

Berlin, January 24, 1946

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Dear Ray:

Following my return to Berlin about a month ago, the Ambassador is now sending me off again, this time to Stuttgart with our secretariat to the so-called Laenderrat there, i.e. on general governmental work. As you've probably noticed, I had tried while in Heidelberg for those ten weeks to keep up somewhat with my work for you, and since getting back here was just beginning to get the various threads picked up again.

It seems clear, however, that in Stuttgart I shall not have time to do any work along these lines. I wonder if we should not drop the whole project from now on? I don't think it is practical to try and follow that subject for a few weeks at a time and then drop it for a while. It is obvious that Berlin is the focal point for the subject, and that it cannot be reported adequately from our zone. I am far from satisfied about the little I could accomplish at Heidelberg and would prefer dropping it entirely rather than do an erratic and half-job. I did enjoy the work immensely while I was able to devote my full time to it.

I can well understand the Ambassador's position in trying to accomplish many things with insufficient personnel. Furthermore, you will remember that I joined his staff a year ago armed only with a letter signed by you and addressed to me, regarding the work you desired to be done. In the absence of more specific instructions from the Department to the Ambassador, I can see that he must consider me just as available for any work as all members of his staff.

Dick Sears sends his regards. He has been a very faithful worker and a real help but will, I am sure, fit

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Raymond E. Murphy, Esquire,  
Office of European Affairs,  
Department of State,  
Washington.

29 January  
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in equally well elsewhere if <sup>our</sup> his work for you is to be terminated now. I shall be more than glad to take it up again but, as indicated above, do not believe there is much use in attempting to do so, unless the Department explicitly requests the Ambassador to make this arrangement.

Very sincerely yours,

Brewster Morris

29 January, Murphy, re Brewster Morris

cc

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~*Mr. MacKerach*

## PUBLIC ATTITUDES ON FOREIGN POLICY

No. 56

Special Report

March 9, 1945

"UNCONDITIONAL SURRENDER"-- From Casablanca to Yalta --Contents

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Summary    The unconditional surrender policy has consistently received the approval of an overwhelming majority of the public, but the formula itself was increasingly subjected to critical comment in the two years preceding the Crimea Conference.

Commentators, although approving of the formula as expressing a military goal, have urged the Allies to state more fully their policy toward Germany. These critics have not been drawn from any particular geographic or political group, whereas advocates of a "negotiated peace" are limited for the most

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part to doctrinaire socialists and pacifists. There are fewer indications of how the public feels on the question of clarification, although a February poll shows that 8 out of 10 continue to express approval of the unconditional surrender policy.

~~Increased demand for elaboration of the formula has usually coincided with general demands for more information on U.S. foreign policy.~~ Widespread discussion of the policy has also been stimulated by Senator Wheeler's attack (Jan. 5) and by Prime Minister Churchill's renewed advocacy of the formula (Jan. 18). The declaration on Germany issued after the Crimea Conference has been favorably received by a number of those previously disturbed at the lack of an Allied pronouncement supplementing the unconditional surrender demand.

#### THE CASABLANCA POLICY

Widespread The great majority of commentators found no fault  
Acceptance with the unconditional surrender policy down to the late autumn of 1944.

Polls show that an overwhelming majority of the public (about 80%) steadily "favored an unconditional surrender from Germany before we stop fighting"; and a majority (between 54% and 66%) was also opposed "to accepting an offer by the German Army to discuss peace terms", even should it overthrow Hitler.

"Conditional" Of the small number of commentators who have  
Surrender ever since Casablanca desired terms on a basis other than "unconditional surrender", most are either doctrinaire socialists (e.g., Norman Thomas) or pacifists (e.g., Christian Century). Although those who support the "Peace Now" movement are limited in number, their views have been widely publicized (see Public Attitudes On Foreign Policy, Report No. 7, p. 7--January 7, 1944).

Among the large papers noted, the Washington Star appeared to take an unrepresentative view in stating that if complete victory could be achieved "short of a literal unconditional surrender, as is quite likely, (no Allied leader) would want to prolong the war merely for the sake of an inspirational phrase". The Washington Times-Herald, with an uninhibited approach, has proposed that a more persuasive psychological offensive be directed at the German people--with the Allies free to do as they wish after cajoling Germany into surrendering.

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### REQUEST FOR CLARIFICATION

Psychological Warfare A year ago, a number of prominent commentators were demanding an authoritative statement to supplement--but not to replace--the unconditional surrender formula (e.g., Dorothy Thompson, David Lawrence). Following the Normandy invasion, others also called upon the Allies to make it clear to the German people that their annihilation was not intended (Edward Murrow, Hans V. Kaltenborn, Chicago Sun, St. Louis Globe-Democrat, New Republic).

"What Is The Policy?" As Allied troops progressed toward Berlin, there was mounting concern about the program which the United Nations intended to impose upon Germany. Well-known commentators argued that the people of the United Nations were entitled to more definite knowledge of the program (Philadelphia Inquirer, New York Times, Vera Dean). Some construed the absence of an additional Allied pronouncement as meaning the absence of any agreed-upon policy (Scripps-Howard press, Washington Post).

