanat stated Thai Fomoff had already transmitted Phil note and Malaysian reply awaited. He added if both countries reached agreement there was hope differences would be reconciled and normal diplomatic relations resumed in near future. Thanat said aim was to eliminate differences among disputants and restore friendship and if aim could be achieved without convening Fomin meeting so much the better. Asked if Indos being consulted, Thanat said Indo Ambassador attended his river boat party honoring Lopez and "close negotiations" were continuing.

Lopez declined to comment most press questions but acknowledged upcoming Bangkok Colombo Plan conference offered opportunity for informal talks between GOM, Indo and Phil Fommies. He said he was prepared return for such talks but decision held discussions would require agreement others. He felt atmosphere in general had improved and w

2E-78-299-8

18 Sep 64

PRESS POLEMICS

Indo press political polarization sharply renewed recently starting with split over film boycott and extending to GOI order stop demonstrations and boycott against Pan American and USIS.

Press elements supporting GOI instructions to cease actions anti-US include nearly all elements anti-Commie press including pro-Murba organs. Despite argument continued actions in face GOI orders would be disobedient to Sukarno, some non-Communist editorials have hinted that PKI acting on Chicom rather than Indo behalf pointing out that even Chicoms have not taken action against British Hong Kong or severed relations with British because of tactical considerations. Argument goes; therefore no reason why GOI should center its attack on US rather than British. Merdeka also implied PKI trying alter Indo policy from non-alignment to alignment with bloc. Reply of PKI has been to



Indo press ->
for pub.
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← Youth Front

Merdeka US-Indo

recount alleged US aggressive acts against Indonesia and to cite Sukarno's Tawip speech. Merdeka, its most outspoken rival, has been singled out by pre-Communist press for extensive specific condemnation of its anti-revolutionary attitude. Suluh Indonesia (PNI) has also mildly criticized Merdeka and Berita Indonesia for their position on film boycott which Suluh approves. Merdeka offices visited on evening of September 15 by Youth Front delegation which threatened to "take action" unless Merdeka repudiated morning editorial. Press comment on Youth Front action developing as corollary issue with division similar to existing split.

This press dispute moved on to domestic row over Sukarno's statement on foreign aid.

Security Council -- Malaysian Complaint

USSR's 102nd veto prevented SC Sept. 17 from adopting Norwegian res deploring Sept. 2 paratroop landings in Malaysia and calling upon Indonesia and Malaysia to respect each other's territorial integrity and political independence. Vote was 9-2 (USSR, Czechoslovakia) - 0. Stevenson pointed out USSR veto inconsistent with its memo on peacekeeping activities and Khrushchev's declaration to President Johnson.

Indonesia had right contest formation of Malaysia but not right use force, Seydoux (France) noted. France thought it desirable focus attention on Sept. 2 incident but also to endorse idea of resumption negotiations.



Sudjarwo (Indonesia) objected to res "deploring" Sept. 2 incident and rejected operative para 4 -- calling on parties

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respect each territorial integrity and political independence — realistic. This was, in fact, "very point at dispute." He welcomed call for resumed talks. GOI's "confrontation" policy against Malaysia was part of its fight against colonialism and neo-colonialism and consistent with charter.

Morocco's "extremely delicate position" due to its close ties with Indonesia, Sidi Baba (Morocco) observed. Choice "almost impossible" and only respect for law could dictate his del's behavior. He had "serious doubts about appropriateness of res" but SC must hold principle of law shall prevail.

Usher (Ivory Coast) supported para 4 and wanted see it respected. It applied not only to GOI and GOM but also their allies. Continuation of armed struggle do not good and only lead to split in asaf world.

Morozov, speaking as USSR rep, contended res ignored dangerous situation created by colonial powers in SEA. He regretted Indonesia's "constructive" position opposed by (out)

Western powers who wanted "impose their will" on people of
SEA. Res unacceptable to GOI and only worsen situation.
USSR could not support res.

After vote, Stevenson said USSR's refusal allow SC exercise
even minimum peace-keeping responsibilities inconsistent
with avowed desire of USSR strengthen peace through UN,
particularly SC. It was hardly designed engender confidence
in Soviet position outlined in its recent memo on peace-
keeping activities. Veto also inconsistent with Khrushchev's
declaration to President Johnson USSR opposed any invasion,
attack or occupation, however, temporary, for whatever
political, economic, strategic or other considerations.

Dean (UK) declared USSR veto denied protection to member state.
If he were not SC President he would not asked President
interrupt US rep "who attempted lecture US," Morozov



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asserted. ^{These very important documents which} fully reflect ^{2E-78-299-8} foreign policy. Charter allowed all countries fight against colonialism and for true freedom, "not in US understanding of word." USSR vote should not be construed as contrary to USSR policy quoted by Stevenson.

Ismail (Malaysia) was glad SC, with near-unanimous voice,

rejected GOI thesis, "admonished Indonesia in no uncertain terms" and "unambiguously disapproved" Sept. 2 incident. He welcomed call for negotiations, noted res stated they must be preceded by renunciation use of force and agreement respect integrity, and only after this took place and right atmosphere created should talks commence. Now GOI "secured non-passage" of res he supposed "our immediate future contains more trials and tribulations" but at least situation clear for world to see.

His delegation benefited from debate, Sudjarwo (Indonesia) stated. SC seized on "certain detectable area of agreement" --Tokyo communique. If all parties, including UK, saw discussion in positive way, nothing lost, he said thanking President for his "able and wise guidance."



Press today quotes Tunku as telling reporters upon his return from Singapore that he prepared meet with Sukarno again provided Indos show sincere desire for peace by stopping all acts of aggression against Malaysia and withdrawing all "troops" from Malaysian territory. Tunku reportedly said also GOMssee no purpose in taking Malaysia complaint to UNGA.

Tunku quoted as saying there must be real intention achieve peace in any further talks with Indos since "I cannot attend talks wheever President Sukarno feels like taking a holiday." He reportedly said Malaysia would welcome Afro-Asian efforts to mediate dispute, adding that GOM plans soon send goodwill team on Afro-Asian tour.

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Memorandum

Sept 24, 1964

I believe it was James Michener who told the story about the happy Thais and their new post office. It seems that the new post office, of which they were very proud, had the usual slots for domestic mail, air mail, foreign mail, etc. When one stepped behind the partition, however, one found a single basket into which all letters fell.



Indonesian characteristic may be illustrated by the handling of traffic in Djakarta. If one drives from the Hotel Indonesia to the American Embassy, for example, instead of being permitted to turn at the corner of the street on which the Embassy is located, the driver has to make a complete turn and back-track for almost half the distance, then making his turn and approaching the street on which the Embassy is located on. All this, despite the fact that he has passed by and has not been permitted to turn at the intersection of the street to which he is required to turn.

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2E-78-299-8

Tunku after Tokyo - June '64

154/4

KL - June 24, 64 - 1

Tunku's remarks to press on return from Tokyo have been moderate and statesmanlike. While warning that Malaysia must expect "trouble" from Indos and be "prepared for the worst" Tunku avoided inflammatory personal remarks about Sukarno and he did not rpt not preclude possibility of another Formin meeting or even summit.



Tunku quoted as stating on arrival Alor Star "post-summit situation serious but it is not rpt not entirely hopeless. I consider I have achieved my object - to meet President Sukarno and to get to know precisely where we stand. For instance I know now rpt now what is inside his mind. From that point of view it has been useful discussion."

Asked whether Pres Sukarno had "acted tough" Tunku reportedly

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replied there not
but I found he was ^{2E-78-299-8} his cake and eat it as well." Tunku
"explained" that Sukarno was under internal pressure and if
pressure was strong nothing could be discussed but if pressure
relaxed, "then we would be able to achieve something."

Later on his arrival in Kuala Lumpur after news of latest
Indo guerrilla attack in Sarawak had been received here Tunku
still reiterated he did not rpt not consider summit was
"complete failure".

Tunku said Indo attack was "warning to West." Said Indonesia
"dangerous neighbour who has not rpt not respect for human
right, for peace and good neighbourliness. Not rpt not just
Malaysia's battle. If battle starts, will be against peaceful
democratic world."

According official information service release, Tunku when
told by newsmen that Pres Macapagal had appealed to him and
Pres Sukarno to have Fornain meeting in order prevent full-
scale war, replied "He need not rpt not appeal to me. He has
got to appeal to President Sukarno. If there is going to be a
Foreign Ministers' meeting it must have a purpose and not
rpt not just to go or travel to some foreign country for

KL June 24, 64-2 TUNKU after TOKYO - JUNE '64
sight-seeing. There must be some intention shown before we
can attend." Tunku quoted further as stating, "If Sukarno
wants to make peace this very minute I will fly to Indonesia
to discuss the terms. But they must be terms which are
a fair and in keeping with the sovereignty and prestige of any
nation."



According press account when asked about resumption diplomatic
relations with Phils Tunku replied question "never cropped
up" during talks, "they only raised question of submitting
claim to Sabah to ICJ but I told them I could not rpt not
decide on that until I have consulted people of Sabah."
Official release added, "and my colleagues in the Cabinet."

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2E-78-299-8

KL-JUN 24, 64-3 TUNKU AFTER TOKYO - JUNE 64

Tan Razak continued moderate tone set by Tunku in remarks to pressmen on his return from Tokyo yesterday. Said he "was not rpt not entirely disappointed" with summit result, "after all we didn't expect get very much. We knew Pres Sukarno was not rpt not prepared change his stand but we had to prove it. Must be obvious now rpt now to rest of world that he doesn't want peace."

Commenting on Pres Macapagal's Afro-Asian commission proposal, Razak quoted as stating, "We can not rpt not consider proposal unless and until Indonesia agrees stop her aggression."

Re another Fonnin meeting however Razak reported as saying such did not rpt not necessarily depend on either cessation of hostilities or complete withdrawal of all Indo guerrillas, "This was our agreement when we signed the communique."

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2E-78-299-8

But he called for meeting. Added for another Fonmin meeting depended entirely on Pres Sukarno.

Remarking on latest Sarawak border clash Razak warned Indos seemed be "stepping up aggressive activities." Said "We will take whatever measures are necessary to defend country," including appeal for more military assistance "from some members of Commonwealth." When asked if he approved of British labor MP Healy's reported proposal attack Indo guerrillas on their side of border, Razak quoted as replying, "Something like that is for us to decide."

Staff Persecy Ghazali who returned earlier yesterday reported as stating at airport, "Pres Sukarno's actions only mean he does not rpt not want peace or an investigation by Afro Asian commission." Also said that at present "things do not rpt not point" to another Fonmin meeting in near future.

Editorial comment generally against further meetings with Indos unless latter cease hostilities and withdraw troops. And most see little hope of this happening. There growing press preoccupation with problem of Indos attacking from "sanctuary" of bases across border. Malayan Times commented "heart of

KL - June 24, 64 - 4 TUNKU after TOKYO - JUNE 64
every Malaysian goes out to security forces guarding national
frontiers under extremely difficult conditions against
unscrupulous invader. Always under threat of attack, they have
to observe unilateral restraint and refrain from attacking
bases of aggression across frontier." Straits Times declared,
"So long as they are allowed this advantage, there can be no
repeat no end to nuisance. Tunku has previously warned that
Malaysia will not rpt not put up permanently with this unnatural
state of affairs. It time to reinforce this warning and to
consult with our allies present and potential, on the matter
of unstrapping the hand that is now rpt now tied behind our
backs."



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2E-78-299-8

154
 June 28, 1964 - 1 BRIT. - on SALE of Buses
 Morning papers featured stories on sale 500 more busses to Cuba by Leyland motors. several reported US officials Washington had emphasized US remains opposed to any trade with Cuba.

Contract signed on occasion ceremonial inspection by Cuban Ambassador of first bus for Cuba of lot of 450 sold in January. First 80 of these now said to be ready for shipment June 28. Total 950 busses so far contracted for are to be completed within year. Newspapers agree that new 500 lot is valued at 5 million.

Financial times says 950 busses will cost total about 19 million to be repaid or next five years in sterling and the export credit guarantee department is covering credit. Financial times also reports Cubans have option purchase 550 more busses which they have not yet exercised and "it is understood" that ECED has undertaken extend cover if this option taken up. ~~XXXXXXXXXXXX~~

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Director Donald S made points that 2E-78-299-81y commercail, Cuba old-established Leyland customer, busses not "strategic weapons" that it would be unfortunate precedent if British government prevented commercial deals because of pressure, even by ally like US, and Leyland had millions pounds already tied up in production.

Financial times also reported June 22 that vauxhall's prospective sale of 1,000 vehicle chassis to Indonesia would almost certainly fall through because ECGD would turn down application for credit cover on grounds not in national interest.

Explain that since last August ECGD has refused to consider rules consider sales to Indonesia, long a bad credit risk, in national interest. Said sale 1000 built Dodge trucks, which just delivered was last to Indonesia to be covered under national interest provision.

Telegraph, financial times, and Times ran substantial editorials on Leyland bus deal. Telegraph takes line that economic sanctions as instrument diplomacy have minimum effectiveness at cost of maximum annoyance to those against whom used to bring about change regime or of internal policy. Uk is trading nation and cannot afford restrict dealing to "diminishing circle of countries" whose policies UK approves. Telegraph states despite predictably violent and sincere reaction based on US "reasonable

2E-78-299-8

June 28, 1964-2 BRIT. on SALE OF BUSES
to US. UK cannot cooperate in this matter.

Financial Times editorial states UK refusal join in economic sanctions against Cuba in on grounds that UK must trade to live and that it is vulnerable itself to policies economic denial and therefore should not set precedents. If collective boycott EX Cuba achieved, which unlikely, possibility it become "reasonably non-aligned" would vanish as it would become even more dependent on USSR Aid than at present. Busses non-strategic and will contribute to raising Cuban living standards, lessen Castro's need to distract attention from home situation by means foreign adventure. Economic sanctions in any case will not topple Castro and if they did it uncertain what type of regime will follow. Financial times editorial continues that ECGD now considers Cuba a fair economic and political risk, thanks partly to Soviet Aid. When Bus sales first reported last year Cuba consider had risk and ECGD originally gave cover on national interest basis for sake boosting key US export industry. Editorial

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contrasts Cuba sit
eligible for ECGD 2E-78-299-8ver even under National interest criteria
and says this seems to be based on political more than economic factors,
even though UK bases stand on fact Indonesia's "confrontation" XXXX with
Malaysia makes it unlikely she will be able repay credits

Times editorial also comments Cuba bus and Indonesian vehicle chassis
sales situations. Says ECGD cover on latter likely be confused and defends
UK against expected US accusations of UK doublestandard in restricting
trade whan own interests threatened but refusing help ally in same way.
Times thinkk situation really not similar. Cuba good credit risk, getting
better, while Indonesians the opposite. Times sees US-UK differences
are on where to draw line on use economic weapons in Todays complex tangle
of proxy wars, subversion, and confrontation. US believes, as UK does not,
that trade can be effective weapon in this "twilight world"

The times editorial concludes that the only clear line is reached
when armed conflict develops. Cuba certainly is threat to US but no
actual fighting is under way. In malaysia, British soldiers are actively
fighting Indonesian aggression against commonwealth country and the
times believes that few would argue that government organ should provide
substantial support to the aggressor.

2E-78-299-8

JUNE 30, 1964

Following two and one half hour meeting National Defence Council June 30 Tunku announced four-point program adopted by council to check Indo subversive activities, reported in press as follows:

1. State Security Executive Councils (used during emergency) are to be immediately revived "to keep track of Indo aggressive moves".
2. Vigilante corps will be organized in all Malaysian states drawing on National Service registrees and volunteers.
3. A "number of measures" will be introduced to deal with all forms of subversion and to provide better protection for Malaysian fishermen.



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4. Min of Inform ^{2E-78-299-8} Broadcasting will set up close liaison with info media "to keep public informed daily of situation on war front."

Tunku also reportedly told newsmen question of bringing Malaysian case before UN had come ~~up~~ up at meeting but stated only "I will discuss this more fully at the London (Commonwealth Prime Ministers') talks.

According Malayan Times account press conference, Tunku when asked whether proposal to counter-attack across Indo border in Borneo had been discussed, replied "I cannot rpt not tell you as security is involved, and besides it is a military secret." Straits Times on other hand reported Tunku as stating

Tunku as stating "We cannot rpt not do this. It is against principles of UN charter. But the matter is very much in my mind and bears discussion at the Prime Ministers Conference".

Tunku also reported as stating that he suggested that Admiral Sir Varyl Begg, Brit ~~ENNE~~ CINC Far East, be present in London for talks, "To help me explain war situation to Prime Ministers, particularly those of Britain, Canada, Australia and New

2E-78-299-8

November 28, 1964.



TO: The Files

FROM: The Ambassador

SUBJECT: Sukarno

"I am just a small brown man", Sukarno said at a dinner given for him by Vice President Nixon in 1956. "I keep asking myself why I am here. It all seems like a dream." And then he proceeded to make so eloquent a speech in English, a language not his own, that a hardboiled newspaperman sitting next to me, who had been quite skeptical of Sukarno in the earlier part of the evening, leaned over and said to me, "Gee--this guy is good!"

Sukarno

press-US

Jones

US-Indo

UNISORT ANALYSIS CARD

FORM Y9

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2E-78-299-8

Dec 21, 1964

UN

1st of 2

A. Indo Form Rep Palar replied on Dec 18 to comments re Malaysia problem in general debate speeches of both NE and Malaysia (reftals).



1. Main points in reply NE speech as follows:

A. As condition for negots in AACCC, GOM insists not only on cessation hostilities but total withdrawal Indo volunteers. Demand for withdrawal volunteers tantamount to demand for Indo prior recognition Malaysia.

B. Indo recognition is integral part, if not core, of whole dispute. Thus, makes no sense require Indo recognize Malaysia as condition for putting AACCC into effect.

2. Main thrust of reply to Ramani was to picture Malaysia problem as one of many manifestations of oldefo-nefo con-

*oldefo-nefo
Palar*

For. policy *NSA* *UN*

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frontation with No Objection To Declassification in Full 2010/08/30 : HIA-R JONES HOWARD P
world. -2E-78-299-8

A. Drew attention to illuminating parallel between Malaysian and Congo questions; both countries new members UN, only recently decolonized politically, in search national identity; both govts face strong oppositions, indeed rebellions, supported by other newly independent nations; deplorable state affairs in both countries due largely to interference former colonial masters; both govts would soon collapse without support former colonial masters; in both cases, one side has made use of mercenaries. Final parallel: Essence of both problems is right new nations settle own affairs in own manner without interference from outside.

B. Concluded with lengthy but familiar review of establishment Malaysia in violation Maphilindo concept and Manila agreements, emphasizing Indo objects not to federation per se but to fact federation as established represents "intrusion of subtle form br. colonial power in our area world."

B. Both NE and Malaysian perm reps made counter-replies:

1. NE, in addition recalling points made in general

No Objection To Declassification in Full 2010/08/30 : HIA-R JONES HOWARD P

-2E-78-299-8-

(Continued from H. Jones Rem - Dec 21, 1964 HNM)

2nd of 2

debate speech, denied request for withdrawal Indo volunteers tantamount to request Indo recognise Malaysia, reminded GOI of obligations under Art 2 of charter, and challenged voluntary nature of Indo "volunteers" by quoting from Indo law of last Sept re volunteers.



2. Ramani cast doubt on sincerity Indo 1961 statements to effect GOI wished Malaya success in plans for Malaysia and GOI had no designs on territories outside old Netherlands East Indies. Emphasized that SYU's 1963 report fulfilled sole condition GOI ever raised re Malaysia (that it conform to desires of peoples of North Kalimantan). Asserted that present GCM insistence upon withdrawal Indo forces not so much condition for negot as effort get GOI abide by promise Sukarno had made in writing prior to Tokyosummit.

For policy

MSA

UN

old info
Parker

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2E-78-299-8

12/27/64 Kuala Lumpur
 Latest official Mininfo released on Indo activities
 report following:

1. Security forces in contact with Sungai Bantu invaders,
 killed three captured eleven.

2. Offshore curfew along Johore west coast extended to
 midnight December 26.

3. Late afternoon Dec 24 HMS ajax captured 22 armed Indos
 in seven boats off Kuala Selangor. leader of party identified
 as Sgt. Marimba Muna, who reportedly said (A) group had been
 training for over two months and had planned land on Alayan
 coast night Dec 24 and (B) Indo patrol vessel was about to
 unload 28 more invaders into boats when ajax came on scene.

In midst this activity Rausak told press conference Dec 24 this

military
 For info

Use

Howe

Howe

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statement 1. No Objection To Declassification in Full 2010/08/30 : HIA-R JONES HOWARD P
of increase in Indo threat to Malaysia. He cited Sungai Banta
landing, buildup of Indo forces Borneo and on Sumatra coast.
Razak said Malaysia would report these new acts aggression to
UNSC. Appealing people to be calm and vigilant and assuring
them of security forces ability to handle Indo threat, Razak
said Malaysia would take all defensive measures under UN
charter to protect itself.

MININFO release confined to foregoing. However, press reports
that home affairs Min Ismail, who also present at press
conference, elaborated on Razak remarks. Ismail quoted as saying
"Under UN charter party attacked is allowed to pursue enemy.
At moment we have to confine ourselves to our own side. But we
want serve notice to UN and whole world that we not going take
it lying down." This statement made in context of Razak
reference to need for defensive measures in event of more massive
Indo attacks.

rec. 30, 1964



Department spokesman made following statement on Malaysian rejection military sales package:

QUOTE:

We regret that the Government of Malaysia is unable to accept the US offer of credit arrangements for the purchase of military equipment. The terms offered were standard for the purchase of military equipment under arrangements whereby the US government guarantees loans extended by banks. The United States has exceptionally heavy commitments in Viet-Nam and elsewhere in Asia where we are expending our resources to defend the independence of free nations. These efforts represent a real contribution to the security of Malaysia. Malaysia is already receiving substantial military aid from Britain, Australia, and New Zealand. The US has offered grant aid for military training which the Malaysian government has under consideration.

UNQUOTE.

over

Foreign relations Msa foreign aid

US
Malaysia

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(1) Confirmed to 2E-78-299-8 percent 7 years but declined state amount involved.

(2) Said USG expected continue discussion on grant aid for training.

(3) Had not heard about charge that terms harder than those for Indonesia and not aware that this is case. Also noted current military assistance program in Indo limited to support for such programs as civic action aimed at promoting economic development and associated training programs. Said current total program Indo about \$10 million was grant aid.

