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1. Further Developments in Wake of September 30 Affair

a. The reporting week has been characterized by a progressive strengthening of the Army/Moslem position vs. Sukarno and the PKI, and an increasing display of Sukarno's lack of ~~flexibility~~ capability to seize the initiative from his opposition.

b. Anti-communist demonstrations resulted on October 14-16 in the burning of a Chinese university and the rifling of the headquarters of the Chicom Commercial Counselor by security forces. First news of the latter came in a tirade October 16 from Hsinhua (New China News Agency). The increasingly distinct anti-Chicom overtones of the campaign against the PKI were strengthened considerably by a growing number of vitriolic protests, demands, and evaluations of events in Indonesia broadcast by Radio Peking. These have been noted here and have helped stoke the anti-Chinese fires to the point that by the close of the reporting period Indonesian newspapers were demanding a break in relations with China in their headlines, and a mass demonstration on October 20 by the NU's youth organization Pemuda Ansor, while mainly directed against foreign military bases in the context of KIPAMA, also called for a break with the CPR.

c. Arrests of lower-level PKI cadres have continued, with some higher-level PKI officials arrested after surfacing in the belief that their status as members of the Anti-Foreign Military Bases Conference Committees (see item below) would afford them protection. The Army stood firm on the question of the succession to General Yani's position, and Sukarno somewhat grumpily announced October 14

that Major General Suharto, primarily if not uniquely responsible for the speedy recapture of key installations in Djakarta from the 30th September Movement, would indeed succeed the murdered Army chief. This was followed by a flood of congratulations for Suharto, which later in the week began to include plaudits from Indonesian opportunists obviously trying to ingratiate themselves with the Army after having sensed its ascendancy in the political struggle with Sukarno. Suharto was installed on the 17th.

d. Over the week-end, the demonstrations in Djakarta subsided, having demolished most PKI and PKI-associated installations. Sweeps by the Army, assisted by Moslem youth groups, continued in the kampungs. Elsewhere in the archipelago demonstrations were still going strong. The security situation in the Jogjakarta-Madiun-Solo "PKI redoubt area" was still very much in doubt, as was the question of the possibility the PKI in North Sumatra would take to the hills and establish a "Yenan" type base area in that region.

e. After the Suharto appointment, a number of Army victories became apparent. Although Sukarno had announced earlier that "the accusation against the Indonesian Air Force" of having participated in the coup attempt was untrue, Air Force Minister Omar Dani left the country on Wednesday the 20th, and Air Force officers who had trained or armed PKI youth groups were being incarcerated. Some 26 Antara reporters were arrested by the Army, which also stationed plainclothesmen at the Hotel Indonesia to arrest communists arriving for the KIAPMA Conference. Monday saw the beginning of a flood of suspensions and bannings of PKI organizations, the most important of which was a temporary ban on the activities of the PKI and its affiliates in the Djakarta area. Sukarno was reportedly furious over this ban, but when confronted by him the Army leadership, including Nasution, stood firm, and he was unable to have the ban retracted.



f. 5-255-0ber of extremely interesting developments in Indonesia's political and psynological climate have emerged during the present week. First, Sukarno has displayed an inability to move quickly to forestall moves by his adversaries. The Army-Moslem campaign, having moved quickly from the PKI to Communist China, continues to ~~entertain Sukarno by presenting him with a series of faits accomplis~~ ~~presenting him with a series of faits accomplis~~. Sukarno has been kept away from a microphone (except for his rather unimpressive KIAPMA performance), and his contacts with the press have been limited, possibly because of his fear of assassination and also possibly as a result of Army strategy. He is thus unable to employ his charismatic appeal to the Indonesian people, who must be wondering who is really in charge at this point. The Army shrewdly bought quantities of rice on the market and forced the price down to pre-coup levels, and the explanation in the kampungs is that once Suharto was put in charge, the rice flowed.

g. Second, for the first time in many years, the political crisis appears to have impinged on the everyday life of the ordinary man. Newspapers are the most sought after item in town, and in the provinces--after rice. Bus riders, betjak (pedicab) boys, shopkeepers, members of the civil and military services, and housewives are avidly buying and reading the news. A Djakarta housewife said happily: "Half of my budget now goes for newspapers." The Indonesian face of the week had a distinctly hopeful cast,--a look of release "after we have been so long suppressed," as one middle echelon government official put it in some amazement and wonder. A visiting university rector (from Padang) said soberly: "I believe we are really finding ourselves."

2. KIAPMA Flops

a. The much-vaunted International Anti-Foreign Military Bases Conference, finally held in Djakarta October 17-20 after numerous changes of schedule and locale, took its place as the latest and one of the most poignant of all Indonesian foreign policy failures. Opening with a dreary speech by Sukarno on Sunday, through which most people slept, the Conference proceeded through several days of anti-American diatribes by visiting delegates, and finally collapsed on Wednesday after ratifying a document which contained almost none of the Indonesian proposals. Although Indonesia pushed for the establishment of an international anti-foreign base "front," for a condemnation of the UN, for strong approval of Conefo, and for the honoring of Sukarno as "great pioneer of the Nefos," the Conference rejected all of these, and limited itself to endorsing positions on various issues in accord with those generally held by the world communist movement in general.

b. The delegates--only 186 of whom finally turned up--were in a general state of uneasiness throughout the Conference produced by continuing Army repression of PKI elements, and the vigorous anti-PKI campaign pursued in the Djakarta press. Two American delegates from "Women Strike for Peace" arrived late and are not known to have participated in the Conference, although they did sit through the final speech. Both Indonesian and foreign participants in the Conference breathed a strong sigh of relief when it was over.



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