Scope of Demand At the beginning of 1945 those who wanted elaboration of the unconditional surrender formula included representatives of almost all shades of political opinion. Among conservative spokesmen were George Sokolsky, Upton Close, and the Commercial and Financial Chronicle; "liberals" included Cecil Brown, Common Sense, and the Union for Democratic Action; while "middle-of-the-road" opinion was represented by W. P. Simms, the Des Moines Register, and the Richmond Times-Dispatch. Religious groups, including the Society of Friends and a national conference called by the Federal Council of Churches, have joined in the request for clarification--as have Commonweal and the Brooklyn Tablet (Catholic weeklies). The Post-War World Council and National Council for the Prevention of War have taken similar stands.

Congressional Attitudes The most vigorous opponent of the unconditional surrender formula in Congress has been Senator Wheeler, who has persistently denounced this "asinine...and brutal" policy. A number of public comment letters received in the Department expressed bitter opposition to the January 6 statement of Secretary Stettinius that the Senator spoke only for a "discredited few"; but American editors have generally criticized what they characterize as "pleas for a negotiated peace".

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Senator Vandenberg, in his widely discussed speech in the Senate (January 10) suggested that there was a need for "honest candor with our foes", and wished that "we might give these Axis peoples some incentive to desert their own tottering tyrannies by at least indicating to them that the quicker they 'unconditionally surrender', the cheaper will be unconditional surrender's price". Other Congressmen who have expressed dissatisfaction with "Unconditional surrender" include Senators Johnson (Colo.) and Revercomb (R., W.Va.) and Representatives Case (R., S.D.) and Lane (D., Mass.)

#### REAFFIRMATION OF PUBLIC SUPPORT

Churchill Statement The majority of editors and commentators have consistently expressed the view that the only alternative to "unconditional surrender" is a negotiated peace. Prime Minister Churchill, after his statement in the House of Commons on January 18, was praised with the same fervor with which Wheeler had been denounced. Some of these editors have said--counter to the claim of the critics--that letting the Germans know more precisely what policy is to be adopted toward them will have no effect in shortening the war (Raymond Swing, Milwaukee Journal, New Orleans Times-Picayune). Some have feared misinterpretation should the Allies elaborate their intentions; and others have stressed that the policy "is the major point of agreement" among the Allies (Wilmington Journal, New York Post, Cincinnati Enquirer, El Paso Times).

February 1945 Opinion Polls Public support for "unconditional surrender before we stop fighting" was as great in early February 1945 (81%) as it was in May 1944 (82%), according to opinion polls by Princeton.

The public appears to be much less concerned than commentators with the question of whether the German people have been adequately informed by the Allies as to "how they will be treated after they surrender". When questioned, 62 per cent of a national cross-section said they "didn't know" whether or not "the Allies have told the German people how they will be treated"; 27 per cent thought that they had been told; and 11 per cent thought not.

Since October there has been some increase in popular willingness to "discuss peace terms" with the German Army (not Hitler) although the majority still rejects this idea. The present results approximate those found, just after the invasion of Normandy, on the following question (Princeton):

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"If the German Army overthrew Hitler and then offered to stop the war and discuss peace terms with the Allies, would you favor or oppose accepting the offer of the German Army?"

	<u>June '44</u>	<u>Oct. '44</u>	<u>Feb. '45</u>
Favor	37%	27%	36%
Oppose	54	66	57
No opinion	9	7	7
	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>

Crimea Conference Following the Crimea Conference, many editors who had previously expressed dissatisfaction with the "inadequacy" of the unconditional surrender formula voiced appreciation for the policy statement on Germany. This "clarification" was regarded by the Foreign Policy Bulletin and others as "the first Allied attempt to go beyond the immediate objective of unconditional surrender."

Approval was given quite generally to the assurance that the Allies did not intend "to destroy" the German people, and the Philadelphia Inquirer, St. Louis Globe-Democrat, and William Shirer anticipated an earlier collapse of Germany as a result of this statement.

Few mentioned the announcement that terms "will not be made known until the final defeat of Germany has been accomplished"; but it received favorable notice from the Chicago Times, Memphis Commercial-Appeal, and Springfield Republican. The San Francisco Chronicle felt that the Germans had been told what to expect and emphasized that the Allies could not place "a mortgage" upon "unconditional surrender".

However, the most persistent critics prior to the Conference remained dissatisfied with the amount of information given in the communique. They charged that important questions, such as the character of reparations, and the economic future of Germany, had been left unanswered (Dorothy Thompson, Business Week, Washington Post, Baltimore Sun, Walter Kiernan). The New Republic considered the German program a "dubious matter, because we don't know what is intended"; and the Nation regretted the absence of any clear indication of how the plans were to be carried out. Several commentators reiterated their belief that the war was being prolonged as a result of "inept" political warfare (David Lawrence, the Cincinnati Times-Star, the Commercial and Financial Chronicle, Commonweal). But the tendency toward criticism of "unconditional surrender" was clearly halted by the Crimea Report.