(4) Reconsideration of offer would be up to Malaysians.

(5) Found no justification in remark that we permitting Malaysians to "drown" before coming to their rescue.

(6) Said was in no position to say whether US would be willing to relax terms. Added that US offered what it considered acceptable set of conditions and was not in any way unfair in offer.

(7) Said US reaction to GCM statement was that it was moderate in its language and no bitterness detected.

-2E-78-299-8



DEC 65 / MSA - MAPHILINDO - BR*VIEW; ANOLO-ALEX DIFFS-*(Notes on...." Br. Emb. D; Dec '63)

It has for long been a consistent theme of British foreign policy to support regional groupings throughout the world. For example, we have encouraged closer union between some of our former colonial territories (eg. the West Indies and Central Africa) but have not, of course, insisted on this against the will of the people of the territories concerned. In a wider context, the British Commonwealth itself is perhaps the most notable example of the free association of independent states.

As regards Maphilindo, it is not at all the case that Her Majesty's Government are opposed to President Macapagal's concept. When the idea was first put forward, Her Majesty's Government were greatly struck by its statesmanlike and imaginative character. We did not at once give it public acclaim, because we believed that Maphilindo had a better chance of success if it could be seen as a purely independent move by the Asian powers concerned without obvious encouragement from outside. For the same reasons, we adopted a similar attitude over the Association of South-East Asia, of which we approved from the outset.

The doubts which we have expressed about Maphilindo arise from the use to which the Indonesians seem to wish to put it. Maphilindo, it seems to us, can-

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not have reality when 2E-78-299-81 partners talk about "crushing" or "devouring" Malaysia. There is a great difference between an organization based on a genuine desire for co-operation by all the parties, and one which is aimed to allow the strongest member to dominate the weaker ones. Her Majesty's Government will sincerely welcome any success in persuading the Indonesians to give genuine unselfish co-operation in Maphilindo. We think that this would be greatly helped by the entry of Thailand into the Association.

If Maphilindo is to succeed, it must grow naturally in the spirit of mutual understanding. The formation of Malaysia, which is genuinely desired by its constituent peoples, is no barrier and indeed could be the first step towards the possibly larger unit in the area.

-2E-78-299-8

ARCHIVES

R OOV; 8 OCT 85// NSA -POST-SUMMIT BREAKDOWN -OBSERVER ISSUE: BR ROLE IN NEGOTS
(By UN Rep, Mr. Peter Thomas, Replies to FM Lopez in Gen Debate of 18th Sess GA)
"Mr. Pres., on reading the speech of the distinguished P.Min. of Phils I find
tht some confusion exists abt the precise part which my Govt played in the negotia-
tions on the admission of observers. This is of course quite understandable and I
believe tht it's my duty to info the distinguished P.Min. of the Phils and this Assoy
abt exactly what happened. At the request of Mal Gov, the Br Gov agreed on Aug. 10
to allow Mal, Ind & Phils each to send one observer to Sabah & one to Sar making a
total in ea territory of 3 observers watching 4 of the Sec. Gen's investigators. The
Gov of Ind countered almost immediately by announcing their intention of sending up
to 20 observers and 10 secretarial staff in their own military aircraft. The Gov of
Philis indicated tht this was also their intention. If the Gov of Mal hd md the same
demand we wld have been faced with the ludicrous situation where 90 observers watched
the work of the 9 mem in the Sec. Gen's teams. The Sec. Gen then info my Gov tht it
might sometimes be necessary for his 2 teams in Sar and Sabah to split up, making a
total of 4 groups of investigators. My Gov accordingly agreed to accept a total of
4 observers fr ea of the 3 Manila countries, eventhough this means tht the 12 obser-
vers wld now outnumber the 9 UN investigators they were supposed to observe. The
Ind Gov refused to accept this compromise but demanded a total of 9 observers. The

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FORM Y9

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Gov of the Phils also
 Aug 20 tht Ind, Mal - 2E-78-299-8, could be allowed to send a total of 4 observers
 plus 4 clerical assistants. My Gov agreed to make this further concession on certain
 conditions, the principal one being tht the assistants should be genuinely clerical
 and not just extra observers under a new name. The Ind. & Phil Gov accepted the Secr.

Gen's pp in pn. Nevertheless, they nominated as asst. senior ofcls incapable by any stretch
 of imagination of being cons. of cler. grade. Here I think a genuine misunderstanding may
 have arisen. I shall say no more abt it except to comment tht in any indirect negotiations
 where the parties aren't dealing directly with one another such misunderstandings are by no
 means uncommon. My Gov was, however, quite clear abt the cond. which they hd attached to
 their acceptance of Secr. Gen's pp. In these circ. therefore they were obliged to with-
 hold visas until on Aug 29 the Ind Gov conceded our position & replaced the 2 intelli-
 gence officers which it hd nominated as cler. assist. by persons more nearly approaching
 cler. status. My Gov accepted this Ind pp together with the corresponding compromise offere
 immediately afterwards by the Phil Gov. On Sep 1, therefore, Ind & Phil observers at
 last reached the Horneo terr. I am bound to say tht they could have been there from the
 very start of the Secr Gen's investigation if their gov hd not endeavoured to inflate the
 status of observers fr witnesses to judges, and to suggest numbers wholly disproportionate
 to the size of the Secr. Gen's teams. There had in addition been the further diffi-
 culty created by the Gov of Ind's attempt to use its observers for wholly different ob-
 jectives implicit in its insistence on nominating intelligence officers as cler. asst.
 Nevertheless, Mr. Pres. the absence of these observers through no fault of ourselves
 during the early part of the investigation doesn't in any way detract fr the authority
 of the conclusions reached by the Secr. Gen. It gives my Del. great pleasure to note,
 that, in spite of the criticisms which the distinguished F. Min. of the Phils has made, he
 does not challenge the conclusions of the Secretary-General."

2E-78-299-8



6 MAY 64 BRIT FOR SEC BUTLER PRESS CONF MANILLA
& PRESS REPORTS RE BUTLER TALKS

SRCE: 7 May Tel. Manilla Emb
CONTENTS:

Press May 6 gives prom cov arrival UK Fonsec Butler who told press:

- 1) "We have always been in favor of Maphilindo as an idea";
- 2) Msa prob "should be settled by Asian countries themselves";
- 3) Glad to see an "initiative" taken. Thgt such an init "should be preceded by meeting of for ministers";
- 4) UK wished only to fulfill its oblig to Msa in form of providing defense in event of aggression;
- 5) UK was amenable to any settlement of Msa ques wh "respects indepen & integrity of Msa";
- 6) He had discussed Msa w Jap leaders who are ready at any time to help improve the peace in SEA. Bulletin reports Butler as saying Fonmin Ohira felt that any proposal ff Japan now would be premature.

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-2E-78-299-8

Bulletin & Times ~~report~~ also had 20 min talk w Indo Amb Pamontjak during evening at residence of Br Amb.

Butler met w Fonseco Lopez for two hours May 5 & according to press discussed Msa, Sino-Sov dispute, Seato & Phil Borneo claim.

Chronicle rpts Peck, UK Fonoff Asian Affairs Chief who has been accompanying Butler, will go on separately to Saigon, Djakarta & KL.

Accounts report meeting morning 5 May btw Macapagal & Lopez to discuss Butler visit. Chronicle cites Malacanang "sources" as saying Mac confident Summit can be held & that Pres. & Lopez "agreed hostile statmt's fr Dj + KL + familiar tone of confrontation do not seriously prejudice holding of Summit". Lopez "sd. he had received renewed assurances from Sukarno that he was willing to go to Summit sans preconditions".
(Service)

2E-78-299-8

ARCHIVES

BR GOV: 8 OCT 65// MSA -POST/SUBMIT BREAKDOWN- OBSERVER ISSUE
 ((Br UN Rep, Mr. Peter Thomas, Replies to FM Lopes in Gen Debate of 18th Sess GA))

INDO POL OF CONFRONTATION FORCE BR TO IMPOSE LIMITATIONS ON ACTIVITIES OF OBSERVERS;
 ABSENCE OF OBSERVERS THRU PART OF SURVEY NOT DETRACT FR AUTHORITY UN CONCLUSIONS

INDO POL OF CONFRONTATION: "...although Gov of Phils was not a party to confron
 Indo both was and his. It is against this background that my Gov's action over
 under Chptr XI of the Charter of the UN was plain. This was to develop self-gov. in
 these territories and to prevent outsiders from obstructing this process. Let no-one
 be in any doubt that such attempts at obstructions were being made. Quite apart fr
 the torrent of abuse & threats which flowed fr Jak., Sabah & Sarawak had, during the
 last 6 mo. of Br. admin. been subjected to repeated armed incursions fr Ind. Incu-
 sions which were directed & supplied fr tht country. These incursions had resulted in
 death & injury to the peaceful inhabitants of the border areas of Sar. & Sabah. My
 Gov's clear duty was to protect them against this kind of senseless violence to the
 best of its ability & to ensure tht their right to determine their own future was
 not destroyed by alien interference.

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It's in this con-2E-78-299-8 that the distinguished Foreign Minister of the Philippines to understand the limitations which we were forced to place on the activities of observers in his country. To be brutally frank, the trust which we were prepared to place in the Gov of the Philippines, which ranks amongst our best friends and allies in Asia, could not be extended to Ind. This was a risk we were not prepared to take. Nor would public opinion in Sabah & Sar both of which were suffering from Ind intervention, have tolerated it. Against this background, I hope that the distinguished Foreign Minister of the Philippines will accept that our actions didn't imply any reflection on the motives and integrity of his Government.

Having set the matter of observers in this context, I should now like to remind the Assembly that, as the Secy. Gen. has himself remarked in his conclusions, the arrangements for observers were no part of his responsibility. Equally, there was no provision in the Manila Agreement for four separate and independent investigations to be carried out: one by the Secy.-Gen's team; and the other three by representatives of Ind., the Philippines and Malaya. Any difficulties which may have arisen over observers didn't therefore affect the Secy.-Gen's conclusions, nor were they in any sense an essential part of his investigation."

-2E-78-299-8

ARCHIVES

DEC 63/ MSA - RIFTURE OF DIP RELS - BRIT EMB VIEW; ANGLO + AMER DIFFS
 ("Notes on ...", Br Emb, D. Dec 63)

The story has gained currency that it was Malaysia which broke off diplomatic relations with Indonesia and the Philippines. This is partly the result of consistent Indonesian propaganda representing themselves as the aggrieved party, and partly because of the words in which the Tunku described the situation when he spoke to the Press in Kuala Lumpur on September 17. In fact, of course, the initiative for the break came in each case from the other side.

Indonesia

U Thant's report on Malaysia was published on September 14; and Malaysia came into existence constitutionally on September 16. On September 14 the Indonesian Foreign Minister told the Malayan Ambassador in Djakarta that "there would be no recognition of Malaysia". On September 15 Dr. Subandrio told Press correspondents that "Indonesia could not recognise Malaysia as it is now". When the Malayan Ambassador saw Dr. Subandrio on September 16 he pressed for a clear statement on the subject of recognition or non-recognition, but Dr. Subandrio was evasive; when the Malayan Ambassador finally asked, "What is my status?"

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Dr. Subandrio replied "2E-78-299-8 no status here." This was the moment at which diplomatic relations between the two countries were broken and the initiative was Indonesian. The Tunku's subsequent remarks to the Press on the next day, September 17, about the withdrawal of the Malaysian Embassy from Djakarta were merely the consequence of the Indonesian act of rupture.

The Philippines

Similarly in the case of the Philippines a Press release was issued by the President's Office in Manila on September 15. The first paragraph read as follows:

"President Diosdado Macapagal has decided to defer action on the question of the recognition of the proposed Federation of Malaysia, Acting Secretary of Foreign Affairs Librado C. Cayo announced today. The President's decision, in effect, means that the Philippines will have no relations with the new state of Malaysia which will be inaugurated in Kuala Lumpur tomorrow, Cayo

A further Press release the following day, Sept. 16, stated that the Philippine Acting Foreign Secretary had summoned the Malaysian and Indonesian Ambassadors on the previous afternoon to inform them of the President's decision about the recognition of Malaysia. Diplomatic relations between the Philippines and Malaysia were thus broken by a Philippine initiative of Sept. 15, which took effect with the constitutional establishment of Malaysia next day. This too ante-dated the Tunku's remarks to the Press on Sept. 17.

CR 18821-22, 11

-2E-78-299-81D - HEATING/AMENDMENT

about the TOWER



12 of 2 cards

Mr. HEATING. I thank the Senator. It seems to me it makes no sense whatever for us to be training Indonesian soldiers in this country to enable them to be ready to fight against Malaysia, which is a friendly country and is using American taxpayers' dollars for this purpose.

Every Member of the Senate knows that I have been a supporter of the foreign aid program over the years. The distinguished Senator from Texas and I have some differences of opinion as to the program generally. But I am not sure that we should cut off all aid to Indonesia. I believe some Indonesian students are studying in the United States. Perhaps that is desirable. It is the training of military personnel that seems to me absolutely indefensible.

There are some inconsistencies in our foreign policy that cannot be tolerated - specifically, providing aid to an active aggressor, Indonesia, with our left hand, while assisting its victims, Malaysia, with our right. Such action violates the anti-aggression provision of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1963, which specifically provides that:

No assistance shall be provided under this or any other act, and no sales shall be made under the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954, to any country which the President determines is engaging in or preparing for aggressive military efforts directed * * * any country receiving assistance under this or any other act.

Foreign relation

foreign aid

Tower
Amend.
US Congress
Heatingover
US-Indo

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Unfortunately No Objection To Declassification in Full 2010/08/30 : HIA-R JONES HOWARD P
agencies of our Gov-2E-78-299-8

Last September, when President Sukarno, of Indonesia, unleashed his guerrilla and regular troops against the new Federation of Malaysia, the United States found itself in the embarrassing and irresponsible position of betting on both sides.

While Indonesian guerrillas were killing the defenders of Malaysia's borders at the rate of 30 per month, the United States continued to train Indonesian military and police officials in our military training centers. The Department of State reluctantly admitted this to me after a lengthy exchange of correspondence this spring.

Mr. KEATING. Mr. President, more than 400 Indonesians have been killed or captured by Malaysian defenders of North Borneo and Sarawak since the start of 1964. Captured Indonesian documents leave no doubt about the fact that this subversive campaign is directed by Indonesian Regular Army officers, acting on the directives of President Sukarno. Sukarno stated on May 1 his intention to step up guerrilla activities aimed at crushing the Federation of Malaysia. And on June 25, the Soviet Union's troubleshooter, First Deputy Premier Anastas Mikoyan, announced that the USSR was supplying Sukarno with modern weapons and Soviet personnel to train his troops to use them in the struggle with their "neocolonialist" neighbor, Malaysia.

Nevertheless, \$9.8 million is requested for AID's technical assistance program for Indonesia in fiscal year 1965's program, plus an unspecified sum of military assistance in the form of training. The program for use of military assistance funds has not been divulged.

No Objection To Declassification in Full 2010/08/30 : HIA-R JONES HOWARD P

CR 18821-22

-2E-78-299-85AID - Keating re TOWER AMENDMENT

2nd of 2 cards

The United States should not support the army of a government that commits aggression against its neighbors. Sukarno's excuse for his vow to crush Malaysia is that the Malaysian Federation of 10 million people threatens his nation of 100 million; his real reason for aggression is the traditional mad ambition characteristic of dictators like Mussolini, Hitler, and now Masser, to distract a poverty-ridden, badly governed people's attention from their own plight - and to keep happy the well-fed army of 350,000 that comprises the armed support of the Sukarno regime.

Both supporters and opponents of the foreign aid program realize that we cannot make friends everywhere, but we must also realize that we can actually do great damage by helping to shore up regimes fundamentally opposed to the principles of international peace and order. To provide aid to the military and police personnel of a nation actively committed to the destruction of a free nation cannot possibly be reconciled either with our own principles or those of the United Nations.

Moreover, to think that \$9.8 million or \$43 million or \$150 million will convert the men on Sukarno's payroll to democracy is mere illusion. The current program of aid to Indonesia is admittedly a small effort; but of what value is it all?

Foreign relations

foreign aid



US Congress

over

Keating / Tower Amend. US- Indo

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Could not these f-2E-78-299-8 for Indonesia's militarists under the military assistance program, be put to better use in a peace-loving nation that would use it for the benefit of the people, rather than the dictators?

Mr. President, I support the Senator's amendment if it is modified to apply only to Indonesian military and police personnel and not to bona fide civilian students, doctors, engineers and so on. I think it is a fine idea to expose Indonesian civilians to U.S. life and ideas, but I can see no justification for U.S. aid to train the Indonesian military or police forces in more efficient forms of aggression or repression.

Mr. TOWER. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the pending amendment be temporarily laid aside so that I may call up my amendment No. 1214.

THE PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection? Without objection, it is so ordered.

The amendment offered by the Senator from Texas will be stated.

The legislative clerk read as follows:

On page 12, between lines 15 and 16, insert the following:

"(g) Amend section 620(j) to read as follows:

"(j) In light of the actions of Indonesia in alining itself with North Vietnam, a nation which has aggressively attacked United States naval vessels, and the actions of Indonesia in threatening the peace and security of the nation of Malaysia -

*(1) No further United States assistance shall be furnished to Indonesia under this Act or any other provision of law; and

over

Foreign relations

Foreign aid



US Congress
Tenth Amendment

115-Indo

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"(2) All military school^{2E-78-299-8} or at any other United States Government facilities, or under any United States Government contract with any private institution or facility, shall be notified of the immediate termination of such training, and no other training of Indonesian nationals shall be initiated".

On page 12, redesignate succeeding sub-sections.

Mr. President, American foreign aid funds have been misspent in many ways. One of our worst faults is our continuing failure to distinguish between friends and enemies. I want to detail what I regard to be just one of those instances.

Let us take note of Indonesia and Sukarno.

The United States now is spending money to train Indonesian military and police personnel. Meantime, Indonesian is killing and wounding troops of our British allies and threatening the freedom and peace of Malaysia - a nation which we support and which I believe proved to be one of the most stable of the emerging new nations of Africa and Asia. The British are to be commended for bringing the Malaysian Federation into existence. It is a tribute to the ability of the British to impart to other people their experience in the art of self-government.

As recently as the last week of June some 100 Indonesian terrorists drove across the Malaysian border killing and looting. Some of them may have been trained here, or have gotten instruction from men trained here.

I think the Senate must face the fact that Mr. Sukarno is no friend of the United States. We also must face the fact that he is walking in lockstep with the Communist Party of his nation, the PKI.

2E-78-299-8

CR 18819-21. 11 ID - TOWER AMENIMENT.

2nd of 2 cards

It is, indeed, likely that he can do nothing not approved by the Communists. Sukarno and the Reds are indentified with the same goals.

As one Western diplomat has said:

If President Sukarno didn't exist, the Communists would have to invent him.

Two Communist Party leaders, Chairman D.N. Aidit and First Deputy M.H. Lukman, already hold the rank of minister in Sukarno's state advisory council. Their ties with Red China are close.

Sukarno continues to state publicly that he is out to crush our ally, Malaysia. He clearly demonstrated his peaceful neutrality when he torpedoed the cease-fire arranged in the area last January. He continues to send his volunteer troops against British Commonwealth forces in Sarawak and Sabah. Informed sources say there probably are 600 well-equipped Indonesian soldiers inside Malaysian territory - an increase of 450 in this year alone.

Yet, the gullible United States continues to train Sukarno's forces.

As of late April there were 187 Indonesian armed forces personnel training in the United States, plus 38 police personnel, a total of 225.

Here is a breakdown of the U.S. folly.



over

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Of particular interest is the police training program administered by the Agency for International Development since 1954, and upon which, to date, American taxpayers have spent more than \$16 million.

AID blithely admits that the training is designed to increase the competence of the 110,000-man national police of Leftist-Dictator Sukarno. We are to help train the police officers, modernize their radio communications, update their transport facilities, and improve their supply system.

American taxpayers are footing the bill for this so that Sukarno will not lose control of his island nation. That is a priority set by our foreign assistance program. It could use some prompt rethinking.

American foreign aid must be curtailed, then revised, then reapplied with reason. Unless it is, the Sukarnos will come home to haunt us.

In fact, Mr. Sukarno established diplomatic relations with North Vietnam on August 10 thus alining himself with the aggressor nation which so recently attacked our destroyers. This act alone should be enough to exclude him from any U.S. foreign aid and to eliminate from our military schools any of his officers and policemen.

Since it is unlikely that we shall undertake a reappraisal of foreign aid, we should adopt the amendment cutting off aid to Sukarno, who is engaging in hostile activity against a friendly ally.

-2E-78-299-8

OR 10822-23, 13 Au

DOMINICK AMENDMENT

1st of 2 cards

Congressional Record

about the TOWER

Mr. DOMINICK. I am happy to support the amendment as modified. I have been actively critical of Mr. Sukarno in particular for some time, having delivered a speech on the floor of the Senate on this subject on November 1, 1963. Almost immediately thereafter, I made another speech about him on November 15, following a protest by the Ambassador from Indonesia about my verbiage in connection with Mr. Sukarno in my first speech. I did not withdraw the comments I had made.

Mr. Sukarno is an interesting person. His background is not often outlined for us. It is most difficult for me to understand why the United States is supporting Mr. Sukarno and his Government. I should like to detail a little of his background so that we will know what we are talking about. A fuller explanation is contained in my speech of November 15, 1963, at page 20850 of the Congressional Record.

At the time most of us were fighting the Japanese and the Nazis in World War II, Mr. Sukarno was holding down the important post of general political adviser to the Japanese Military Government, in Indonesia. He is a fine type of person to have immediately picked up as a supporter.

While he was engaged in that work, he turned 2 million of his own countrymen over to the Japanese to be treated, in the words of Major General Willoughby, who was then chief of our intelligence in that area, like "coolie slaves".

Foreign relations

foreign and

US Congress
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UNISORT ANALYSIS CARD

FORM Y9

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One of Sukar ^{2E-78-299-8} was to try to get the Indonesians engaged in a greater war off the free world. In this effort, one of his slogans was: "We shall flatten out America". Another was: "We shall overturn England".

In 1944, Sukarno organized a really big anti-American rally in Djakarta. A caption under photographs of pictures being burned by Sukarno read: "Roosevelt, Churchill Condemned".

In 1945, Sukarno decided he was not on the winning side, so he jumped over and joined the Russians. This man is not a great idealistic leader. He is an opportunist of the first order, one who tries to keep himself in power. He jumped over and asked Stalin for support.

In 1949, when he became President of Indonesia, he was awarded the Order of Lenin by the Russians. According to his own statement, he said, "This means I am a Communist of the highest order". It is reported that he said this with a chuckle. Whether that was meant as entertainment or as self-satisfaction, I am not certain.

Sukarno has, of course, endorsed the Communist Party in Indonesia as a major participant in his Government. The Communist Party in Indonesia at the present time is the largest Communist Party outside the all-Communist nations.

It is interesting, strategically speaking, to look at that section of the world and see what is happening. We are engaged in an effort to assist the people of South Vietnam to control their own Government and to be able to control their own lives.

From the north, with the aid and assistance of Red China and the North Vietnamese, come guerrillas moving down through the peninsula onto the great land mass of Asia. While they are doing that, in come the Russians from the other side.

CR 18822-23 13 1-2E-78-299-8 AID DOMINICK H TOWER AMENDMENT 2nd of 2 cards

Those who are supposed to be friendly to us are moving into Indonesia. They supply armaments to Indonesia to make the country strong in its military forces in the entire Asian area. Indonesia, in turn, is moving against Malaysia, so there is a vast pincer movement coming in from both sides, one supported by the Red Chinese, and the other supported by the Russian Communists.

Both sides are trying to gain control of the area of southeast Asia which, if effective, would effectively cut us off from any opportunity to save that portion of the world for the free world, and would substantially place in danger our perennial and longtime allies, New Zealand and Australia.

So I would say to the Senate that from a purely strategic military position, we are dealing with a crucial area of the world. To have us give money or training to the military forces of Indonesia, which are largely using Russian weapons in order to continue their aggressive efforts, so far as I am concerned, is nothing but a complete denial of our own purpose and principle in Asia.

Last year, when the amendment was before the Senate, we were well assured that only a modicum of aid would be continued to Indonesia, that in fact no new programs were being authorized, and we really did not have to worry about it. Yet, I am told, the President of the United States had publicly stated that it is in the interest of the United States to continue giving aid to the Indonesian people.

Foreign relations

foreign aid



US Congress
Tower Amend.

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Apparently, we are trying to use the "carrot on the stick" approach, because from time to time our Ambassador, in an effort to do something over there, has indicated that perhaps our aid should not be continued.

Mr. President, I hold in my hand an article published in the Washington Post of March 26, 1964, entitled "'Go to Hell With Your Aid,' Sukarno Tells United States".

If Sukarno wishes to tell us that, so far as I am concerned, there is no reason to conclude that his island is any worse than where he is telling us to send our aid - or any better, for that matter. I would as soon keep our money in the United States.

2E-78-299-8

CR 18824, 13 Aug 78, US MAIL - MORSE AMENDMENT.

re TOWER

Mr. MORSE. Let me say to the Senator from Texas that I shall support his amendment. For years, I have opposed foreign aid to any dictatorship, either right or left. I have opposed giving support to the so-called presidential escape clause in the foreign aid bill. I happen to believe that Congress has the duty, under our checks and balances system, to appropriate money or not appropriate money without giving to a President arbitrary, discretionary power to give foreign aid to dictatorships because he might decide it to be in our national interest to do so.

In case of any emergency, the President can always lay his case before Congress and secure enactment of legislation, if in the wisdom of Congress it should be granted to him. There is the great danger which I have argued for so many years on the floor of the Senate, of weakening our system of coordinate and coequal branches of government by building up, step by step, more and more of a government by executive supremacy.

If we do not stop it, we shall jeopardize the freedoms and liberties of the American people, because if we develop a system of government by executive supremacy we will lose the effectiveness of legislative checks and controls.

Foreign relations

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We need to be on -2E-78-299-8 the standpoint of the abstracts principles of our Government, without ~~reference~~ to any given President to stop this trend toward government by presidential supremacy. My objection has nothing to do with the particular individual who occupies the White House. It is bad from the standpoint of protecting our constitutional system.

Therefore, I shall support the amendment of the Senator from Texas, Sukarno is a corrupt and dangerous dictator. Not 1 cent of taxpayers' dollar should be made available to him. The President should be denied any discretion to grant Sukarno a dollar unless each dollar is specifically approved by Congress. This amendment seeks to cut Sukarno off from all foreign aid. I have urged that action for 3 years and I am glad to vote for the Tower amendment.

2E-78-299-8

CR 18824, 13 Aug 64, US AID - JAVITS AMENDMENT.

about the TOWER

Mr. JAVITS subsequently said: Mr. President, I wish to state my reasons for voting "no" on the amendment on aid to Indonesia. I am very well aware of the activities of the Sukarno regime and disapprove as fully as anyone in this Chamber of the continued inspired guerrilla activities against Malaysia and any indentivity of interest with the North Vietnamese. I join with my colleagues in condemning unreservedly any support extended by the Sukarno regime to the enemies of freedom in south and southeast Asia. It is for these very reasons that I do not wish to see an absolute cut-off of any hope of saving Indonesia from being devoured by the Communists. It certainly may be personally gratifying to be able to denounce activities I consider so inimical to the free world by voting for this amendment. But it is too high a price to pay to contribute to cutting off any hope that Indonesia can be saved from the Communists by tying the President's hands as this amendment would do in respect of any operation in Indonesia no matter how it might appeal to the U.S. Government as being helpful in checkmating Communist influences there - this is most unwise in my judgment. We should aid, not cut off whatever effort we may be able to make to maintain our free world position which is so critically important. By cutting off this aid completely, we are denied any such opportunity.

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I would not wish u-2E-78-299-8 do that, as I believe that is against our interest in the struggle for freedom and peace in the world.

I thank my colleague for yielding.

-2E-78-299-8

GR 18824, 13 Aug 1954, ~~was~~ ^{was} ~~not~~ ^{not} ~~man~~ ^{man} - MANSFIELD & DIRKSEN / AMENDMENTS.



about the TOWER

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I hope it will be possible to come to the vote requested by the distinguished Senator from Texas (Mr. Tower) very shortly.

The present amendment provides, as has been brought out in the debate so far:

No assistance under this Act shall be furnished to Indonesia unless the President determines that the furnishing of such assistance is essential to the national interests of the United States. The President shall keep the Foreign Relations Committee, and the Appropriations Committee of the Senate, and the Speaker of the House of Representatives fully and currently informed of any assistance furnished to Indonesia under this Act.

There is not much more that I can say. The amendment was brought forward largely, I believe, through the efforts of the distinguished Senator from Wisconsin (Mr. Proxmire) and other Senators. The issue is drawn. The distinguished Senator from Texas (Mr. Tower) wants to go a good deal further and drop everything absolutely and completely.

It is my belief that the President should have a small degree of flexibility at least.

Mr. President, I ask for the yeas and nays.

Foreign relations

foreign aid

*US Congress
Tower Amend.*

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US-Indo*

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Mr. DIRKSEN. Mr. President, there is one reason why I believe the amendment of my distinguished friend ought not to be defeated.

It is now roughly two months since the distinguished leader in Indonesia, Mr. Sukarno, stated publicly to all the world - and it was carried by every wire service - that, "The United States can go to hell with its aid".

What was in my mind at the time was that probably that was the only country that was not receiving aid. But if Sukarno does not want it, and if he wants us to go to hell with our aid, I shall be the last one under any circumstance to force it on him, or to even put in the hands of the President the authority to force it on him.

Sukarno left no doubt as to where he stood. All the world knows it. And this is one time that we can be exceptionally selective and take the leader at his word when he tells us to go to hell with our foreign aid.

I shall take him at his word. I shall vote for the amendment of the distinguished Senator from Texas.

Drs. Muhammad 2E-78-299-8 appointed on August 27, 1964, as Minister of Transmigration and Cooperative Affairs.

Achadi was born about 1934. During the Indonesian Revolution, Achadi joined the 17th Brigade of the Student Army which operated in the Solo area of Central Java under the regional command of Achmadi, who was Achadi's predecessor as Minister of Transmigration and Cooperative Affairs.

After the 17th Brigade was demobilized, Achadi was sent to Reading University in England, where he majored in Political Economy. According to a newspaper biography, Achadi was a good student and also an active participant in international student conferences at that time, including Indonesian student conferences held in Europe.

Achadi had been Chief Assistant to the former Minister in the Department of Transmigration and Cooperative Affairs for five years prior to his present appointment. He was active in the fields of



*For Biography
Donors*

Cabinet

Transmigration

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No Objection To Declassification in Full 2010/08/30 : HIA-R JONES HOWARD P-
Council of t2E-78-299-8nesian Cooperative Organizations Union (KOKSI).

Achadi is a close associate of Major General Achmadi, dating from Student Army days during the physical revolution against the Dutch. Achadi is married and has one child.

Soetomo Marto**Labor.**

appointed on August 27, 1964, as Minister of



Soetomo was born February 9, 1916, in Solo, Central Java. According to Bintang Timur he attended grammar school in Solo, Junior High School in Purwokerto, and in 1936 graduated from Senior High School in Jogjakarta. While still a student he was arrested and tried by the Dutch authorities and served one month in prison for violation of the "right of assembly" law. In 1944 he graduated from the Legal Course in Djakarta.

While still in grammar school he became a member of Indonesia Muda and in 1931-32 was Chairman of the Purwokerto Branch of that organization. In 1933 he was Chairman of the Matjaram (Djogjakarta) Branch and in 1934 Chairman of the Solo Branch. From 1945 to 1947 he was Vice Chairman of the Federation of Movements of Young Generation Officials (Gabungan Gerakan Pegawai Angkatan Muda); 1948-49 he was Vice Chairman of the Congress of the Youth of Indonesia (Badan Kongres Pemuda Republik

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No Objection To Declassification in Full 2010/08/30 : HIA-R JONES HOWARD P-
Indonesia); in 1962 he became Vice Chairman of that organization. Since 1963 he
Development of 2E-78-299-8 is Advisor to the Young Generation for the
(Angkatan Pemuda Pembangunan Indonesia) and
has been a member of the Review Board (Dewan Pertimbangan) of the
PARTINDO Executive Council.

Offices he has held include the following: In 1945-46 he was a
high official in the Social and Labor Ministry; in 1947-48 he was
assigned to form and lead the Labor Ministry's branch office in Sumatra;
in 1948 he was Deputy Chief of the Labor Office in Djogjakarta; from
1948 to 1955 he assisted the Minister of Labor and headed the Employment
Service; and from 1955 until his appointment as minister he held the
position of Chief of the Manpower Directorate.

Soetomo is more efficient and a better organizer than his
predecessor. He is a pleasant and personable individual who speaks
English quite well. He visited the United States in 1958 under the
Exchange Visitor Program and spent about four months there. He is
married. *has 2 children. He is married by P.H.T.*

Brigadier General Ge2E-78-299-8rdhio. Appointed on August 27, 1964 as Attorney General of Indonesia.

General Soetardhio, a professional Army officer, was Deputy Chief of Military Police and a student at the Command and General Staff School at Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas, at the time of his appointment.

Soetardhio was born at Solo on March 15, 1925. He graduated from a secondary school in Solo in 1942 and also attended and graduated from a "high" school in Semarang from 1950 to 1951, and a U.S. Army School for Military Police officers in the United States from 1954 to 1955.

He was commissioned a First Lieutenant in 1946, was promoted to Captain in 1949, Major in 1955, Lieutenant Colonel in 1959, Colonel in 1962 and Brigadier General in 1964. He commanded the First MP Battalion from 1950 to 1954, was at the CDT MP Center at Tjimahi from 1955 to 1957, was intelligence chief at MP headquarters from 1957 to 1959, Assistant Director of the Military Policy from

gov't organization Biography

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In addition to his year of schooling in the United States in 1954-1955, Soetardhio traveled through Asia and Africa in 1957-58, to the United States and Europe in 1959, on other trips to Europe and Asia in 1960, to the United States and Europe in 1960-61, to Asia and Europe in 1962 and to Asia, Europe and the United States in 1963.

He speaks and reads English and Dutch well. He is married.

2E-78-299-8

*Demonstration in Medan**Aug 29 '64*

ARCHIVES

CONTEL 69 TO DJAKARTA 17 TO DEPT US RUBBER REPORTS THREE TO FIVE THOUSAND DEMONSTRATORS BURNED EFFIGIES JOHNSON AND TENGKU BEFORE MAIN OFFICE AT KISURAN MORNING AUG 29. DEMONSTRATORS ATTEMPTED ENTER OFFICE BUT WERE BARRED BY POLICE. POLICE DID NOT RPT NOT PREVENT PAINTING AMERICAN HOUSES WITH OIL. NO INJURIES REPORTED, ONLY MINOR PROPERTY DAMAGE. DEMONSTRATORS REPORTEDLY PNI YOUTH AND NOT STATE WORKERS. SARBUPRI DID NOT RPT NOT TAKE PART. ALSO LEARNED FROM GOOD SOURCE THAT DEMONSTRATORS AT CONSULATE MORNING AUG 29 INTENDED SEIZE OR DAMAGE USIS LIBRARY. AS REPORTED REFTTEL POLICE PREVENTED APPROACH CLOSER THAN SEVERAL HUNDRED YARDS. PKI

HARIAN HARAPAN AND LEFT PNI BENDERA REVOLUSI REPORTS THIS MORNING THAT I ATTEMPTED FLATTEN /DECEIVE DELEGATION. REVOLUSI HEAD LINE READS, QTE AMERICAN CONSUL TRIES TO BRIBE YOU THE FRONT LEADER. UNQTE.

*For info**demonstrations
rubber**15-8-64
Sumatra*

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2E-78-299-8

DELEGATION - US CONSULATE

29 AUG 64

MEDAN

UNCLAS ACTION DJAKARTA 69 INFO DEPT 17 PM MEDAN TWENTYNINTH LUNDBERG
REPORTS ALL QUIET ON GOODYEAR ESTATES. NO WORD YET FROM US RUBBER WHER
POLICE ANTICIPATE LARGE DEMONSTRATION. SEVERAL HUNDRED YOUTH FRONT
MEMBERS DEMONSTRATED NEAR CONSULATE THIS MORNING. POLICE ON HAND
HOURS IN ADVANCE, BLOCKED STREET SO THAT DEMONSTRATORS UNABLE APPROACH
NEARER THAN CROSS ROAD SEVERAL HUNDRED YARDS FROM CONSULATE.
ON ADVICE RECEIVED FROM CHIEF POLICE LAST NIGHT I MET DELEGATION
OF SEVEN WHO PRESENTED STATEMENT ATTACKING US POLICY VIETNAM
AND MALAYSIA. REQUESTED POLICE NOT ADMIT PRESS BUT SEVERAL REPORTERS
ACCOMPANIED DELEGATION. DELEGATION REPORTED BACK TO DEMONSTRATORS

AND GROUP DISPERSED. COMMENT. STATEMENT IDENTICAL IN SUBSTANCE
WITH THAT PRESENTED AUGUST 12. NOT CLEAR WHY GESTURE REPEATED
UNLESS HINTING WHO NOW BACK MEDAN WISHED DO JOB HIMSELF. SURPRISINGLY
GINTING UNWILLING TALK ABOUT STATEMENT OR US POLICY. HE CUT INTERVIEW
SHORT AFTER I MENTIONED HAD HEARD HE ONCE VISITED US. POLICE PROTECTION
EXCELLENT. DETAILS AND TEXT STATEMENT BY NEXT POUCH. HEAVNER

NB Tel. Aug. 29 64 From Medan

For info

Dem. demonstration



US Indo
Sumatra

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**PALAR, L. N. : 27 SEP 64// MSA - POST-SUMMIT BREAKDOWN -ADEQUACY OF 'FRESH APPROACH'
((Statement by Indo UN Rep in Gen Debate of 18th Sess Gen Assemb))**

The observers of both countries were able individually to establish certain important inadequacies in the fresh approach required of the investigation, unavoidable because of the short period of time within which the United Nations teams had to work, the smallness of these teams, and the insufficient facilities put at their disposal by the colonial administration. In their report, the Philippine observers likened the operation of the United Nations teams to a guided tour organized by the British colonial authorities.

Anyone who has lived under colonial conditions knows that it is not difficult for the authorities to make people answer questions exactly in the way required. Very often the mere presence of armed soldiers or police will suffice. In general, only those who are members of a militant freedom movement dare to defy the intimidation of a show of force. With this in mind, the investigators, in adopting a fresh approach towards ascertaining the wishes of the people, should have tried to make reasonably sure that the persons questioned were relatively free from official pressure. And then they should also have tried to see that the hearings

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took place without as

Mr. President, 2E-78-299-8 he investigators did not take all the necessary precautionary measures to ensure the integrity of their findings is not in any way to place blame upon them. Their number was too few and they had far too short a time at their disposal. Facilities were entirely dependent on the cooperation of local colonial authorities. This being the case, my Government does strongly feel that in the circumstances, their report should then have included ~~strongly~~ a full description of the conditions in which the hearings did take place. We, who were but a short time ago a colonial people ourselves, know very well from bitter experience that mere figures on the number of answers obtained are not enough. Without a knowledge of the conditions surrounding the various hearings, how can we be even reasonably sure that the wishes of the people have been genuinely ascertained? I can assure you, Mr. President, that my Governm. for one is still in doubt. It is not that we are denying the possibility of the Br. Borneo peoples being in favour of joining Malaysia. For if this were genuinely the case, Indonesia and the Philippines would, as we wrote in the Accord, welcome Malaysia. As things stand at the moment, however, we are not in a position to do so. There have been grave violations of the Manila Agreements and these make it impossible for us to have any assurance of the true wishes of the colonial peoples concerned and of the goodwill of this British-sponsored Malaysia towards us. May I repeat that the date for the proclamation of Malaysia was fixed with utter disregard to the outcome of the ascertainment conducted by the United Nations, as required by the Manila Agreement. This arbitrary act was not overlooked by the Secretary-General in his report. It was a slap in the face

of the United Nations

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PALAR, L.N.; 27 SEP 68 // ISA - POST-SUMMIT BREAKDOWN - 29 AUG ANNOUNCEMENT: INDO VIEW
 (("Statement by H.E. L.N. Palar, Perm. Rep. of Indo. to UN, in Gen Debate of 18th
 Session of Gen Assembly")) pp. 16 -7. / p. 19 re rel sig in Indo view.

Let me now try to evaluate the role played by the British in the events that followed the Manila Conference. First let us consider Malaya's official announcement, made on 29 August, of 16 Sept. as the date for the establishment of Malaysia, regardless of the outcome of the United Nations investigation which at that time was still in progress. Neither Indonesia nor the Philippines are willing to believe that Malaya was already thinking in terms of acting contrary to the spirit of the Manila accords when we agreed at the Manila Conference to welcome Malaysia provided the support of the peoples in Sarawak and Sabah was ascertained. It was clearly understood in the Manila summit meeting that Malaysia could only be proclaimed when and if the support of the people of Sarawak and Sabah had been ascertained by the Secretary-General. Indeed, on his return to K.Lumpur from Manila on 5 Aug. 1963, Tunku Abdul Rahman himself stated to the press that the Manila Agreement on Malaysia had made Malaysia day on 31 Aug. 1963 "flexible". Questioned as to what would happen should the outcome of the ascertainment prove negative, he

2E-78-299-8

answered rightly that "formation of Malaysia should be cancelled." We were, therefore, very astonished by the sudden change in Malaya's position. The very inconsistency of this position, the suddenness of her reversal of attitude, is to us sufficient indication that it could only be as the result of heavy

British pressure and manipulation. For we should not by any means underestimate the U.K.'s enmity towards the whole idea of a United Nations investigation team entering her territory and examining election processes that had been held under her own auspices. Members will recall her consistent refusal to allow the Committee of 24 to conduct similar surveys in British non-self-governing territories. Moreover, the demand which we made in the Manila Statement for a 'fresh approach' to the methods of actually ascertaining the wishes of the people seemed to endanger the findings of the Cobbold Commission, which she herself had sent to investigate the territories in 1962.

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PALAR, L.N.: 27 SEP 64 // MSA - POST-SUMMIT BREAKDOWN - BR MOTIVES: 'NEOCOLONIALISM'
((Statement by Indo UN Rep in Gen Debate of 18th Session Gen Assemb, pp.19-20;
Was a plot to perpet Br col interests; Maphilindo anathema to col interests.

The U.K.'s motives for this wrecking of an Asian supported Malaysia are clear. Malaysia was originally conceived by the British as a perpetuation of their sphere of influence in a strategic area of S.E.A. The proud declaration by the three Heads of Government in Manila that foreign bases in their region are temporary in nature and should not be permitted to be used either directly or indirectly to subvert the national independence of any of the three States, coupled with the declaration that each country will refrain from using collective defence arrangements in order to serve the individual interests of any of the big powers, cannot have been welcomed by the Br. Government. Nor can the U.K. be expected to look with favour upon the new S.E.A. spirit manifested in the first steps toward Maphilindo which were taken at the Manila Conference. The very conception of Maphilindo is anathema to the colonial interests of the British. So they felt they had no choice but to try to destroy it. And they went about their unsavoury task by subverting the decolonization process in Sarawak and Sabah so that these colonies might be merged

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into a greater unit making. It is just this form of decolonization policy, already pursued by the British in four abortive federations established in the previous decade, that we in Asia and Africa call British 'neo-colonialism'. It is the desecration, Mr. President, of the process of decolonization that we hold sacred.

Britain may cry victory now. S.E.A. is in turmoil. The unity of the peoples of Malaya, the Philippines and Indonesia embodied in the Manila Agreements is splintered. Sentiments are aroused, brother faces brother in angry quarrel. Maphilindo, the real target at which Britain was aiming, is crippled. Crippled, Mr. President, but not crushed. The Maphilindo spirit is still running high in Indonesia and in the Philippines. And even in the British-sponsored Malaysia there are signs that it has not been entirely extinguished. The immediate future seems dark for the sister nations of S.E.A., but their natural affinity will surely triumph over any temporary conflict. And then Maphilindo will once more present itself to the world, in greater strength than before, free from colonial stains.

PALAN, L. N. ; 27 SEP 64 // MSA -POST-SUMMIT BREAKDOWN - OBSERVER ISSUE
((Statement by Indo UN Rep in Gen Debate 10 18th Sess Gen Assemb,pp.17-18))

"Not content w trying to obstruct work of IN team, Br Gov also attempted to delay as much as possible the arrival of the Indo & Phil observers provided for in the Manila Statement --even going to length of warning Indo observers that they wold have to sleep in tents, in order to discourage them. As a result of Br delaying tactics, observer teams present only for less than one-third of the time during wh investigs took place. Despite this, however, the observers of both countries able individually to estab certain important inadequacies in the fresh approach required of the investigation..."



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PALAK, L.N.; 27 SEP 64// MSA-POST SUBMIT BREAKDOWN- TIME LIMIT FOR UN SURVEY
((Statement by Indo UN Rep in Gen Debate of 18th Session of Gen Assemb))
-- INDO CHARGE BN WIT IMPOSING 'EXTREMELY SHORT TIME LIMIT'.

It is not surprising, therefore, to find that, having officially accepted the Secretary-General's investigating teams, the United Kingdom imposed limiting conditions. The Secretary-General himself acknowledged in his report on the team's findings that it was extremely difficult for him to implement his task properly within the short period he had at his disposal. But who was it that imposed this extremely short time limit? Not Indonesia nor the Philippines certainly. It is true that the three Manila powers were in agreement that there should be time limit. But at the same time, they also agreed that the investigation should be a thorough one, based on a fresh approach. To meet both these requirements together, the end of September was considered a likely target date for the completion of the assessment. A period of a mere ten days, however, which was the actual duration of the United Nations investigation, was definitely not contemplated.



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2E-78-299-8

Stop of rice ration rejectedSep 28 1964 *Antata*

Munir, who was elected as the new chairman of SOBSI replacing Njono who has joined the Politbureau of the Central Committee of the Indonesian Communist Party in his speech indicated that the congress had taken its resolutions in the spirit of Vivere Pericoloso which is the title of President Sukarno latest Independence Day's message.

The congress resolved among other things to reject the government's decision to cease rice rationing and demanded that it be repealed and the ration be increased instead.

The 4th SOBSI National Congress also fully endorsed President Sukarno's speech "Tavip" especially regarding the crushing of "Malaysia" and the intensification of the struggle against the British - American imperialism and colonialism among other things in the form of confiscation of all resident British capital and the expulsion of US Ambassador Howard P. Jones.

It also demanded the formation of a "Nasakom" Cabinet.

The Congress further resolved to intensify the struggle to crush "Malaysia" and to help the peoples of North Kalimantan, Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, Angola etc in their struggles to liberate themselves from imperialism and colonialism to establish their respective

*Political Parties**PKI
SOBSI*

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national independ

SOBSI demands

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Government disband "SOKSI" (the Central Organisation of Indonesian Socialist Workers).

Finally Munir revealed that the 4th SOBSI National Congress had resolved to make the Afro-Asian Workers' Conference a success for which purpose it expected the close cooperation between the Minister of Labour of Affairs and Indonesian central labour organisations.

Dr. Thajeb 2E-78-299-8

September 29, 1964

Appointed Minister of Higher Education and Sciences on August 27, 1964.

Dr. Thajeb is personable, 44 years of age, born in 1923 in Atjeh, North Sumatra, of an Atjinese father and Javanese mother. Two of his brothers are outstanding members of the Indonesian Foreign Service -- one serving as Ambassador to Italy, and the other to Mexico. Another brother is a member of the Central Verification Committee of the PKI.

Dr. Thajeb, who is a Brigadier General in the Army and participated in campaigns against South Moluccan rebels in 1950, is one of the leading pediatricians in Indonesia and received his advance training at Harvard University Medical School and the Medical School and Hospital at Temple University. He has made several other shorter visits to the U. S. His most prominent patients are President Sukarno's children.

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September 29, 1964

Major General

Appointed Minister for Veterans and Demobilees Affairs
on August 27, 1964.

Born June 10, 1914 in Indrosari, Central Java.

Educational background in medical training. Officer of PETA (Japanese-organized Indonesian "self-defense corps") during occupation. Joined Republican forces in 1945 and became Chairman of Badan Keamanan Rakjat (embryonic TNI) for town of Magelang. From 1946-1956 commanded various field units in Central and East Java. Staff appointments until May 1963, when named CO of VII military region (Central Java). Appointed Brigadier General in 1960, Major General in August 1964.



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Memorandum

Sept 29, 1964



Indonesian Versus Indian Views on World Conflict.

The Indonesian interpretation of current world conflicts is quite different than that of the Western world, or some of the Asia-African countries, such as India. To Indonesian eyes, the current world tensions are caused by the efforts of the so-called old established forces to dominate the new emerging forces. Indonesians see the world as essentially a conflict between the haves and the have-nots, with the haves generally represented by the West, and the have-nots by Asia and Africa.

India believes that world tensions are primarily caused by ideological conflict in the context of the East-West cold war. This difference of view point was the basic issue between Sukarno and Nehru during the 1961 Belgrade Conference, and is basic to many of the misunderstandings between Asia-Africa countries, as well as in the West.

*ideological
misunderstanding*

A-A

India

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In all the conferences, such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Conference, the Algerian Conference, as well as the Cairo Non-Alignment Conference, the Indonesian position follows the line that the struggle against colonialism, neo-colonialism, and imperialism (in the way of expressing the have-nots versus the haves concept) is the basic struggle of mankind today more important and more significant than cold war tensions resulting from the conflict between the communist and anti-communist world. Indonesia is convinced that current conflicts in the Congo, Cyprus, Southern Arabia, Caribbean, Latin America, and Southeast Asia, demonstrate the validity of their approach. They are convinced that world peace can only be achieved after colonial type of imperialistic evils have been rooted out and new world order established. Unfortunately this view of the world coincides to a considerable degree with the Chinese Communist interpretation of world problems and its view that world peace can only be established when imperialism has been wiped out.

Oct. 8 '64 K2E-78-299-8

Thousands of posters, banners, leaflets and painted slogans broke out in first and second divisions early morning hours before Sarawak Governor's official birthday celebration October 5th. Heaviest concentration in Kuching environs and along Simaggang road with unconfirmed news reports of similar efforts in Sibu and Miri. Slogans (mostly in Chinese, some in English and Malay) opposed Malaysia, national registration, conscription for use as "cannon fodder", and ~~imperialist~~ imperialist involvement (especially British.) Also praised Indo support of "righteous anti-colonial struggle of people of five Malaysian territories." New wrinkle was occasional blast against American imperialism. "Get out Yank" painted on wall nearest my residence. (Thus far no other signs reported near official American or Peace Corps residences).

Sarawak vanguard reports three hundred sloganeers involved and that police had one weeks notice that CCO would implement plan.

Foreign Relations *Risa*

Sarawak



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Seventeen slogs
red-handed and

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2E-78-299-8

Interesting to note that this incident came shortly before longest border battle yet waged in Sarwak. In fifteen hour engagement starting 1500 hours 5th October at Terbat near Serian twentyfive man security forces patrol stood off ~~themselves~~ fierce

attacks by approximately 120 IBTS who finally withdrew across border with ~~considerable~~ casualties.

Referring to recent step-up of IBT action in Borneo following security council debate, October 7th Sarawak Vanguard edit recalled that Malaysian Government "has warned world that if security council failed take action against Indonesia Malaysia and allies would take what (action) thought appropriate to deal with next invasion of Malaysian soil. Well, invasion has come not only once but many times since then on Malaysian Borneo soil".

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Oct 13, 192E-78-299-8-^{pure}

Replying orally to questions in Parliament October 12, Tunku said an Afro-Asian conciliation commission one possible means resolving Malaysia-Indonesia dispute. He said GOM would gladly entertain proposals from such commission to bring about peace between the two countries so long as Malaysia's independence and integrity respected.

Asked specifically whether he had imposed pre-conditions on GOM acceptance AACC proposal made by Phils at Tokyo, Tunku said he had agreed to commission in principle. He added "but we should never lose sight of fact talks cannot be carried out with gunat our heads. Hence the provisio that we agree to ~~commission~~ commission only if Indos withdraw their troops, regular and irregular, from Malaysian territory."

Meantime Straits Times editorial October 13 caustically takes Pres Macapagal and Phil House Deputy Speaker Pendatun to task



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for their
for differ
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between parts of Malaysia as far as aggression
concerend and for erroneously describing Borneo states as
"disputed" in context Malaysia-Indonesia relations. Macapagal
queried as to nature of progress towards settlement dispute he
professes see varying news reports from Washington.

Editorial says "from here it would not seem there slightest
progress, or even that Sukarno more seriously abashed by
failure at Cairo than by hostile vote of SC. Keeping on good
terms with Indonesia worthwhile, Pres Macapagal added, to prevent
Indonesia turning Communist. If Pres Macapagal seriously believes this
then awakening not yet complete. Among his reasons for wanting talks
with Tunku (note: Macapagal's desire for such bilateral talks asserted
by Pendatun) is nearly critical situation Vietnam. Pres Macapagal
should talk this over with Sukarno, who so unmistakably on other side. "

Oct 7 1964 2E-78-299-8 *over*

Press headlines New Borneo clash October 7, describing alleged rout of 120 Indonesian invaders by 25 Garikas after 14 hours of heavy fighting in Tobein area of Sarawak. Clash reportedly began at 3 PM when Indonesians attacked security post force post two miles from border at Terbat Bazaar. Artillery supported besieged Garika unit during fight and RAF helicopters dropped supplies and ammo but, according to press account, 25 Garikas alone held out all night against 120 border crossers

Meanwhile, in mainland Malaysia, air strike launched same day against remnants of Panton invading force on South Johore coast. At GOM request, 8 RAF jet fighters repeatedly struck area with three inch rockets while Malaysian units supported attack with mortar fire.

Agriculture Min Nair Johari told press October 7 cabinet considering measures to end Indonesian raids on Malaysian fishing

Foreign Title

Msa. M. S. Sarawak



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vessels such as 2E-78-299-8 ted in refel. Continuing, press quotes informed sources as indicating measure to be adopted will be naval escort of fishing fleet in straits, or "convoy fishing". Spillia reportedly told press weekend raid resulted from fishermen's penetration into "so-called 12 mile limit in Indonesian territorial waters". Whether escorted fishing boats would continue to ignore Indonesian 12 mile claim not stated.

2E-78-299-8

We see no reason, looking at it objectively from a distance, as to why these two countries need to be in any sort of armed conflict with each other. We think it is very important that the normal processes of peaceful settlement be employed for whatever disputes exist, and that all parties act in accordance with the charter.

On the second part of your question, I point out that our own defense arrangements with the Philippines are very far-reaching, are without qualification, and that if there is an attack on the Philippines from any quarter, that is an attack on the United States. And I would think that it would be very reckless, indeed, for anyone to suppose that there is any doubt whatever about our commitment to the security of the Philippines. Unquote.

156

Following is quoted for your information from transcript
of Secretary's news conference October 8: 1964

Quote: Q. Mr. Secretary, particularly in the light of the
talks here this week with President Macapagal of the Philippines
would you assess or reassess for us how you see the situation
between Indonesia and Malaysia; and, also whether you
share the concern of the Philippine Government that they,
too, may become a target for Indonesian infiltration, or
interference of some sort?

A. Well, on the first point, it has been our hope all
along that such issues as exist between Malaysian and Indonesia
can be settled by peaceful processes. We joined with eight
other members on Security Council in expressing our
very deep concern about the armed actions taken by Indonesia
against Malaysia.

Malaysia Sec Council

US-Philippil.

Indo's "encroachment" Rusk

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2E-78-299-8



9 Oct '64 K. L.

COI issued White paper October 9 ~~data~~ detailing official Indonesian involvement in Borneo fighting. Paper (copies to be pouched) commences with quote from Sudjarwo's recent statement to UNSC which admitted Indonesia training "volunteers" to infiltrate Sabah and Sarawak, then proceeds to cite voluminous evidence indicating preponderance of "volunteers" in reality Indonesian regular troops. Conclusion drawn is that entire effort has been failure because no internal uprising could be engineered and COI now faced with necessity of fielding more and more regulars or standing by to watch whole offensive ~~and~~ collapse. COI paper predicts Indonesia will redouble efforts to spread alarm and dependency in Borneo states but that it realises present strategy, pursuit of military victory, is futile because impossible to achieve.

Official KEMER statement released today welcomes Pres Macapagal's concern over continued presence Indo troops in Malaysia as ~~expressed~~ expressed his speech to National Press Club Washington. Statement declares however that limiting withdrawal to peninsula not repeat not in accord with pre-Tokyo agreement that regular and irregular Indo forces should withdraw from all Malaysian territory including Sabah and Sarawak.

Foreign Policy

Hologram

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MoA - military

MoA

Statement the 2E-78-299-8M therefore cannot support the contention that we waived withdrawal from Pontian and Labis could constitute a minimum condition for talks. Withdrawal must take place from all Malaysian territories. We now seeking clarification on Pres Macapagal's speech whether it constitutes departure of Philippine attitude from what already agreed to, before and during Tokyo talks".

October 6 editorial in Malay Mail (afternoon paper Straits Times Group) meanwhile more charitable to Macapagal than either KUTUP statement or other papers. Mail regrets he did not "Condemn also presence of Indo raiders in Sarawak and Sabah and then speak against whole idea of confrontation." Goes on however to "Honor his opinion" that it extremely important for free world maintain communication with Indonesia and to echo his hope that "room remains for further attempts restore peace between our country and Indonesia:

Visit by Indonesia Defense Minister.

Karachi Oct. 9 1964
Pak press Oct 9 noted comments made by Indonesian DefMin Nasution during brief transit stop Karachi en route from Moscow to Djakarta. When asked comment on possibility Indian nuclear capability Nasution reportedly declared it would be regrettable if Asia and Africa are involved in nuclear warfare through a country in the region. DefMin bitterly claimed Western powers have betrayed us. Cited US, UK, and Italy as refusing to supply even spare parts for transport aircraft. Nasution claimed fourth Indo-Soviet arms agreement signed during his 11 day visit to Moscow.



Handwritten: No JONR 1964

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Mil aid

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2E-78-299-8,964

Canberra

Press, public and Parliamentary reaction to news of first direct combat between Australian troops and Indonesian in Malaysia was surprisingly mild. Although somewhat overshadowed by domestic events, matter given top newsplay. Predictable & editorial reaction was that GOA had no choice except to carry out its commitments when requested by Malaysia. There was, however, underlying sense of relief that no Aussie casualties had resulted.



PM Menzies assured Parliament situation was well in hand and that GOA action would be reported to UN. He warned that GOA would continue take such actions in order help Malaysia defend herself against unprovoked attacks.

"Canberra Times" summed up general reaction by saying "most Australians will feel quiet satisfaction that by their prompt and efficient action they were able to help our ally."

Foreign Policy

Australia

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So long as Inc 2E-78-299-8 continues her attacks, then Australia will
be ready to support Malaysia. "

2E-78-299-8

Wellington, 1 Nov 64

In press statement Prime Minister Holyoake confirmed that new group Indonesian infiltrators landed South-West coast Malay Peninsula October 29 and NZ and Australian troops dispatched to deal with them. He stated (non-essential words omitted):



"This first landing by Indonesian forces on Malaysian mainland since Security Council debate Malaysian/Indonesian relations mid-September and non aligned nations conference Cairo at beginning this month. Both these meetings made crystal clear responsible world opinion totally opposed this kind adventure on part Indonesians. All But communist members Security Council joined in deploring Indonesian paradrops which had taken place 2 September and called upon parties refrain from all threat or use force; the Non Aligned nations, a group in which Indonesia has hitherto played leading role, also explicit that all states must abstain from use force against territorial integrity and political independence other states.

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"Obvious, there expressions int-2E-78-299-8-~~persons~~ have chosen disregard these feeling. Their protestatiojs they willing negotiate differences with Malaysians seem meaningless, especially since latest incident ~~occurs~~ occurs at time President Sukarno overseas on goodwill tour. There no doubt Indonesians government realizes it playing very dangerous game & in thus violating territory ~~not~~ another government. Peace of whole area continually disturbed over past year by Indonesias policy of confrontation. It hard see that further landingsand paradrops can fill lead aggravation in already tense situation.

"Indonesia simply cannot be allowed succeed in overthrowing Malaysia by armed force."

2E-78-299-8

Malaysian Letter to SC Pres.

3 Nov 1964

Major points in Malaysian letter to SC Pres (submitted Oct. 31 and being circulated as SC doc Nov. 2) as follows:



1. Indo has committed further acts blatant and inexcusable aggression against Malaysia since conclusion SC debate Sept. 17, culminating in Oct. 29 SEA landing of estimated 55 heavily armed invaders on Southwest coast mainland Malaysia.
2. These acts of barefaced aggression are in violent contravention UN Charter and cynical defiance of Norwegian draft res endorsed by 9 of 11 SC members in Sept. Indo has furthermore violated principles of OAU Charter, Bandung declaration, and Oct. 10 declaration non-aligned conference.
3. GOM emphasizes there is mounting evidence that Indo determined continue policy armed aggression against Malaysia, thereby provoking Malaysian people and wantonly increasing risk of major hostilities in region.

Policy Malaysia

UN SC

Malaysia

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4. Details of Indo incursions between Sept. 24 and Oct. 29, all but latter in Sarawak, given in annex to letter (which also being circulated).

2E-78-299-8

SUBJECT: MALAYSIAN LETTER TO DC PRES

11 Nov 64 NYUNat's

1. In Nov 10 letter to DC Pres, which being circulated as SC Dec Nov 11, Malaysian perm rep called attention to three recent incursions into Malaysian territory by "Indo armed personnel, both regular and irregular"



2. Incidents cited as follows:

A. Nov 2: Security Forces (SF) contacted enemy personnel north of Tawau in Sabah; one enemy killed, no SF casualties. In follow-up operations, SF discovered hut in deep jungle set up by Indos containing arms, ammunition, military clothing.

B. Nov 4: SF contacted about 40 enemy personnel south of Ba Kelalan in fifth division of Sarawak; at least one enemy killed, and one member SF wounded; search of area disclosed nine ambush positions.

Foreign Policy of Malaysia

UNSL

Malaysia

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C. Nov 6: SF contacted about 30 enemy personnel in Ramudu area, fourth division of Sarawak, about 15 miles from border; enemy casualties were two dead and three wounded.

3. Full text GOM letter being pouched.

13 Nov 1964

2E-78-299-8

Interviewed by newsmen following weekly cabinet meeting Nov 11, Tunku reported as describing Sukarno's Heroes Day speech as mild compared with previous speeches, hence "encouraging". Commenting on Sukarno's suggestion that British force Tunku to make peace, Tunku quoted as saying he has always been ready discuss things with Sukarno: "I am prepared meet him wherever he wants. Only condition is he must respect our sovereignty and withdraw his troops." Tunku said it "completely unnecessary" for Sukarno to keep harping about British. Only reason British in picture, he said, is because of Malaysian Defense Treaty with them, "and we have to have defense treaty because of Indonesia's threat to crush us".

During same interview Tunku reportedly described as encouraging Australia's announced decision to conscript men for peace time overseas service. He said it showed Australia realizes (1) Malaysia is her first line of defense and (2) Malaysia must be saved if small nations are to remain free.

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2E-78-299-8



Sept 9, 64 - 2 . Security Council - Malaysia.

Describing Indo paratroop landings, Ismail told of dropping flares and crates of arms, ammunition, medicine and rations. Interrogation of captured paratroopers revealed about 40 Indonesian infiltrators dropped from Indonesian air force plane from Djakarta. Paratroopers ~~XXXXXXXXXX~~ belonged to Indo air force paratroop battalions and 10 of 40 members of party were chinese Malaysians from underground movement "committed to violent overthrow" GOM. He listed arms and ammunition captured in area, including automatic rifles, sten guns mortar, handgrenades, detonators and slabs of TNT, which could be clearly identified as of Indonesian origin.

After Gun, mortar, helmet, parachute, uniforms and instruction books with Indonesian air force stamp placed on council table, President Morozov (USSR), noting Malaysian rep requested permission sept. 8 bring arms into chamber, asked they be removed until granted permission.

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This was first ~~in~~ No Objection To Declassification in Full 2010/08/30 : HIA-R JONES HOWARD P
er not" brought to 2E-78-299-8 table.

Indonesia first denied landings then said aircraft carried "carago of 70 beautiful Cambodian dancers," I email continued. It was for SC decide whether incident "fake" as Indonesia maintaining. It was not isolated act but one of series in policy "Malaysia must be destroyed." Indonesia took law into own hands. Council must enjoin upon Indonesia it desist from such activity and demand assurances such acts not be repeated in ~~XXXX~~ future and "that if vacate such aggression as it already committed."

---INDONESIAN STATEMENT---

3

Indonesia did not recognize "Malaysia" as sovereign and independent country but participating in debate since GOI directly involved, Sudjarwo (Indonesia) asserted. Malaysian allegations taken out of context and without reference to "deeper and broader conflict" between two govts. colonialism and imperialism "artificially dividing our great family."

There was Sudjarwo said, deep conflict between "new emerging revolutionary forces of freedom and national self-assertion in new emerging countries-- especially Asia and Africa and probably LA-- and old dominating forces "

-2E-78-299-8



Sep 9, 64 - 3 Security Council - Malaysia
Problem particularly acute in SEA where struggle has to be fought out, in many ways and in many forms."

Question before SC should be seen in context "this deeper and broader conflict" in SEA, Sadjarwo continued. Indonesia paid heavy price for independence. Struggle had to be continued. Long as imperialism and colonialism existed in world, fight unfinished. Indonesian revolution was part of "great human revolution this century" KMM and GOI had faith in itself and in "just cause of our struggle."

Areas called "Malaysia" used by "British colonialism as bases from which challenge, fight and subvert our republic, our revolution politically, economically and militarily," Sadjarwo contended. Idea of "Malaysia" originated in London. GOI not opposed to such idea. It had been prepared cooperate with "genuinely free and independent Malaysia", founded on will for freedom of MUMUK peoples rather

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UK actions gave rise to suspicion, not only in Indonesia, but Mal-
Singapore and Northern Borneo. In 1962 revolt broke out in Northern
Borneo against UK rule and projected British "Malaya" and colonial
territories concerned proclaimed independence. It be only fair
and just if leaders of govts in exile addressed SC. Indonesian
people could not but support "people's revolt" in northern
Borneo and GOI not refrain from lending support -- Moral or otherwise
to independence movement in territories.

Sudharwo reviewed Maphilindo concept and asserted UK "sabotaged"
implementation that part Manila agreements providing for: UN
reassessment peoples' wishes. GOI could not compromise
with "British Malaysia"---project of neo-colonialism." UK policy
was direct challenge to Maphilindo concept, and GOI launched
"confrontation" policy in order defend Maphilindo and Indonesia's
own national independence and revolution. UK used legalistic
arguments, but "so called international law of world of colonial
powers" could not be used in struggle against colonialism.

Indonesian rep then listed lengthy series of UK incursions
against Indonesian territory, subversive activities, smuggling
of weapons, parachuting British soldiers into east Kalimantan
and Machine-gunni

2E-78-299-8



Sept 9, 64 - L Security Council - Malaysia
weapons available for at members see. Allegations against GDI
must be considered against this background. GDI "compelled
counteract such ruthless confrontation."

Indonesia would not deny Indonesian volunteers, with militant
youth of Sarawak and Sabah, some Indonesian trained, entered
"Malaysian" territory in Sarawak and Sabah, and Sarawak said. It
was no secret they fighting there for some time. Why was GDI
so concerned with this new fighting in other areas, such as
Malaya? Was it because of racial riots and GDI unable overcome
internal troubles?

Inursions into each other's territory going on for some time
Sarawak admitted. Acts of Indonesian volunteers for
cause of freedom against neo-colonialism not "aggression"
whereas many hostile acts against Indonesia were. Problem

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could be solved ; refer dispute to -2E-78-299-8 in ASAF conciliation commission. Indonesia agreed to proposal but GOM accepted only on condition GOI stop confrontation policy and withdraw guerrillas. These were result, not cause, of conflict and they cease soon as political dispute resolved. GOI gone far in search for peaceful solution. It now up to GOM decide whether it wanted peace or war with Indonesia, Sudjarwo concluded.

---Rights of reply---

Ismail called Indonesian statement "old and often repeated story," but with "redistribution of emphasis." He did not degenerate into polemics of neo-colonialism and revolutionary socialism. Issue was whether GOI committed aggression Sept. 2.

Dean (UK) noted "with interest" Indonesia no longer maintained parachute landing "fake". accusations against UK and reported discovery British arms in Celebes "Quite unfounded." There no doubt however, rebels ~~MM~~ had British arms since they used by Indonesian army from which rebels defected. Question was violation Malaysian territory and SC should act deter such future action, strongly condemn such ~~MM~~ attacks, and call for assurance it not occur again.

2E-78-299-8

acil - Malaysian Complaint

15/5

Sept 14, 1964 - (1)

Bratt, Ivory Coast and Norway advanced ideas for inclusion in res as SC sept 14 ¹⁹⁶⁴ continued discussion Malaysian complaint against Indonesia. Malaysia prepared talk with Indonesia at any time but would not negotiate "with pistol behind our head", Ismail (Malaysia) stated.

Sudjarwo (Indonesia) continued attack UK and suggested it was ironic for US rep make accusation of use of force in light of Bay of Pigs and Tonkin. Other statements made by UK, China, Philippines, Czechoslovakia, Morocco. Discussion be resumed 3:00 p.m. Sept 15.

Facts showed Indonesia committed "blatant and inexcusable aggression", Ismail said. GOM threatened by "neo-imperialism: of "Gig neighbor" and came to SC prevent acts "from escalating



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"for defense purposes" **2E-78-299-8** Ismail pointed out. Bases never used "subvert GOI's national independence" and be "completely and permanently " eliminated soon as threats to GOM's security ceased.

Rejecting assertion Malaysian economy dominated by UK, Ismail stated tradewith UK only 12.5 per cent of GOM's *Mise* foreign trade. USSR one of largest rubber importers and *had no* Japan one of largest trading partners.

need "prove independence by expropriation without compensation. " USSR statement "badly misjudged " actual situation.

Principal problem with negotiations was "GOI's instance troops remain in Borneo States". GOM had to insist on withdrawal since it otherwise have to negotiate "with pistol behind our head". GOM wished Indonesia well and prepared talk with GOI "at any time, in any place and in anyway" in spirit ASAF solidarity, Ismail said.

Noting another landing made Sept 9, Ismail declared this was issue "of gravest importance". It was first time UN member openly admitted troops in another's territory and

2E-78-299-8

2nd of 5

Sept 14, 1964 - (2) Security Council - Malaysian Complaint
 proclaimed its policy was "eliminate peaceful neighboring
 country". Aim contrary peaceful co-existence res, submitted
 by USSR and Czechoslovakia, to charter and Bandung declaration. P. 2
 It was for SC uphold charter, Ismail concluded.



XXXX Evidence showed Sept 2 attack planned by GOI military and
 Indo rep admitted this was small-scale compared with other
 Indo "volunteer" operations on GOM territory, Silos (Brazil)
 observed. Council do well remind GOI its "aggressive"
 policy threatening peace and weakening UN which contributed
 so much to Indonesia's independence.

Brazil viewed "with utmost concern" violation charter
 obligations by GOI, Silos continued. Territorial problems
 between two countries should be settled by negotiations.

For 200 100 100

UNSC

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SC ~~must~~ compelled No Objection To Declassification in Full 2010/08/30 : HIA-R JONES HOWARD P
through presence UN-2E-78-299-8-try prevent recurrence similar acts.

-- UK STATEMENT--

Dean (UK) declared UK "most punctilious " avoid violations
Indo territory by land, sea or air. UK had no Dakotas in
SEA nor had it lost helicopter in Borneo as alleged

^{Underlying}
the theme of GOI's "spurious argumentation" was UK relationship
with GOM threatened Indonesia. UK was not threat to GOI's
sovereignty, independence or govt but obstacle to its
attempt "dominate its neighbor". UK and GOI had ~~an~~ harmonious
relations when Sabah and Sarawak actually colonies but GOI's
attitude changed when colonial rule terminated.

UK believed SC should disapprove "in unmistakable terms"
GOI's actions against Malaysia and make clear in future
it expected GOI respect Malaysia's sovereignty and territorial
integrity. First task was end "undeclared war" and clear way
for resumption of talks, Dean stated.

After President Merozov (USSR) gave floor to "Mr. Liu, "
Liu (China) observed he was representative of China and GOI's
confrontation policy

Sept 14, 1964 - (3) Security Council - Malaysian Complaint
It was well known Chinese Communists had "own design" on
Malaysia and upheld GOF's policy. Elimination European
colonialism should not be accompanied by "Asian expansionism."
SC should not condone use of force and should "pronounce its
disapproval" of incursions into Malaysian territory.

"M" in SC
p. 3

-- INDONESIA reply to Malaysian points--

Sudjarwo declared: GOI had no territorial claims outside its
boundaries; independence had to be fought for; struggle did
not end with recognition formal independence. In lengthy
denunciation, he charged UK supported politically and
economically rebellious secessionist movement in Sumatra.
Histroy Malaysia connected with "aggressive and subversive"
policy UK imperialism and colonialism - British "policy
of confrontation."



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2E-78-299-8
Singapore was real c
continued. Several large British warships entered Malaysian waters while Malaysian complaint being prepared. Ships apparently preparing "new Tonkin Affair." Denouncing UN ascertainment people's wishes, he said Indonesia and Philippines "could not but refuse accept" it. Under such circumstances, GOI could not recognize GOM which "clear and arrogant continuation and imposition of British colonial designs." Philippine claim to Sabah completely ignored.

It was "rather ironic" accusations of use of force came from US rep "whose powerful country shows such impressive record of use of force", Sudjarwo declared. US rep "forgotten" occurrences like Bay of Pigs and Tonkin Affair. US "wisely kept silent about British colonial ~~xxxxx~~ record". US not be able wash its hands of all this ugly business". US and UK involved in armed support of rebellion against Indonesia in 1958-59.

Maphilindo concept was solution to conflict, Sudjarwo asserted. UK reportedly decided bomb Indonesia but GOI retaliate with counter-blow. Political solution, not merely res, needed.

-2E-78-299-8

Sept 14, 1964 - (4) Security Council. Malaysian Complaint.
 Philippine suggestion submit conflict to four-nation ASAF
 conciliation commission new device and expression principle
 of Mapfilindo. SC should "seize this open door" and honor
 "growing responsibility of Asia and Africa solve own
 problems in own region."



M in SC

P 4

----PHILIPPINE COMMENTS----

Philippines previously ~~stated~~ expressed desire help "our friends",
 two contending parties, settle differences by way Macapagal
 proposal for ASAF conciliation commission, Borja (Philippines)
 recalled. Specific question before SC was charge of aggression---
 existence or non-existence of which was for SC determine.
 Philippines opposed aggression anywhere in world and he hoped
 council soon decide on course designed head off more serious
 incidents in area. He trusted dispute be settled peacefully.

For pol.

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if possible through support any other pr ^{uponal, but UCA prepared} 2E-78-299-8 ^{can adopt for peaceful solution.}

Hajek (Czechoslovakia) said peoples of northern never accepted idea of Malaysia and it was natural Indonesia support them but this action by "number of Indonesian volunteers" could hardly be called "aggression". Problem had to be examined in context decolonization. People concerned could settle differences if "all outside intervention and pressure" removed. UN should encourage settlements through understanding, negotiation and agreement.

Ivory Coast friend both Malaysia and Indonesia, Usher (Ivory Coast) stated, but obliged say parachuting foreign forces on territory sovereign state contrary to charter. SC should exhort both parties abstain from any act of hostility, resume negotiations, and call, if necessary, for good offices friendly nations. This should be based on proposal in Tokyo communique. His govt support such res which, drafted moderately, avoid premature condemnation.

Only on basis mutual respect and peaceful co-existence

would two countries b

Sept 14, 1964 Security Council - Malaysian Complaint
"correlations which are as ruinous as they are useless",
Sidi Baba (Morocco) suggested. Anti-colonial urge soon
enable Malaysia "free itself from sequelae of economic and
military dependence on former colonizers."

Natural GOI regard GOM as threat to its security since base
at Singapore like "gun pointed at its head", Sidi Baba
continued. Singapore and Aden were two main links in chain
of strategic bases surrounding ASAF world, "perpetuating
presence imperialists power". GOM should take into account
GOI position and adopt attitude of non-aligned power toward
Singapore base.

Sidi Baba appealed to resp Malaysia and Indonesia cooperate
with SC in finding formula which offer GOM security guarantees
any independent state entitled have and invite parties negotiate.



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He was convinced GO and know how emerge 2E-78-299-8; unfortunate crisis" while preserving its great prestige.

Indonesia had not denied Malaysian charged, it was case military intervention in another stated, and Norway deplored such acts as "irresponsible", Nielsen (Norway) observed. He paid tribute to Philippine efforts, but expressed understanding GOM could not start negotiations under pressure. SC should call for end armed attacks against Malaysia, appeal under Art. 33 to both parties settle difficulties soon as peace re-established, and appeal both sides accept outside mediation.

Ismail commented Indo rep criticized even SYG, making him appear "either puppet of imperialists or victim their duplicity". GOM endeavored reach peaceful settlement. He could not however, detect from "myx arrogant and neo-imperialist" Indo statement what issues were for negotiation.

Kuala Lumpur

Information Ministry release issued January 21, 1965 quotes airport statement by Indo Minister Senu (when he leaving for visit to India) on two topics as follows:

1. Peking-Djakarta axis obvious danger to peace in SEA, he said. Indo aggression against Malaysia similar to Chicom aggression against India. "We facing identical problems in this respect and there definite link between them. Hence I would discuss with Indian leaders steps that can lead to further strengthening our relations."

2. In reply to question about PKI agitation against certain GOI ministers, Senu said PKI policy ever since Madiun revolt had been to try split Sukarno away from non-Communist and anti-Communist leaders in Indonesia. He described PKI as successful in this so far, citing "misunderstandings" between Sukarno on one hand, Hatta and Sjahrir on other. Senu said

For. rel's
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MSA
PKI

Malaysia



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PKI's main aim
economically ~~destruction of Indonesian political and~~
2E-78-299-8 "Sukarno would be won over to its side."
This is background of campaign against Chaerul Saleh and
Adam Malik, he concluded.

Comment: Some of newspaper stories reporting Senu's
airport remarks at variance with text of official release.
Thus Malay Mail January 21 quotes him as saying (1) PKI seeks
political and economic destruction of Indonesia "so that they
can take over country", and (2) historical PKI policy of
trying to separate Sukarno from non and anti-Communists
seemingly successful "judging from widening rift between
Sukarno and Chaerul Saleh and Adam Malik."

-2E-78-299-8

Jan 26, 1965
 Follows text official MinInfo release quoting Extraff spokesman's comment on reported Ayub offer of good offices to settle Malaysia Indonesia differences:

Quote as the Prime Minister told a Japanese correspondent the other day, Malaysia would welcome any move from any country if it would help to bring about a peaceful settlement between Malaysia and Indonesia. It has always been Malaysia's foremost desire to live in peace with her neighbours, and to this end she has spared no effort nor spurned any constructive proposals in seeking to obtain that objective.



As Malaysia is the victim of Indonesian aggression, it ~~must~~ is only reasonable to expect Indonesia to cease all hostilities and acts of aggression against Malaysia first, so that any mediation effort will have a reasonable chance of achieving some result. There should be respect for Malaysia's territorial integrity and sovereignty, ~~and~~ any proposal for a solution should leave no room for doubt in this regard.

For. rel's

Msa

Tunkin

Msa

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The record has ^{-2E-78-299-8} that up to now our government alone has been making ~~on our own~~ and prepared to walk the last mile for the sake of peace.

Malaysia is an established fact, recognized and accepted as a member of the family of ~~nations~~ nations. This must be taken into account in any move to mediate between Malaysia and Indonesia for certainly Malaysia cannot be expected to negotiate for her own liquidation. Unquote.

NYT FEB 58

2E-78-299-8 ION PERIOD

1st of 2 cards

21,2/20 Padang(TD) ~~ruled~~ by a Jakarta Destr yer Ties Up Shipping at Rebel Port
I Navy's biggest warship, Gadjah Mada patrol near Padang./Psych war on.
/ "The belief here is that Jakarta will not make any sort of mil attack
in Cen Sum, at le st for the present. Is he e say that, if such an attack did
occur, it wd arouse the bitterest resentments here and disrupt any possib of a
peaceful settlement of the Padang-Jak diffs."

21,2/20 Jak(BK) SUKARNO-HATTA CONFER Rptedly H refuse to publicly condemn rebels
as PS wished because of belief condemnati n wd only sharpen situation. H agrees,
however, that rebels 'had gone too far' in estab op, on gov.

21,2/20 K. (Sp) PADANG Seeks to Buy Ships in Singapore

22,1/21 Pad(TD) JAK Planes Bomb Rebel Bridge . No casualties per Pad.

SIJAP UDDIN re ction to tough PS speech: "This closes door for
further efforts at peaceful settlement. Violence is now possible."

L. DJANBEX, Min of Interior: "The prob is no longer one of the
outer regions and the cen gov", he sd. "After PS' atm the prob has become one of
a choice btw com & non-com, belief in God & atheism. The revol gov in Pad has
already made its choice in going back to the indepen proc of 1945, wh was based on
belief in God."

Foreign relations

Rebellion

Hatta

US-Indo
Sumatra

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22/21 Jak(BK) PS SPEECH CHANGES FOREIGN INTERFERENCE *NYT Feb '58 2nd of 2 cards*
 1958 Sd "no essential diff" btw Jak & Pad. Dissident leaders failed to
 smooth rels & foreign intrigue prevent peace.

"There are a lot of indications that at present the regional demands
 have become the instruments of foreign powers in the pursuit of their objects, i.e. to
 make Indonesia either in whole or in part join one bloc or the other." Not specify
 what "indications" or which "for powers".

PS sd approved all actions taken by Cab before his return. Appar
 incl dison discharge of 4 rebel colonels.

PS assert that "deviation of 15 Feb must be met firmly & with
 all the strength at our command." ((INDO TEXT, PKemiu, 207-209))

DJUSADA explain to pers that gov plan emph economic, rather than
 military measure to attack rebels. Cite current econ blockade. Jak wld strive avoid
 armed clashes.

22,2/21 Manila(Sp) PHIL TO LET COL. SURAL & OTHERS STAY

Despite strong Jak representations to have Sural seized & returned,
 Pres Garcia told press he old not a "how failure to comply old be consid an "unfriendly
 act" by Jak. Sd S had I passports properly visaed & so far as he knew was not conducting
 rebel active in the Phils.

Foreign Relations *Rebellion* *US-Indo Philippines*

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2E-78-299-8

BRACKMAN, Indo Co. REBELLION- US POLICY: Confusion then Reevaluation

ALLISON RECALL
 p.249: "At the onset, the rebellion strained I-A rels almost to a breaking point.(3.I Spectator,1 Apr 58) US prestige in period preceding the rebellion was already at a low ebb: Little Rock, Sputnik, US abstention on WI, "and the abrupt recall of Amb John M. ALLISON on Jan 21. Allison had urged Wash to apply pres on D to move towards an Irian settlement, while putting pres on I to respect D econ interest--the Lingradjati-Renville formulas. Allison considered Sukarno a perpet revol who exploited Irian for its rev mass appeal. He felt Irian provided Aidit a natural link to Sukarno. Allison wanted to dissolve that link. But if Sukarno was a perpet revol, would Irian really satisfy him? The State Dept declined in principle to place pressure on a NATO ally for Sukarno's benefit. This, however, begged the question. At issue was whether relinquishing Irian was of greater benefit to Sukarno or to the non-Com world. ***

INTERVENTION BUT CONFUSED & INEFFECTIVE

"During the next three months (~~THE BEGINNING OF THE IRIAN WAR~~), in quest of 'peace and stability', the American position seesawed. " After contrasting Dulles 11 Feb & 20 May stms, Brackman continues: "The readjustment in Amer policy reflects a fundamental Dulles decision to contain the Indo war, for by then, the conflict embodied the ingredients of an East-West clash."

Foreign Relations

Rebellion

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"Sufficient evidence exists, including eyewitness accounts in Anglo-American press, to confirm that the FULI received tacit foreign assistance. (4.1g. Keyes Beech, Chicago Daily News, Apr 8, '59; The Economist, May 3, '59). Regular arms drops over rebel territory precluded erratic arms profiteering. In some broad respects, the role of the US in the FULI rebellion was comparable to that of the US & others in the Cuban affair in 1961. At best, the "intervention" was uncoordinated, reflecting moral uncertainty, confusion and indecision."

REASON: RELEAP ANAL OF US POL DIAMETER BY MAY 21 AGENT MINS p.251-252.

"The American re-evaluation reflected the judgement that Nasution offered the best prospect for stability. The Dutch seizures, followed by the civil war, had immeasurably deepened the army's participation in the governing process. Some called it a 'creeping coup' (B. Reports, 23 Jul 59). Washington was impressed by both the army's technical and political capabilities--reflected in the military operations--and Nasution's moves to prevent the Coms fr advancing their own interests as the army engaged the FULI. The Action Committee for Lib of VI, controlled by rad nuts & Coms, was dissolved and replaced by a VI Nat Lib Front under Nasution's chairmanship; the army prohibited parades,..." and even prohibited an elaborate FULI welcome at the airfield for a new Soviet Ambassador, Boris Volkov. (9. CSM, Dec 5) Djauanda also reshuffled the cabinet on June 25, dissolved the Mobilization Ministry, wh had financed the pyramids of the anti-Dutch campaign, and demoted Hanafi to a state minister. ...The now politically sophisticated FULI, influenced by Ali, launched a vigorous anti-Com campaign...."

2E-78-299-8

Sept 9, 64 - 1

Subject: Security council -- Malaysia

It was no secret Indonesian volunteers been in Malaysia-- which GOI did not recognize--for sometime helping "their brothers in fight for freedom," Sudjarwo (Indonesia) told council Sept 9 as it began consideration of Malaysian complaint against Indonesia. Such acts against neo-colonialism could not be termed "aggression" whereas many incursions and other hostile acts from Malaysia against Indonesia could be. GOI's confrontation policy end with peaceful solution and it was up to GOM "whether it wanted peace or war with Indonesia," he asserted, Ismail (Malaysia) accused Indonesia of "unprovoked aggression, blatant and inexcusable." He urged council "condemn such international brigandage," demand assurance GOI not repeat such or similar acts in future and "vacate such aggression as it already committed."

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Malaysia and UK R

Discussion to be 2E-78-299-8 3:00 PM Sept 10

At outset, SYG Thant announced death of Cyprus mediator
Touleja and council observed moment of silence.

---Malaysian statement---

Malaysia sincerely pursued policy of promoting friendship with
Indonesia, Ismail stated. Motivation behind enlarged
federation was close religious, economic and social ties,
and similar systems of administration, law and justice.
His country took "unusual step" of agreeing to UN fact-finding
on self determination. Neither Philippines nor Indonesia willing
accept "decision which presumably not to their liking." Indonesia
announced Military and economic "confrontation" and army infiltrations
stated "flooding into borneo states."

Malaysia exhibited "utmost patience" and persuaded by friendly
powers attended talks but Indonesian "appetite for concessions"
growing and efforts failed. GOM able "establish without shadow
of doubt "landing on Malay peninsula for sea-borne Indonesian
infiltrators was "calculated Indonesian aggression, carefully
planned and skillful

TO: Chargé - Mr. F. J. Galbraith

September 8, 1964

FROM: ECON - T.M. Manley



SUBJECT: Pan American's Abortive Landing at Kemajoran, Sept. 7.

I thought it might be useful to review, for the record, the events leading up to incident of yesterday (September 7) when Pan American was forced to return to Singapore without unloading passengers or baggage because of the refusal of the airport workers to provide service and the refusal of the police to provide protection.

(1) On September 2, you were informed by Foreign Minister Subandrio that the boycott against Pan American was contrary to the policy of the Indonesian Government. Then, in your presence, Dr. Subandrio telephoned Labor Minister Sutomo and Attorney General Sunarjo and instructed them to end the boycott.

For. rel. S

demonstration

Pan Am

US-Indo

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(2) On September 6, on the occasion of your call on President Sukarno, Dr. Subandrio again gave assurances that arrangements had been made for Pan American to resume its service to Indonesia. These assurances were communicated to Pan American, and, on the basis of them, and other official and unofficial assurances received from its own sources, Pan American decided to resume its weekly flight to Djakarta, beginning September 7.

(3) At noon on September 7, the Commercial Attaché and I called on Air Minister Iskandar and reviewed the problem of the boycott. The Air Minister stated that, while services involving the airport workers were outside his jurisdiction he could and would guarantee full police protection and safety of the passengers and plane while on the ground. When the Commercial Attaché reminded him that protection had been assured for the Jefferson Library in Jogjakarta but had not been particularly effective in preventing a take-over, the Air Minister emphatically reaffirmed that there would be no question about the safety of the plane and personnel while in Djakarta. These further assurances were communicated to Pan American and the decision to proceed with bringing the plane in was reaffirmed.

2E-78-299-8

MEMO
Pan-Am's Abortive Landing - Sep 7 '64

2nd of 3

(4) At approximately 2 p.m., shortly before the plane was due to land, a representative of the airport workers union contacted Mr. Paul Vohs, Pan American's airport manager and asked him why Pan American was challenging the boycott. Mr. Vohs cited the assurances that had been given by the Foreign Minister.

The union official then inquired whether the assurances were in writing. When Mr. Vohs stated that they were not, the union official said "In that case you had better not bring the plane in". Despite this last minute warning by a union official (at a time when it was already too late to stop the flight) Pan American's decision, based upon the Foreign Minister's assurances and the iron-clad promise of police protection by Air Minister Iskandar, was to proceed as planned.

(5) At the airport, with the Pan American plane already circling for a landing, union officials again demanded to know why Pan American was challenging the boycott and were again informed that government guarantees had been received that the



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boycott was ~~not~~ ~~given~~ ~~the~~ ~~2E-78-299-8~~ ~~they~~ were informed that their help was not required since the American staff members would themselves perform any necessary services. The plane was then landing. As the Americans proceeded to wheel the passenger ramp onto the runway, the highest ranking police official, Wichjani, Kom Pol I, forbade them from going any further, declaring that he "would not guarantee personnel safety or the safety of the plane" if the Americans persisted. As Pan American's American maintenance and service technician and two local Pan American mechanics proceeded toward the plane to perform technical servicing, the same police official stopped the two Indonesian mechanics from proceeding any further and warned them not to get involved. Obviously frightened, the two Indonesian mechanics left the scene. Mr. Vohs then sought help from Airport Director Germania but was told that he could do nothing, that it was a "union problem" not under his jurisdiction. The Chief of Garuda Operations, Captain Sudjalmo, refused to give any assistance whatsoever.

(6) After identifying myself as an Embassy Officer, I reminded Wichjani that Air Minister Iskandar had personally guaranteed police protection and I requested that protection should now be given the Americans who were attempting to wheel the passenger ramp up to the plane. He refused. At this point the crowd of some 200 airport workers was becoming

2E-78-299-8

MEMO - P.3

Pan American Airline to deliver service to

3rd of 3

nasty and threatening. There were only 12 policemen on hand to control the situation and provide protection. Their statements and actions were directed toward the support of the boycott action rather than the protection of the plane and the American personnel who, in the absence of other servicing, were attempting to unload the passengers and cargo.

Having been unable to provide minimum services to the plane and having been denied the promised police protection, Pan American officials reluctantly decided to send the plane back to Singapore.

ECON:TMM:anley:pm



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-2E-78-299-8

>> This question about U.S. is being asked by military men in Manila:

Whose side is U.S. on in Indonesia? Important Filipinos had thought that U.S. agreed with them in supporting the anti-Communist rebels in Indonesia, unofficially if not officially. Now Manila hears that U.S. opposes any kind of aid to the rebels, instead even talks of letting Jakarta buy U.S. arms.

Military leaders in Manila feel let down.

1958



>> There's more to it than injured feelings. You hear this in Manila:

The anti-Communist revolt in the Celebes is probably on its last legs. The tiny rebel air force has almost been wiped out. Jakarta's pro-Communists are winning. A Communist-dominated Indonesia is to be expected sooner or later.

To Filipino military men, a Red Indonesia looks like more of a threat than Red China. Indonesia is practically in the Philippines' backyard. Question that occurs to Filipinos is how much they can count on the U.S. for protection in the future, if U.S. opposes aid to anti-Communists in Indonesia now.

This Manila criticism of U.S. isn't out in the open yet. It is important because key officials share it and may see in it justification for a Manila policy of neutralism. The tide is running that way just a little now.

Foreign policy

Rebellion

U.S. State
Philippines

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NYT FEB 58

2E-78-299-8 REBELLION PERIOD/ JONES' INSTALLATION BY DULLES

/Wash, Feb 21 (Sp) Sec St Dulles bids godspeed today to H.P. Jones...with warning he was taking on "tough" job. / Mr. Jones, former Dep Ass't Sec St for Far East Aff, ..to succeed John M. Allison. / Mr. A reported reassigned after 1 yr in post bec. State dep felt he too favorably disposed to Indo in dispute over W. Irian. Appointment of Mr. Jones involved switch of plan..orig to go to Taiwan. Change of plans attrib to critical situ t in Indo following seizure of Dutch colonies. / Sit now even more acute with chal. to cent gov by rebel grp in cent Sumatra. / Concern of US manifest by speed with w. Mr. Jones is setting out for post following swearing in. He will leave tomorrow and arrive Jakarta latter part next week. / In remarks swear-in ceremony, Dulles not mention revolt in Indo. He also spoke of that nation in language quite different fr that he used in his last news conf. / ...Then Dulles plainly concerned over "comm in new Guided Democ gov't...He then suggested "CD not quite conform with Indo constitution and appear not satisfy "large segments of people". Added large segments of Moslem popul concerned "at growing comm influ in gov't" These remarks evoked sharp admonitions from Jakarta against interference in internal affairs. / Today Dulles said Indoc had come into being largely bec of US interest that republic should be founded. He added that US had had "very great interest in its future and in good relations between the

Foreign policy
Foreign relations

Rebellion



Allison
Jones Dulles

Us-Indo

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NYT Feb 58

Jones Installat by Dulles - cont

Republic and the US."/ Dulles went on, "great effort of citizenship required" to achieve the hopes and ideals of the Indo gov and people, and that "in that effort they have the goodwill and the sympathy and support of the United States"

MACIE, AUSTRALIA 2E-78-299-81, p.301-02// REBELLION - US POL SHIFT IN MAY, MAY?

"Several incidents in Apr & May, partic rebels' use of Amer pilots & aircraft fr Taiwan, caused serious strain btw I & A until reversal A pol in favor of Soekarno regime in May. There were two reasons for this change. One was the danger that Com su port for the Cen Gov was drawing Indonesia into closer dependence on Russian and Chinese aid: the reported purchase of MIG fighters fr Czechoslovakia, Russia's sale of merchant ships under her \$100 million credit and China's offer of a low-interest loan in April increased the opportunities for Com influence, and the only way Amer'ld check it was to reconsider her own refusal to sell arms to the Indo Gov. But a more basic reason for A mer's change was the rebels' mil failure. ((Note TDMG))

"The rebels' mil strength remained an unknown quantity throughout March. They failed, however, to gain political support snowball-fashion fr wavering mil commanders and, once Gen Nasution had successfully landed troops in West Sumatra on 17 April, their mil threat was confined to guerilla-type harassing. Even in North Sulawesi the revolt was effectively defeated by the end of June. Whatever hopes the rebels still held of obtaining a negotiated peace, it was now clear that they would be seeking terms, not dictating them. Djakarta was saddled w heavy costs of these campaigns, but its grip of the nation's for exchange earnings was not broken and its authority was no longer a matter of

Foreign relations
policy

Rebellion

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over
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Dispute."

-2E-78-299-8

"AUSTRALIA took much longer to recog the changing situation than Americadid. as late as the end of March, the Sydney Morning Herald still believed that time was on the rebels' side & that support for them wld gradually increase as they obtained arms fr abroad & Gen Gov difficulties increased....

"Mr. CASHY's last and fullest reference to the conflict was in the parl debate on 15 April. He reiterated that his Feb stn on non-interference remained gov pol and tht "the best thing for other cties to do is to keep out of the present fighting & to hope that Is can settle dispute btw themselves without further blood shed". ...The tone of his remarks was still uneasy to Soekarno regime & they throw no light on reasons why rebels had failed or why many anti-Coms had supported Soekarno or stood on sidelines. There was still no suggestion of any change fr the course Australia had been steering thruout-- strict non-interference, but sailing as close to the wind as possible without givin I outright cause for offence." (69. Com Parl Debates).

"In May, American pol pol tow I switched drastically to a rapproch energetical y promoted by new A Amb in Djak NP J. This was symbolized most graphically in decis to sell light arms to I armed forces in August. Unofficial commentators attrib this more to approval of Gen Nasution as putative strong man of the Army and the power behind the Indo Gov, than to any great enthus in Wash for PS himself & his emerging concept of "GI", altho a Cab reshuffle on 25 Je had marked a swing away fr left. So also did decision in Sep to postpone gen elec v..."

Q.DID US & AUS CONSULT ON POL TOWARD REBELS & DECISION TO RAPPROCH?

PEWARTA KEMILU (Th-2E-78-299-8- REBELLION - PHIL ROLE.
p.372-373. Foreign Affairs

PR No. P/20/58 - 12 May '58.



STATEMENT BY THE FOREIGN MINISTER.

Upon returning from the Philippines, I entertained great hopes that the friendly relation and feelings of mutual respect between Indonesia and the Philippines could be most cordially maintained. In my discussions with President Garcia and Foreign Secretary Serrano, it became clear that these two authorities were prepared to erase every impression that the Philippines are interfering in the internal developments in Indonesia. I feel that the recent statements made by Foreign Secretary Serrano strengthened my impression.

I therefore completely fail to understand the nature of the statements issued recently by the Philippine Secretary for Defence, General Vargas, that is whether this conveys that General Vargas cannot refrain himself from providing support to the rebels or whether General Vargas is exploring motives to furnish aid to the rebels.

I feel compelled to reiterate again very clearly Indonesia's stand in the matter. Up till now, there are no volunteers employed in Indonesia, neither as technicians nor as army personnel.

Foreign relations

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-2E-78-299-8

This can be investigated by all foreign missions in Djakarta; moreover, it has been substantiated by the scores of foreign correspondents in Djakarta in their reports.

The Government as well as the people of Indonesia are fully conscious of the danger that any participation of foreign volunteers may result in the outbreak of another world conflagration.

I express the hope that statements, or steps taken by General Vargas will not force the Indonesian Government to revert to foreign volunteers for its defence, because such a development will not be conducive to the security of the Phillipines.

I may add that Ambassador Pamontjak has already twice submitted a protest to Foreign Secretary Serrano in connection with the statements by General Vargas.

PEWARTA KEMLU (TH-2E-78-299-8RI-US/MAY '58 RAPPROCHMENT.

p. 373-374-375.

PR No. P/22/58 - 22 May 1958.



1st of 2 cards

Direktorat Penerangan Kementerian Luar Negeri hari ini mengumumkan sebagai berikut:

Pagi ini tgl. 22 Mei 1958 di Kementerian Luar Negeri diadakan pemukaran Nota antara Menlu Dr. Subandrio dan Dubes Am. Serikat, Howard Jones.

Nota ini merupakan perubahan dari sebagian dari Agricultural Commodities Agreement antara R.I. dan Am. Serikat yang telah ditanda-tangani pada tanggal 2 Maret 1956.

Dalam rangka Agreement tersebut diatas termasuk pembelian kapas seharga \$ 11 djuta dan pembelian beras seharga \$ 35,8 djuta. Perubahan yang diadakan dengan nota hari ini adalah, pembelian kapas dari \$ 11 djuta menjadi \$ 5,5 djuta, dan pembelian beras dari \$ 35,8 djuta menjadi \$ 41.3 djuta.

Pada upatjara pemukaran Nota ini Menlu Dr. Subandrio dalam kata sambutannya mengatakan a.l.:

It is a very simple ceremony, but I regard this as a very special one, because, after several weeks of exchanges of statements which did not necessarily reflect similar and common attitude, the signing of this agreement might be the start of a new understanding between both countries.

Foreign relations

Rebellion

Jones

US-Indo

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US secretary

No Objection To Declassification in Full 2010/08/30 : HIA-R JONES HOWARD P

US policy in Indon-2E-78-299-8 might be some people here who are not satisfied with it, but we - managers - who know the process of thinking of Mr.Dulles and the set-up to the State Department realize that US-Indonesian relations are improving. I do not envy your task, Mr.Ambassador, because immediately after your arrival in Indonesia, you had to solve "near-crises" situations, but thanks to your sincerity and approach these problems could be solved and we are now moving towards closer cooperation.

By saying this I do not imply that US policy is directed by ulterior motives, but on the other hand, you'll agree, Mr.Ambassador, that sometimes things that are logical and immediately understandable to us are not easily understood by the state Department and the people of the United States and vice versa. Human beings everywhere have the same aspirations but different stages in economic and democratic development will have their impact on the crystallization of one's thought.

I would also like to add that this agreement, in which the United States is the donor, and Indonesia the recipient, shows only that despite everything, the United States is on the road to progress.

I hope that the signing of this agreement and the statement of Mr.Dulles recently could be regarded as the first success in the discharge of your task in Indonesia and our first success in our efforts in Indonesia to bring the two countries closer together".

Dulles disambiguates Data Bear Jones a.i. mangkatam:

No Objection To Declassification in Full 2010/08/30 : HIA-R JONES HOWARD P

214 of 15 cards

UNISORT
FORM 92-100-1

"I cannot resist expressing my own personal pleasure for the opportunity of signing this agreement with the Government of the Rep. of Indonesia. This signing is significant, not primarily for the commodities which the Agreement covers but it is more important in a larger sense, because it serves as the symbol of the continuing good relations and cooperation between both countries and Governments.

It is the task of every nation to understand another nation and my most important contribution here must be in the direction of understanding and interpreting the aspirations and desires of the Indonesian Government and people to my Government and people. Cooperation and understanding is a two way street and I may add that Mrs. Jones and myself, despite of some problems we faced since we've been here, are most happy to return to Indonesia and work together with your Government and people.

I express the hope, Mr. Minister, that not only that the close relations between our two countries will continue but that they will become even closer".



over

Foreign relations Rebellion

Jones

US-Indo

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FORM 92

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Pihak U.S.A.:

-2E-78-299-8

Mr. Howard P. Jones
Mr. James C. Baird, Jr.
Mr. George Gurov
Mr. Jay A. van Swearingen
Mr. Hamilton

- Ambassador of the U.S.A.
- Director I.C.A.
- Deputy Director I.C.A.
- Embassy of the U.S.A.
- Embassy of the U.S.A. (U.S.I.S.)

Pihak Republik Indonesia:

Dr. Soebandrio
Mr. Ismail Thajeb
Pangeran Bintoro
Mr. Jumas
Sdr. Sundara
Sdr. Rody Karin
Sdr. Djajakusumah

- Menteri Luar Negeri.
- Kementerian Luar Negeri.
- Kementerian Luar Negeri.
- Kementerian Keuangan.
- Kementerian Keuangan.
- Kementerian Perdagangan.
- Bank Indonesia.

2E-78-299-8

9. SEC IV, 6/7(TU 1. ~~INDO CONFLICT: FORCES BEHIND THE OPEN REVOLT~~
 Bg article incl estimate of Rebel Gov strength. Despite limited
 territory under its control and lack of navy & air arm to strike central gov,
 "The Gov has a symbolic appeal, however, for all Indonesians dissatisfied w
 Jakarta and its political support may grow." material

"its soon leverage will be new Gov's most effective weapon." Notes
 rebel desire for Caltex & others to hand over revenues.

"Even leaving oil out of picture, new Gov can cause drastic econ strains
 for Jak thru forcing heavy mil expenditures & denial of proceeds fr exports other
 than oil fr its own areas. ..."

Can Gov invasion of Can Sum "would probably only result in units
 getting bogged down in guerrilla warfare after the fruitless seizure of a few
 cities and towns. Jak lacks the means for anything more than a small land attack
 or a light naval blockade and harassing air attacks."

SIAPRUDDIN has sd that if his regime can held out for 3 months, econ
 & polit disintegration will insure break-up of Jak Gov.

Large-scale Gov Bloc aid wld forestall disruption BUT likely provoke
 Wash aid. Possible Korean war sit.

Military
 Foreign Rels.

Rebellion



arms aid

over
 US-Indo

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FORM Y9

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PEWARTA KEMLU (Th-2E-78-299-8- SUBAN REACTION TO DUTCH PROTEST TO DULLES ON ARMS.
p.375-376.

PR No. P/23/58 - 29 May '58.



Directorat of Information of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs today releases the following:

The reaction of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Dr. Subandrio, towards the protest made by the Dutch Government to the Secretary of States, Dulles on United States selling arms to Indonesia is as follows:

"I hope and believe that the policy of the U.S. towards Indonesia will not be based on the political views of the Dutch. During these 7 years, since the transfer of sovereignty, more or less, it has been clear that the Indonesian-United States's relations has not been so satisfactory, precisely because this relation has been greatly influenced by the interests of the Dutch in Indonesia.

"Of course, I cannot suppress my impression that the Dutch Government has only one important aspect in implementing its foreign policy, namely, firstly: to hamper and hinder all progress in Indonesia and secondly: to prevent the return of West Irian into Indonesian territory. For this, it seems that the Dutch Government is prepared to sacrifice all Dutch interests in Indonesia, not only in the field of economic and trade, but as well the friendship of the people of Indonesia and the people of the Netherlands.

Foreign relations

Reaction

also see

*Dutch
US-Indo*

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I am convin-
ion between Indo-2E-78-299-8e United States, will not constitute a major
consideration in the future of the Indonesian - U.S. relations.

"It is true that the friendly relations between the United States and the
Asian Countries could not be reached any more via the Capitals of countries
in Western Europe.

"In this context the smooth relations between Indonesia and the United
States especially could not be based any more on the evaluation made by the
Hague, particularly at present when the Dutch foreign policy has been directed
to hamper the progress and the stabilisation in Indonesia".

SPECIAL ISSUE 14 2E-78-299-8 - FOR INTERVIEW

p.7-8/p.23-25/p.27-30.

"GOV STM ON THE CURRENT STATE OF AFFAIRES" 4 July 58.

By virtue of the above, it is no wonder either that the military rebellion, which culminated in the proclamation of the "Republic of Indonesia Revolutionary Government", greatly attracted foreign elements; the less so as the rebels made propaganda as if they were fighting for an anti-communist cause. These foreign elements were even more attracted when the rebels declared their willingness to join military alliances as their pledge for foreign intervention.

The general public already knows the broad outlines of the foreign intervention as they were reported in the papers.

The smuggling of thousands of light and heavy arms into Central Sumatra was proved by the Government by an exhibition of part of the arms which had fallen into the hands of our Army when it occupied Pekanbaru.

Besides, the commencement of the military operations at Pekanbaru also met with difficulties, for the very reason that at that time about five hundred foreigners, mostly U.S. citizens, felt endangered by our military operations.

Up to the last moment before the commencement of the military operations the Government held to its position that the safety of foreigners could be guaranteed by our National Army in the best possible manner, and that there was no need for any foreign military interference.

Foreign military
South
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services rendered 2E-78-299-80ers of the Armed Forces who - in a disciplinary manner, and sometimes at the risk of their lives - could occupy Pakanbaru and surroundings in such short time that the rebels were not afforded the opportunity to cause disturbances, so that the entire body of foreigners, could be saved.

The fall of Pakanbaru put restrictions on the smuggling of arms to Central Sumatra, and also afforded our army the opportunity to move and attack the rebels.

The intervention of the foreign elements in the Eastern part of Indonesia was even more dangerous in character.

As in Central Sumatra large-scale smuggling of arms could take place without hinderance, especially so when our armed Forces were tied by the military operations in Sumatra. In addition to this, however, aircraft piloted by foreigners were used to attack such places as Makassar, Balikpapan, Ambon, Ternate, Djailolo, Morotai. These really endangered the movements of our Armed Forces in that area.

The Government is also in possession of conclusive evidence that airfields abroad were used as bases to attack several places in Indonesia.

Faced with such a state of affairs, the Government had to employ all its tact and firmness to surmount the difficulties. Firmness in the sense that, if the attacks from abroad were carried on, the Government would be compelled to retaliate with all the means at its disposal which would mean that the rebellion in Indonesia would grow into an international conflict which would be hard to localize.

This firmness was expressed again in the Prime Minister's statement of 30th of April, 1958, which read as follows: (see text on separate card.)

SPECIAL ISSUE 14 2E-78-299-8 - FOR INTERVIEW
p.7-8/p.23-25/p.27-30.



2nd of 4 cards

"GOV STM on THE CURRENT STATE OF AFFAIRS" 4 July 58.

In addition to the above, the political factors which gave birth to the regional turbulences also had its origin with several foreign countries.

The afore-mentioned countries felt their positions threatened by the outcome of the general elections, when the P.K.I. (Indonesian Communist Party) made much headway. They wanted to exert their influence on Indonesia, in the economic as well as the military field.

It goes without saying that they looked for groups or adventurers whom they could use as their foremost pawns and as stepping stones for their endeavours.

Ideologically they came across the groups which styled themselves anti-communist. Besides, they also found people who were willing to "betray" the State we have proclaimed under the lure of money and arms.

It is still fresh in our memory that the "Republic of Indonesia Revolutionary Government" openly asked for SEATO assistance. They availed themselves of foreign pilots and officers (remember Lawrence Alan Pope). And, what is not less dangerous, modern arms were dropped in several areas. This will be set out more elaborately later on.

Foreign policy

Rebellion

Republic

Arms aid

US-Indo

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We can now record 2E-78-299-8 that the regional turbulences then came into a state which was most dangerous to the ideals of our Independence Proclamation as well as to our national life. This was the stage of the danger of foreign intervention.

FOREIGN INTERVENTION p. 13 ff.

In surveying and discussing the rebellion, it will not be possible not to touch upon the aspects of foreign intervention in our country.

It cannot be denied that, since our sovereignty was recognized in 1949, local rebellions and activities of armed gangs have been related, to a ~~smaller~~ smaller or greater extent, to arms-selling adventurers.

On the other hand, the Government is also aware that the implementation of an independent and active policy will meet with pressures from various circles, as a test to how far we are firm or strong in pursuing our independent policy.

A glance on the map will make it clear to us that Indonesia is surrounded by countries which are associated with other countries in one form or another.

Therefore, it is small wonder for the Government that such dislocation in Indonesia - whether it concerns the political, economic or military field - is most attractive to foreign adventurers or foreign countries which wish to derive the greatest possible benefit from such dislocation.

The reactions from several parts of the world to our West Irian action clearly illustrates the danger we have to face.

The Government has always taken this into account, when it takes measures as well when it canalizes its diplomatic activities to cope with these dangers.

SPECIAL ISSUE 11 2E-78-299-8 - FOR INTERVEN
p.7-8/p.23/25/p.27-30.



3rd of 4 cards

"GOV STM ON THE CURRENT STATE OF AFFAIRS" 4 July 58.

The Government also pursues the policy of not abandoning the diplomatic channels in convincing the countries which are in any way related to the afore-mentioned foreign adventurers, that their interference will not enhance the chances of the rebels to win absolute victory. Rather the reverse, the disorder coming up in Indonesia will automatically harm the afore-mentioned countries.

Mr. Speaker,

Our diplomacy is also directed to the countries which are friendly to us, especially to the Asian and African countries, in order that we may get their sympathy with regard to this foreign intervention.

The Prime Minister and the Minister of foreign Affairs sent special letters to their colleagues in several Asian and African countries.

Their response to our difficulties was gratifying.

The President of Egypt, the Prime Ministers of India, Pakistan, Ceylon, Burma and Japan responded favourably. At the least, it can be said that the Indonesian nation receives the moral assistance of the above-mentioned countries in dealing with foreign intervention.

Foreign policy										Rebellion										Separate										U.S. Info									
Relations										Asm. And																													
UNISORT ANALYSIS CARD										FORM Y9										BURROUGHS CORPORATION - TODD COMPANY DIV. - L. HADLEY										PRINTED IN U.S.A.									

The Prime Minister's response of the G2E-78-299-8 of Yugoslavia, the Soviet Union and the Chinese People's Republic. Their position with regard to foreign intervention also shows that Indonesia does not stand alone in the matter of foreign intervention in our internal state affairs.

With regard to the Philippines, the Government took an extra-ordinary step and sent our Minister of foreign affairs to meet his colleague, Minister Serrano, in Manila.

The outcome of the talks was that the two Governments agreed not to issue press statements which would deteriorate conditions.

The two Governments also agreed to discuss all issues concerning their respective countries through diplomatic channels.

The U.S. Government which, in the opinion of our Government, could influence the movements of the foreign adventurers, were also continually approached through diplomatic channels.

As a matter of fact, several statements of U.S. authorities, both civilian and military, made at the start of the Indonesian turbulences were construed by the rebel as having been expressed in their favor.

Therefore, the main object of the Government was to urge the U.S. Government to give such a statement as was in harmony with their official standpoint which stood for non-intervention in the present Indonesian issue.

The statement made by Foreign Secretary Dulles on 20th May 1958 was received by the Government as a hopeful sign for the cessation of the activities of foreign adventurers.

SPECIAL ISSUE 11

p.7-8/p.23/25/p.1

2E-78-299-8



4th of 4 cards

"GOV STM ON THE CURRENT STATE OF AFFAIRS" 4 July 58.

In full, Mr. Dulles' statement reads as follows:

"I would say this. That the United States believes that the situation in Indonesia can be and should be dealt with as an Indonesian problem.

The United States itself is a nation which has suffered civil war and we have sympathy and regret when another country undergoes the losses in life and the economic dislocations that are incidental to civil war.

But we do believe that the situation can be and should be dealt with as an Indonesian matter by the Indonesians without intrusion from without, and we do hope that there will be quickly restored peace and stability in the Indonesian Republic".

The capture of Lawrence Alan Pope by our Armed Forces is a more conclusive evidence of the participation of foreign adventurers.

It should be added that his statements also indicated the use of foreign airfields as rebel bases.

Mr. Speaker.

As reported by the newspapers, the Government's firmness and tact in coping with the foreign intervention has yielded satisfactory results.

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News reports, esp 2E-78-299-8se carried in newspapers in Western countries - which formerly were engrossed in and influenced by rebel news sources have now grown more objective in their news service, and are now also paying attention to the statements and news items of the Central Government.

In this respect the Government can go a little further in appraising the state of affairs: several countries which used to question Indonesia's Government policy and feel concerned about its internal development, now show an attitude which is more inclined to put confidence in the ability of the Indonesian Government and People to overcome difficulties.

The Government has the impression that these countries are also beginning to show their readiness to participate in Indonesia's economic development.

There is no denying the fact that the above foreign intervention caused concern - and is sure to cause concern again, when repeated - in Indonesian circles

The Indonesian Nation which was guided by peaceful principles when it proclaimed independence in 1945 - and when its sovereignty was recognized in 1949 - had, in point of fact, never expected that foreign forces would play a military part in our country.

It goes without saying that these bitter experiences will make the Indonesian Government more cautious in this respect.

Nevertheless, the Government is prepared to carry on normal relations with these countries, provided that its independent and active policy is not interfered with and that the Indonesian people is allowed to arrange its national life on the principles of the Pantjasila without any hindrance from whatever quarter.

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Rowetta Kaula (Th. IV, No. 1) WK - UN '57 - US POL.

pp. 18, 42-43, 47.

Gov. Sp. To Parl. on Indonesian-Dutch Relations. By For Min. Subandrio, 21 Dec '57

Mr. Chairman, as I mentioned earlier, this standpoint of the Indonesian government was put before many other governments, and especially also to the Australian Foreign Minister and the U.S. Foreign Minister Dulles, before the debates in the U.N. While the Dutch diplomatic representation in Indonesia has also been duly informed, with further emphasis that the solution of the West Irian dispute is an absolute condition for continuation of Indonesia-Dutch relations.

Although it was obvious from the debates in the U.N. that Australia and the United States of America were not able to change their attitudes in the voting for the U.N. resolution, I am under the impression that both countries have started to realize that Indonesia - with regards to West Irian - can just not be treated as a factor to be neglected. Viewed from the recent debates in the Australian Parliament, and also from a section of the press, I think, Mr. Chairman, that Australia is becoming aware that their political or military security depend very much on Indonesia's course in those matters.

Mr. Chairman, I feel necessary to state here that one day before the debates on the West Irian question started in the United Nations, I considered it necessary, in my capacity of Minister of Foreign Affairs, to go to Washington in order once again to discuss the West Irian question with Foreign Minister, Dulles.

Foreign relations

West Irian UN

Subandrio
 Dulles

US-Indo
 Australia

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FORM YD

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I undertook

2E-78-299-8 on the day previous to my departure from Jakarta,

information conveyed to me by the United States Ambassador in Djakarta indicated the possibility of active and constructive American participation in endeavors to solve the West Irian issue. However, for an unknown reason, Foreign Minister, Du Dulles, very firmly stated to me that the United States would continue to take a "strictly neutral" policy and would abstain from voting on the resolution tabled by Indonesia and her co-sponsors. The possibility should not be precluded that the United States attitude was influenced by new developments within the ranks of the NATO members, particularly by the rather strained relations between the United States and France as a result of American policy towards Tunisia.

In the present conflict between Indonesian and the Netherlands, the Government is trying hard not to invite any big power or either of the two blocs to enlarge the field of conflict. Therefore, the Indonesian Government appeals to NATO not to interfere in this conflict, precisely in order not to evoke reactions from other countries. In the present situation, the Government still adheres firmly to the principle of settling the dispute by peaceful means, and any attempt from any source to this end will be taken into consideration by the Indonesian Government.

On the other hand, should the Dutch want to bring the Indonesian Government and her people to subjection with the assistance of the physical and economic strength of her friends, then in order to secure people and country the Indonesia Government will be forced to reconsider the principles previously held. In this respect the Government has asked for the attention of the British Government not to allow the harbor of Singapore to be used as the base for the activities of Dutch warships, which impair Indonesian interests.

2E-78-299-811 - MI's New Policy.

P.71.

SPEECH OF FOREIGN MINISTER SUBANDRIO, BEFORE FOREIGN CORRESPONDENTS ASSOCIATION, DJAKARTA, 1 JANUARY 1958.

What is the position now? I regret to say, and most certainly I do not hold correspondents responsible, but the situation is that there has been a more or less complete blackout of objective reporting of Indonesia in the western press during recent weeks. During those weeks, Indonesia has been subjected to intense political pressure, from the Western part of the world which we have survived and will continue to survive. There have even been megalomaniac indications of military pressure. We trust that we can resist that too. We know that the Netherlands is currently campaigning for economic against Indonesia, and is demanding that friendly countries reduce their aid to us.

Let me tell you this again. After due warning, we in Indonesia initiated a new policy towards the Netherlands. It was not a policy of spur-of-the moment revenge or unpremeditated anger. This policy was not executed without a profound calculation of its possibilities and its problems. Of course, every policy contains certain unknown and incalculable factors, but I assure you that there is sufficient margin in our policy to take care of them. We have not been surprised by the effects of our new policy, and we will not be surprised in the future, although others may.

*Foreign policy
Economic*

*West Indian Speech
trade relations*

Subandrio Dutch

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I will tell 2E-78-299-8out our future activities. In the political and military fields, we are determined to maintain our independent foreign policy as far as possible. That is the basic matter with us.

In the economic field, we wish to preserve our relation with the West, and to improve them if we can, to our mutual benefit. No doubt we will seek new markets for our raw materials, and no doubt we shall experiment with new sources of supply for our industrial needs.

We hope that the West will not be too much affected by what it thinks are political considerations, and be prevailed upon or seek the surrender of our policy by economic blockade or sanctions. We hope for the best in this, but noone deny us the right to prepare for the worst.

If the Western world, incorrectly prevailed upon by feelings of solidarity with the Netherlands, should impose upon us regulations which do not facilitate normal ~~and~~ economic and trade relations - if that should happen, no-one can blame Indonesian if she is forced into unconventional or non-traditional trade patterns in order to survive the perios of the blockade.

2E-78-299-8

ON TRANSFER - WASHINGTON POST EVAL /URGENT NEW MEXICO

WASH POST, 22 Jan 68

"We hope that the shift in Jakarta and the replacement of Mr. Allison Deputy Assistant Sec Howard P. Jones does not mean what it appears to mean-- that the US has decided that the situation in Indonesia is beyond repair..."

"Some time ago this newspaper advocated that the US back the Netherlands in the New Guinea dispute. We have modified our stand on the basis of more information... It will do the free world little service if New Guinea is saved while Java is engulfed by communism.... if the stiff-necked opposition in the Hague could be overcome, it still would be worth trying a new initiative that would aim at renewing negotiations and at the same time safeguard the defense interest in New Guinea."



Foreign Relations

US-press
Glean Barot

Jones
Allison

US-Indo

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Powers, Kean (T) 2E-78-299-8 ALLESON & JONES PRAISED BY DJUANDA.
p.119-140.

1st of 2 CARDS

LUNCHEON SPEECH DELIVERED BY PRIME MIN. DJUANDA PARTAWIDJAJA, ON JANUARY 27TH 1958, ADDRESSED TO THE AMERICAN AMBASSADOR AND MRS JOHN H. ALLISON, DUE TO LEAVE INDONESIA ON RECALL.

Perhaps all luncheons should be gay occasions, I am sure that if they were, our digestions would all be better.

But this luncheon can hardly be a gay one, since it is to bid farewell to you, our honoured guests, who are shortly to leave our shores.

I have no desire to say anything which could even seem to be an interference in the domestic affairs of the United States, or in the decisions of the Personnel Division of the American State Department.

However I will say this: when I first had the pleasure of receiving you about one year ago, I never expected that your mission would be of such short duration.

It was a big surprise to myself and to my colleagues when, a few weeks ago, it was intimated that you would be replaced soon.

I am sure that this decision, which came as a surprise to us, has been made by the United State Government after careful consideration and with the full intention of promoting understanding and cooperation between our two countries.

Foreign relations

Rebellion
speech



Alleison Djuannda
Jones U.S. Info

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FORM Y9

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There is one2E-78-299-8 want to make clear, though. The Indonesian Government appreciates the services you have rendered to your government in order to build up, stage by stage, closer relations between our two countries.

I want to make that clear in order to dispel misunderstanding in various quarters both in Indonesia and overseas.

That process of serving your government by building up relations between our two countries is a principle which we here much appreciate, and one to which you have closely adhered during your whole stay in Indonesia.

From this point of view, we regard your mission as not yet having reached its final results.

On the other hand, as I said before, we have full confidence in the discretion of the United States Government.

We have no reason to doubt that your successor will be charged with the same mission as that which you have partly accomplished during your stay in Indo.

In fact, this confidence of the Indonesian Government has been justified by the choice of Howard P. Jones as the next United States Ambassador.

Many Indonesians, both in and out of the government, know Jones from his devoted service in the past as head of the ICA in Djakarta.

We shall welcome him and we hope that you, too will be satisfied that, in the future the seed you have sown will be nurtured by him, and will ultimately bear fruit and flowers, and thus will strengthen the relations between Indonesia and the United States.

I know that it is no strange thing to be transferred in the diplomatic service. We might even call that an occupational risk of the profession.

Pewarta Kemlu (Th 2E-78-299-8) ALLISON & JONES PRAISED BY DJUANDA.
p.139-140.

2nd of 2 CARDS

LUNCHEON SPEECH DELIVERED BY PRIME MIN. DJUANDA KARTAWIDJAJA, ON JANUARI 27TH 1958, ADDRESSED TO THE AMERICAN AMBASSADOR AND MRS JOHN W. ALLISON, DUE TO LEAVE INDONESIA ON RECALL.

But when I express these thoughts on your farewell, I am not referring to the ordinary periodic transfer of an ambassador.

I must stress that, although short, your mission has been deeply appreciated. When I say this, I am most certainly not implying that you have carried out any pro-Indonesian policy.

I am not implying that at all, but I am stating that your loyalty to American interests in this part of the world generally, and in Indonesia in particular; your dedication to the achievement of stability in the Indonesian economic and political fields, stability which is an essential source of strength in the relations between our two countries; these sound principles and your correct judgement about our national growth in this transitional period deserve the greatest merit and the deepest thanks, not only from Indonesia, but from the government and people of the United States.

When a friend leaves us, he takes a little part of ourselves with him.

Foreign relations

Rebellion

Speech

Allison Djundas
Jones

US-Indo

UNISORT ANALYSIS CARD

FORM 99

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2E-78-299-8

We hope that you will take with you a little part of Indonesia, and that, wherever your fortunes take you in the future, you will remember with warmth your year amongst us.

I can assure you that we shall remember you.

-2E-78-299-8



GRANT, B. FEB 64// MSA - WESTERN POL TOWARD INDO: GRANT REC POL BASED ON ASSUMP
 INDO HAS CHOSEN TO USE FORCE TO PRESS AIMS
 ((INDONESIA(Melbourne Univ Press, Melbourne, 1964,pp.175-76))

What sort of policy should be adopted toward Indonesia, seemingly intent on disturbing the peace? There has been argument about 'hard' and 'soft' attitudes, about the need to encourage friendliness and the need to provide scope for improvement. Foreign affairs are actually played as a much tighter game, especially by the Indonesians. The opportunity for moral initiative in deciding a policy toward Indonesia seems to me to have passed. It is necessary to assume that Indonesia is doing in foreign affairs what she has chosen to do.

Sukarno has plainly said that he expects the result of his policies for Indonesia to bring conflicts. He appears to welcome the prospects. The choice of diplomatic initiative becomes dangerous when a nation has so clearly chosen the techniques of force to make its policies succeed. Assuming that it will 'win' without a negotiated settlement, Indonesia may place a high price on calling off some frontation, even if its leadership can be persuaded to engage in 'quid pro quo' diplomacy. In these conditions, diplomacy runs the risk of always appeasing, never

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satisfying.

-2E-78-299-8

Contemporary history is hard to write with assurance. The history of Hitler's Germany or Mussolini's Italy are today deceptively simple, filled with the anguish and knowledge of later events. But at the time people were confused about what was happening; one of the confusions was their hope that it would not turn out the way it did. From the time Indonesia entered the world as a new nation, it attracted hope and sympathy. Some aspects of its policy, including those unpopular among conservatives in the west - such as the tight grip on foreign investment - are useful to Indonesia. If Sukarno were a socialist in deed as well as word, combining non-alignment with a determination to get on with the task of developing the intellectual and physical standards of his people, he would undoubtedly find wide support in the West as well as in communist countries.

It is unlikely that anyone would be disappointed if Indonesia turned out to be a great nation with new ideas which would really startle mankind with their freshness. A new idea for feeding and clothing the Indonesian people would be welcomed not only in Indonesia but by impoverished people all over the world. No-one would be unhappy if the creativity of the Indonesian people, which the present leadership is so eloquent about yet also distrusts, were given more interesting challenges than the old-fashioned demands of power politics.

But the idea of the 'deferred good' which has an appeal in rational and secure societies has found no receptive ground in the new Indonesia. The people's needs are so great and the justification of their suffering under colonialism so strong that there is an assumption, fostered by the leadership, that new Indonesia is entitled to whatever it needs. The gap between desire and expectation is emotionally narrow, although realistically it is widening. There is an air of feverish attainment in Indonesia politics, although the

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GRANT, B.; FEB 64 // GD FOR POL - GEN DEVELOP: DYNAMIC, CUNNING, UNPREDICTABLE
 ((INDONESIA (Melbourne Univ Press, Melbourne, 1964)) pp. 145-46.

As diplomacy was practiced in the early days of the Indonesian Republic, its object was to avoid a commitment to either of the two major power blocs, led by Washington and Moscow. An over-commitment created the danger - which became real in the case of the Sukarno cabinet - of rejection by a parliament of sensitive nationalists. A minor parallel might be found in Australian government efforts to avoid the impression that either of the country's allies, the United Kingdom or the United States, is favoured. Since 1957, when President Sukarno introduced his guided democracy, and particularly since the reorganization of government in 1959, Indonesian 'non-alignment' has become more dynamic. It has become less a matter of finding a mean between the positions of the great power competitors and more a matter of deciding what are Indonesia's particular interests. This is a normal maturing process, but it has been accompanied in the case of Indonesia by an ideological development which has created around the idea of the national interest conceptions of moral grandeur. The policy has been implemented, also, with dash and cunning. Indonesia's military strength has been transformed in the process and

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xenophobia has increased, certainly balanced, the cluster of leaders around the President while the country at large struggles with basic problems that have scarcely been touched in the years of independence, and it is true to say that Indonesia represents, to its neighbours, friends, and enemies, an unpredictable hazard.

Dealings between countries are made easier by knowledge of two things - the definition of each other's 'vital interests', which is the area only to be disturbed in the expectation of serious trouble, and the certainty that the government is 'responsible', in the sense that it can be relied on to stand by whatever commitment its representatives make. In both these respects Indonesia has created doubts in the international community. One reason is the system of government, which relies on President Sukarno's ability to satisfy the power groups supporting him. These groups pay their respects to the concepts and symbols which the President has created to identify the Indonesian nation, but some of them are opposed on fundamental questions and on the distribution of power within the state. To satisfy these competitive courtiers, the President has devised even more abstract theories with little practical application except aggrandizement abroad. Another reason, which applies especially to foreign affairs is that Indonesia's interests, so vehemently pursued, are so broadly and emotionally defined that their limits cannot be perceived. The long crisis over Malaysia revealed all these factors.

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ORANT, B.; FEB 64// MSA -POST-SUMMIT BREAKDOWN: "MECHANICS OF CONFRONTATION CONTINUED"

((Indonesia(Melbourne Univ Press, Melbourne, 1964)) pp.144-45; 149

"Indonesian press & public response to results of meeting((Manilla Summit)) were cautiously favourable, encouraged by Br criticism of Tunku for having conceded too much. Djakarta comment stressed t Indo pos in SEA had been recog by consultations on Msa. ...

But it was evident that, whatever was said in public, the mechanics of confrontation were continuing. Joint navy and air force manoeuvres were held in the South China Sea, involving some fifty ships and squadrons of MIG-21's and TU-16's. General Nasution visited Kalimantan and made several tough speeches, urging the frustration of Malaysia 'by force if necessary'. Djakarta diplomatic circles were convinced that Indonesia would not call off its opposition. A foreign ministry official within days of the return of the party from Manila, advised several correspondents, including the author, that a showdown with Britain was planned. 'Malaysia is a test of strength between Britain and Indonesia', he said. 'Britain has valuable investments in Indonesia - that is our weapon.'

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The arguments ~~1-2E-78-299-8~~ding weeks over the number of observers to accompany the United Nations ~~team~~ and the time given to the team to complete its task seemed peripheral to the fact of confrontation, which continued, especially in

raiding on the Sarawak border by guerilla bands trained in Indonesia. When the secretary-general of the U.N. (U Thant) announced the team's finding, which was a strong endorsement of the wish of the majority of the people for Malaysia, Indonesia had an opportunity to accept Malaysia without loss of face, as the conditions of her public concern for the wishes of the people of the non-independent territories had been met. But she chose otherwise. When Malaysia was proclaimed on 16 September, Indonesia and the Philippines refused to recognize it and the new government of Malaysia broke off diplomatic contact, bringing political relations of the South-east Asian neighbours to the lowest point since they achieved independence.

Indonesian government leaders are also convinced that their country's riches bear a fatal fascination for other nations. They may have reasoned that, when the British had been properly humiliated, they would return, chastened and friendly, like the Dutch, eager for trade, and that, in any case, the Japanese and West Germans were waiting to take their place. The sequence of events itself may have had an effect, the tough line from Kuala Lumpur (fixing Malaysia Day as 16 September before the United Nations' survey had been made) leading to a point of no return.



GRANT, B.; FEB 64// MSA --INDO MOTIVES: FEAR OF ENCIRCLEMENT; NASUTION
((Indonesia(Melbourne Univ Press, Melbourne, 1964),p.167t; 77b-78t))

Indonesia is highly sensitive to its security. From the beginning it has been a shaky national union, with a centrifugal tendency. The regional rebellions confirmed the suspicion that covetous eyes were cast on the outer islands, especially rich Sumatra. The British naval, air and military bases in Singapore, and the American air base in the Philippines, as well as the looming presence of the American seventh fleet, can be seen as a threat to Indonesia's security. As Nasution has pointed out, Britain and America are too big for Indonesia to handle; they may be friendly now, but Djakarta cannot be sure what kind of policies will prevail in London and Washington in the future. Its freedom of action in the region is undoubtedly curtailed. Because it is non-aligned and antagonistic to the interests of western capitalism, Indonesia may well feel that she is surrounded by the enemy and must therefore double her guard.

In foreign affairs and defence, he has followed a strongly nationalist line which has not been out to a pre-war pattern. He negotiated the Moscow arms deal in 1960 and has been belligerent on the Malaysia issue. In an interview he gave me

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In August 1963, when 2E-78-299-8 Kame and Subandrio had returned from the "regional" meeting in Manila, "Kame" argued strongly for the removal of British and American military authority from the region of South-east Asia, while bases like

Singapore and Clark Field (the American air base in the Philippines) remain under western control, he said, Indonesia's security was threatened. Britain and the United States were major powers which Indonesia could not expect to control; it must therefore regard them - with the example of old to the out-of-land rebels in 1958-9 on record - as a danger. There is now some recognition that Hawaii is not the simple, unexploited man that some of his western supporters believed him to be.

Indonesian foreign policies have been dominated by two considerations. One is the requirement that Indonesia should be independent of the cold war power blocs - that she should remain 'non-aligned' or 'neutral'. The second is fear for the territorial safety of the young Indonesian nation. Lately, a third element has been noticed - the claim that Indonesia should be recognised as the first power in South-east Asia and the leader, internationally, of what are called the new emerging forces.

-2E-78-299-8-



GRANT, FEB 64, SEA --INDO MOTIVES: EXPANSIONISM?
 ((Indonesia (Melbourne Univ Press, Melbourne, 1964), pp.149-50))

After listing the customary reasons advanced for Indonesian confrontation-- Suk need to offset PKI attack on econ reform, Nas need repl emerg reg, dislike for Tunku, jealousy M econ success, KL tough line etc --, Grant asserts:

But the fact remains that Indonesia, given several opportunities to accept Malaysia in a spirit of regional friendship, declined to do so, As a deliberate act a sovereign nation, its confrontation of Malaysia must be given face value. It accords with President Sukarno's theory of inevitable conflict between the 'new emerging forces' and the 'old established forces'. It illustrates Dr. Subandrio's principles of revolutionary diplomacy. It documents General Nasution's fundamentals of guerilla warfare.

It also represents a claim by Indonesia for supremacy in the region. 'We must realize that we are a nation of one hundred million, which means five times the Philippines and ten times Malaysia', said the minister for information (Mr) Ruslan Abdulgani) in a speech to the National Front in Medan in August 1963 on the Malaysia crisis. 'It is our role to lead. Because of this we must be prepared to oppose

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every form of neo-colonialism union support the development of Malaysia. And we will ^{2E-78-299-8} This bid for hegemony makes necessary a fresh assessment of assurances. often requested. that 'Indonesia has no territorial claims whatsoever outside the borders of what used to be the Netherlands colony of the East Indies' (Subandrio, in September 1962). This kind of assurance obviously does not mean that Indonesia is renouncing the right to see that the people of Portuguese Timor, Australian New Guinea, Brunei, or people in the grip of Malaysian neo-colonialism like the inhabitants of Sarawak and Sabah, should not be given 'social justice' as defined by the Indonesian revolution, which, as President Sukarno has frequently pointed out, is part of the revolution of mankind. General Nasution expressed this viewpoint on 25 December 1963, on his return from a trip to the Soviet Union, the United States, Yugoslavia, France, Turkey, the Philippines and Thailand, during which he signed another arms agreement in Moscow. In the countries we visited we explained that Indonesia has no territorial claims anywhere, but will keep supporting North Borneo and other struggling nations anywhere to drive out the colonialists. We will always be prepared to train their soldiers and we will not stop our young men from joining them'. The essence of the Malaysia conflict is that Indonesia does not believe that the decolonization of the Borneo territories has been properly carried out and feels justified, to the extent of military intervention, in reversing the process. The same objections could later apply to any of the other territories mentioned.

2E-78-299-8



MACKIE, JAC/ MAR 64/ MSA - INDO MOTIVES - DIVERSIONIST HYPOTHESIS INSUFFIC EXPLAN
 (("Indonesia: a background to 'confrontation', World Today(Apr 64),pp.139-40))

"Why has PS committed Indo to such uncompromising, & appar disastrous,
 econ & mil 'confrontation' w Msa over the past year? ...Is his motive just a
 diversionary tactic to distract attention at home or to shield him fr potential
 rivals for power? ..."

Diversionist hypothesis has more plausibility but is still not an adequate expla-
 nation. Certainly President Soekarno benefits by having an external issue of this
 kind to manipulate. But why did the Communist arty(Pai) take the lead in building
 up the issue if the effect was merely to shield the Government against its criticism
 & give its rival, the emy, justification for sustaining an atmosphere of national
 emergency? It would be indeed be difficult for the President now suddenly to call of
 confrontation without being able to sugar the bitter pill with some symbolic success
 -- but not because he must have an external issue; his fertility of ideological ima-
 gination is rich enough to concoct something else if that is allhe needs. The roots
 of the whole episode are much more tangled. Soekarno is heavily committed ideologi-
 cally and politically to the stand that he has taken. What is more, the Indonesians

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have been indoctrina-2E-78-299-8siastic support for the objectives of confrontation, despite the sacrifices it has entailed. Even if Soekarno and his Ministers wanted to reverse the course they found themselves embarked on last September, it would be a ticklish operation to steer the ship of state about if the trickly tides and reefs of our ent Indonesian politics. Soekarno could do it, if anyone could--assuming he were disposed to; but it would need time and tact."

On July 2E-78-299-8e Attorney General ordered a halt to the month-long press battle between the independent newspaper Merdeka and the PKI organ Harian Rakjat, which has embodied the most outspoken attack on the PKI in Indonesia in recent years. The Attorney General called in the managing editors of both papers and asked them to cease the polemics, which he said in a written statement, "endangered the unity of revolutionary forces in the government, disturbed political stability, and might cause the public to be disunited in their thinking concerning the revolution, and that this was a situation which would detract from carrying out the President's two-fold command to crush Malaysia." Furthermore, said the Attorney General, Guided Democracy was not the field for opponents to fight with each other or for one group to seek a victory over another.

The July 9 issues of both papers were devoid of articles and cartoons on the subject which had been steady fare for the last few weeks, since both papers had naturally "accepted" the Attorney General's decision. In an editorial, however, Merdeka served notice that it had

Political parties

Indo-press

PKI

Djakarta



not completely 2E-78-299-8¹e muzzling order. It said that acceptance of the order did not mean that they should not continue to discuss the problems of the revolution and referred to a rarely quoted clause in the 1945 Constitution which guaranteed free speech, and concluded that it cannot be wrong to exchange views since it is "far better to battle with words than with guns". The paper had expounded the most forthright plea for freedom of speech that has been seen for some time in Indonesian public media in the edition just prior to the Attorney General's order. Merdeka claimed that every citizen had the right to express his opinions both orally and in writing, and that no party or group had the right to prevent it. Moreover, "tyranny of thought is far more dangerous than tyranny of body."

JOINT STATE-UNIA-DEFENSE MESSAGE

July 7 1964 - (1)

To correct possible misunderstanding about U.S. policy toward Southeast Asia stemming from various and conflicting press accounts, Department calls attention to President's news conference statement of June 23 as accurate definition of U.S. policy aims. Statement was carefully drafted and is exact expression of President's views. It should be used as principal source of guidance on this subject in discussions as appropriate with host country nationals, local press, etc.

Special attention is drawn to following paragraph of that statement which states kernel of President's position: quote...there is danger in Southeast Asia. It is a danger brought on by the terrorism and aggression

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so clearly, if the United States is to use its strength to help those who are defending themselves against terror and aggression. We are a people of peace-- but not of weakness and timidity. I should like to repeat again that our purpose is peace...unquote.

For broader, more detailed discussion of situation refer to Foreign Affairs Outline, Department of State, May 1964, No. 6, entitled quote United States Policy in Viet-Nam unquote, transmitted by USIA June 25 as info guide 64-24.

Supplementing these statements here are additional points of guidance on U.S. policy:

1. U.S. is two-ocean power, with vital interests and commitments in the Pacific and Atlantic areas, in Asia as well as Europe.

2. Our specific commitment to the Republic of Viet-Nam goes back a decade. Though the U.S. was not a party to the 1954 Geneva Accords we stated that we would not violate them, and that we would regard violations by the Communists a serious threat to international peace and security.

2E-78-299-8



July 7 1964 - (2) Joint State - USA - Defense Message

3. Our consistent policy since then has been to assist South Viet-Nam in its efforts to maintain its freedom and independence in the face of covert Communist aggression in violation of the Geneva Accords. We intend to keep to that policy.

4. The battle against this Communist attack is being fought by the Viet-Nam itself, with the aid of ~~MMX~~ supplies, equipment, training, and economic assistance, sent by the United States and other free nations, at the request of the Republic of Viet-Nam.

5. We are well aware of the serious consequences that could flow from an expansion of the war beyond the borders of SVN. We do not desire it and will seek to ~~mmx~~ avoid it, but we shall not abandon our objectives or commitments out of fear of it.

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6. Action in or by the central task [2E-78-299-8] building a secure basis for stability and progress in South Viet-Nam itself. Any activity that reaches beyond South Viet-Nam would be supplementary to, not a substitute for the essential on-the-ground solutions in South Viet-Nam. As the Secretary of State said at his press conference on July 1 quote peace ought to be possible in Southeast Asia without any extension of the fighting unquote and quote...the first objective of our policy and our desire in Southeast Asia is this to explore that possibility unquote.

7. The U.S. seeks no war with anyone and will undertake no rash actions. Our purpose is peace, but all should note that we are neither weak nor timid in defense of the independence of free nations.

8. Much is heard about negotiations, neutralization or a political settlement to bring peace to Southeast Asia. Certainly we would like nothing better than an end to the terror and killing. We support the negotiated settlements spelled out in the Geneva Agreements of 1954 and 1962. But without Communist observance of these accords-- and they have violated both from their beginnings-- there can be no new negotiated settlement.

-2E-78-299-8-



July 7, 1964 -- (3) Joint State - USA - Defense Message

The purpose of this guidance is to guard against loose and aimless talk about, on the one hand, possibilities of war or, on the other hand, easy ways out of our Southeast Asian commitment. Recipients will be advised of any change in the policy expressed in these guidelines. Meanwhile great caution should be observed towards the use of unattributed or partially attributed press accounts as a basis for guidance.

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2E-78-299-8

KL JULY 7, 1964

Departing July 5 for London Primin conference, Tunku said he would brief Commonwealth Primins, US and French leaders on Jakarta regime's confrontation of Malaysia. Said "We want a lot of help - money and equipment - to meet threat posed by enemy...as well as moral support. We wellcome help from all countries of free world in this crucial hour of need."

Tunku said he prepared for further tripartite meetings to resolve differences if there evidence of sincerity on part Jakarta regime. Added that Malaysia could not compromise sovereignty or honor. Hence build up of country's defense capability necessary.

Re US visit Tunku said he planned brief Pres Johnson and address council on World Affairs. He closed saying American public opinion very sympathetic to Malaysia.

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Foregoing taken from 2E-78-299-8, al release by information ministry.

July 6 Malayan Times reported Tunku as also saying he envisaged little prospect of further talks with Indonesia. He quoted as saying further, however, that he had asked Deprimin Razak to follow developments and "if he convinced of tangible results, to go ahead with any fresh talks which might be initiated."

2E-78-299-8

ARCHIVES

1st of 2 cards

The Deputy Chief of Mission attended, as my representative, the ground breaking ceremony for the 29 story Trade and Tourism Building on the morning of July 9, 1964. He gave the following account of the occasion, at which Sukarno spoke.

President Sukarno spoke and then led singing and dancing during the ceremony which lasted all morning. This has come to be the standard official variation of the traditional Indonesian Selamatan (celebration). The President, speaking to ministers, diplomatic corps, contingents of Armed Forces and other local VIP's, used the occasion of the ground breaking ceremony to heap scorn on those who predict the economic collapse of Indonesia. He said the Trade and Tourism Center would be the biggest building in Asia and that Indonesia is also building a planetarium which will be the biggest one in the world. These, along with the Hotel Indonesia and the other hotels and projects completed, in process or in planning stage, are evidence of economic progress in Indonesia rather than collapse.

economy

Sukarno

prestige

press-US

USSR-and

Character-building

US-900

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The ^{12E-78-299-8}aid that Indonesia had 237 separate offers of credit, which was an indication that there were many who believed in the future of Indonesia. He also said that Mikoyan has agreed that in 1965 a major highway in Kalimantan would be completed, two steel mills would be built, and the Asahan Dam would be started. Sukarno identified only as "imperialists" those who run down Indonesia, but he clearly pointed at the U.S. press.

Sukarno said "Never have I read an artical from a Soviet, Chinese Communist or Cambodian periodical running down Indonesia. Not long ago someone asked me 'why do you hate us'. I told this person that we do not hate anyone except those who ridicule us and run us down.

President Sukarno, in answer to those who claim that he wastes money on buildings, said that Indonesia had a "three dimensional outlook" before colonization and had built some of the greatest temples in the world such as Borobodur and Prambanan. Indonesia's outlook had become "flat" during the colonial period, but had now recovered its three dimensional life. Sukarno repeated his claim that Indonesia would have the biggest building in all of Asia and the biggest planetarium in the world. He said Indonesia was already recognized as an important country economically, and would continue to build in ways which would astound the world.

3 Jan '65

All papers played Indonesian withdrawal from UN on front page but not necessarily lead article. Straits Times quotes Prime Minister as saying "good riddance. Nobody will shed any tears over spilt milk." Only editorial noted so far was in Utusan Melayu which said Sukarno wanted to pull out and seating of Malaysia on UNSC was only excuse. Reason for pull-out was perhaps desire for greater freedom in disturbing peace. Disillusionment with UN began with U Thant support of Malaysia during ascertainment of public feeling in Borneo before Malaysia formed. Step up in crush Malaysia activity to be expected. Editorial concludes that Sukarno had now gone so far in sharing "Peking's bath."



Foreign relations

UN Msa Msa-guan

UN-withdrawal

Msa
Djakarta

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-2E-78-299-8

COM Letter to

Jan 6 1965

1. Letter m to SC Pres from Malaysian perm rep, dated Dec. 31 and circulated Jan 4, begins by giving accounts of seven Indo incursions into Malaysia between December 13 and 27. Most detailed account is that of December 24 incident when Ajax captured seven boats which m had come from Sumatra carrying 22 Indos and large quantity arms and other materials, including propaganda leaflets purportedly issued by Bentara Republik Nasional Malaya.



2. Letter then quotes Indo statement to SC of Sept. 9 conceding Indo involvement in incidents various parts Malaysia, and notes GOI has not even attempted answer charges made since then in COM Letters to SC Pres.

3. Noting that new incidents will increase COM and Indo casualties beyond estimated 100 plus and 500 plus, respectively, letter ends. "Is it too much expect and too late receive for COM any succour or support fr from SC that will put end to purposeless wastage of human and other resources?"

Foreign Relations

MSA

UN

MSA Military
UNSC

MSA

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Jan 7-1965

Times of India Jan 6 frontpages signed Cairo article by Sudhakar
That saying India has won first round against Indonesia
in championing Malaysia's participation in proposed Afro-Asian
conference Algiers. Article says Conference's Ambassadorial
committee meeting Algiers, despite Indonesian opposition
supported Indian stand that any participating country can propose
that Malaysia be invited and that this be decided by Afro-
Asian Pomins meeting before conference. Article expects India
to propose Malaysia participation and says is there is no
consensus, issue may be voted. Says Ambassadorial committee
also unable decide on Soviet participation and Pomins will
decide this issue also. E



Foreign Relations

AM
HSA

2nd AA conf.

India

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14 Jan 1962-2E-78-299-8

Surabaya Municipal National Front will stage mass rally tomorrow at 8:00 AM in support Presidential decision to withdraw from United Nations. Appeal has been made to all political parties and mass organizations to mobilize their members for demonstration. Reportedly heads of government services, state enterprises, private companies have been requested to release employees for rally and to provide transportation to and from. Slogans and signs which have been approved by front as follows:

- 1) support Presidents decision withdraw from United Nations
- 2) Indonesian people reject UN and call for its retooling
- 3) declare US Consul Surabaya persona non grata
- 4) confiscate all

row rel's

demonstrations

Surabaya
US-8-10

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Bung Karno. -2E-78-299-8

Above no. 3 obviously generated by "my very good friend " Surabaya Mayor Murachman who I understand from several reports would like to see me go.

Newspaper reports indicate that FornMin Subandrio to address rally. However, would appear to be no substance to this, since FornMin not in Surabaya and it is not likely that he will turn up in time for rally tomorrow. There is no indication as yet that demonstrators plan to march on Consulate. Will keep Emb informed as to developments.

2E-78-299-8



June 6, 1964

Following text (unessential words omitted) statement issued by Primia Office. KL June 6, 1964

Quote: Referring to message sent by Mr. Lopez to Permocty Extraff Ghanali today, Primia said it did not rpt not appear to clear doubt existng in his mind on need for the additioenn by Indonesia of Extra para to agreement ~~xxxxxx~~ reached between the three countries.

According to Mr. Lopez announcement made by Indonesia falls into two parts - first being agreement made between three countries in which Pres Sukarno concurs on withdrawal of troops with Their verifying withdrawal before summit meeting held.

Second part apparently attempt by Dr. Subvandrie to produce something for local Indonesian consumption. Are we to regard

For info

MSA Summary

*MSA
Bjorklund*

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this as an answer No Objection To Declassification in Full 2010/08/30 : HIA-R JONES HOWARD P-
not rpt not aff2E-78-299-8ance of agreement?

According Mr. Lopez, as far as Philippines concerned, there only one official version of summit agreement, this being text of May 27. And he had made it clear to Pres Sukarno and Dr. Subandrio that any comments or explanation added to agreement would not rpt not form part of text of agreement in any way whatever.

To me there can be no rpt no interpretation other than what is agreed. Any attempt to add to or alter meaning of agreement would render it null and void. I must therefore have confirmation of text agreed upon between us. END QUOTE.

Statement headlined by press. In addition to official release ;noted above, Tanks reportedly told newsmen he would only go Tokyo after satisfying himself that all points relating to withdrawal were settled. Also quoted as saying he would like leave for Tokyo before June 15 "assuming path to summit clear."

June 8, 1964 - (B)

Following released by Malaysian info service 1230 local today:

Quote: Prime Minister issues statement on withdrawal of forces.

Prime Minister, Tunku Abdul Rahman Putra, issued following statement from residency this morning, Monday June XX 8.

As result of efforts made by Mr. Lopez it was agreed withdrawal of Indonesian forces from Sabah and Sarawak should begin with commencement of Ministers' meeting.

For purpose of actual withdrawal XX Thai teams would be placed at number of check points and when all arrangements were ready President Soekarno would then issue order of withdrawal

Until action has been taken on this line it would not rpt not

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be possible 2E-78-299-8 Malaysia to take any changes, but we must deal with any Indonesian regulars and irregulars found in Malaysian territory as trespassers who would be dealt with in accordance with our law.

The Malaysian Government is still waiting for details of arrangements of withdrawal which are now being worked out in Bangkok

In meantime Government has received report that large number of Indonesian forces have made an incursion into our territory resulting in engagement with our security forces, one of whom was killed.

I am most concerned about this new development, and we are requesting Mr. ~~XXXXXXXXXXXX~~

Lopez to seek explanation from Indonesian side regarding this development at this stage of peace negotiations.

June 8, 1964 - (2)

DFA issued following press release Sunday 2000 hours:
Quote Acting Secretary Librado D. Cayco released tonight the text of the statement which President Sukarno authorized Ambassador Salvador P. Lopez to communicate to Malaysian Prime Minister Tunku Abdul Rahman, confirming Indonesian acceptance of the original agreement to hold a summit meeting.



The statement follows:

Inner quote President Sukarno reiterates his complete conformity with the text of the tripartite agreement of May 27th to hold a summit meeting. The text of that agreement is as follows:
(Agreed five-paragraph May 27 text quoted in entirety at this point.)

Secretary Cayco added that President Sukarno gave the above

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confirmation in 12E-78-299-8ce of President Macapagal, "Who expressed his deep gratification and his earnest hope that the Tunku will join them at the summit to work out mutually acceptable solutions to existing problems. End inner quote.

Secretary Cayco also said that the Indonesian leader has given assurance that inner quote all necessary technical preparations for withdrawals end inner quote will be completed by June 8th and that actual withdrawal could start on June 10th.

Meanwhile, it was learned that the paramount ruler of Malaysia, D.Y.M.M. Yang Di-Pertuan Agang, during a radio broadcast on the occasion of his birthday last Wednesday June 3rd), paid tribute to President Macapagal for his 1045 B-7

2E-78-299-8

Extensive Malayan press reaction to reported results Macapagal's Cambodian sojourn generally favorable but exhibits confusion with little focus on specifics. All purvey line that Phil role in Malaysian affair is that of mediator, hail "normalization" GUP-GUM relations, and give practically no attention to "bolstering" of GUP-ENG friendship, or Sihanouk "mediation".

date ?



Herald editorializes Macapagal and Tunku "appear to have considerably cushioned impact of apparent failure Bangkok conference to bring about any kind of agreement of Malaysia dispute. If Bangkok conference ended on discordant note and appeared to have thrust projected Maphilindo summit farther back, Macapagal-Pahman talks put it again in clear and imminent perspective." Edit concludes "that Macapagal accomplished his mission in Cambodia beyond all expectations, there is no doubt."

For. Policy

MSA

Macapagal

Phil.

Cambodia

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Bulletin of man of peace **2E-78-299-8** bers on a noble mission are far from completed," but states "if he erred, it looks like he did on the side of **MMK** under statement of what he achieved" and concludes "there are signs Macapagal's visit to Cambodia may in due time be accorded its right full place in our history."

Focusing on question of possible Indon reaction to resumption **GOP-GM** relations, bulletin villardolid refutes "conjecture" that Indonesia would react in manner spurned lover, and in

moment blind fury turn to Chicom's" and speculates "Indon reaction may only be minimal." He concludes "having taken advantage of the gib farce of an axis for six months now, Indones know they have everything to thank the Phils for." On this question, (Evening) Mirror edit notes "It is highly unlikely that Macapagal would commit **GOP** to anything involving her future relations with Indones without previous understanding with Sukarno."

Strange bulletin account stresses that Macapagal was greeted by "perhaps smallest crowd to ever welcome a President returning from abroad", says "President obviously wanted world-wide coverage of his Cambodian visit but did not say in his speech if he succeeded in his attempt to stir world-wide attention to his peace-ma