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**NVA PERSONNEL INFILTRATION TO SOUTH VIETNAM**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Count</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>91,600</td>
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<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>95,600</td>
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<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>151,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>75,100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>93,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975 (to date)</td>
<td>38,100</td>
</tr>
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</table>

Total since January 1973 Ceasefire: 193,700
NVA Units Entering/Exiting SVN Since the Ceasefire

1. (C) The majority of integral unit moves into SVN since the ceasefire have been conducted by air defense units.

2. (SS) The strength, origin, destination and date of movement of all units entering the South since that time are summarized below:

a. (S) Divisions

(1) 77th AA Div - 1,000 men; formed in August 1973 in Loc Ninh Area.

(2) 377th AO Div - 1,000 men; entered Khe Sanh area from SVN around ceasefire; deployed to Takepone, Laos April 1973; returned to Cam Lo area, Quang Tri Prov by Dec 1974.

(3) 673rd AD Div - 1,000 men; formed in Khe Sanh area April 1973.

(4) 968th Inf Div (3 Regts) - 5,000 men; deployed to MR-2 in Jan 1974 from Saravane area, Laos.

b. Air Defense Regiments (SS)

(1) 28th AAA Regt - 835 men; detected March 1973 NE of Khe Sanh; entered from NVN.

(2) 210th AAA Regt - 1065 men; deployed from Laos to Loc Ninh area around Feb 1973.

(3) 218th AAA Regt - 835 men; deployed from S. Laos Nov 1973 to central Quang Tri Prov.

(4) 219th AAA Regt - 1065 men; deployed from Vinh Linh area, SVN to N. Quang Tri Prov, March 1974.

(6) 227th AAA Regt - 1065 men; deployed from Laos to Quang Tri Prov around July 1973.


(8) 234th AAA Regt - 835 men; moved from S. Laos to Dak To area, MR-2, Nov. 1973.

(9) 245th AAA Regt - 835 men; moved from northern NVN around April 1973 to Khe Sanh area.

(10) 246th AAA Regt - 835 men; deployed to West Central Quang Tri Prov from Quang Binh Prov, NVN in Feb 1974.


(12) 254th AAA Regt - 835 men; deployed from Kep, NVN to area East of Cam Lo, March 1973.

(13) 262nd AAA Regt - 835 men; deployed from Hanoi area to Phuoc Long Prov, June 1974.

(14) 263rd SAM Regt - 3170 men; deployed from Vinh area, NVN to Khe Sanh, Jan/Feb 1973.

(15) 545th AAA Regt - 835 men; deployed from Savanna Khet, Laos to Ben Giang, Quang Nam Prov, Sep 1973.


(17) 573rd AAA Regt - 835 men; formed in Khep Duc Area, Quang Tri Prov around Jan. 1974 from Cadre/weaponry of the former 572nd Tank/Arty Regt.

c. Other Regiments entering/formed in SVN:

(1) 9th Regt/968th Div - 1300 men; entered Pleiku Prov in Jan 1974 from S. Laos; integrated into 320th Div at that time.

(2) 41st Regt - 1200 men; reportedly entered Quang Nam Prov from NVN around Aug. 1974; presence not confirmed.

(3) 203rd Armor Regt - 850 men; deployed to Bo Duc area, MR-3 around Feb. 1973 from Cambodia.

(4) 24th Arty Regt - 1200 men; deployed to general Ben Cat area late 1973; origin unknown, reportedly infiltrated from NVN.

(5) 367th Sapper Regt - 1200 men; deployed from Cambodia around Aug. 1973; currently operating in both MR-3 and MR-4.

(6) 56th Inf Regt - 900 men; arrived in April-May 1974 in Quang Nam Prov from NVN; subsequently integrated into 2nd Div.

(7) 16th Arty Regt - 900 men; detected in Southern Thua Thien Prov, Feb. 1974; probable origin was NVN.


d. Battalions entering/formed:

(1) 76th Bn/Front 4 - 200 men; formed in Quang Nam Prov around April 1974 from infiltrated personnel.

(2) 78th Sapper Bn/429th Sapper Regt - 150 men; entered SVN as infiltration group around Mar 1974; operates in BA 359, GVN MR-3.

(3) 79th Sapper Bn/429th Sapper Regt - 200 men; entered SVN as infiltration group around Mar 1974; operates in BA 359, GVN MR-3.

(4) 310th Sapper Bn - 150 men; entered SVN as an infiltration group around April 1974; became part of D-1 Regt by Dec. 1974.
3. (SS) The following units operating in SVN at the Ceasefire have since deployed out-of-country:

a. 308th Inf Div - 5100 men at ceasefire; moved by June 1973 from Quang Tri Prov to general Hanoi area.

b. 312th Inf Div - 5000 men at ceasefire; deployed by May of 1973 from Quang Tri Prov to the Thanh Hoa/Ninh Binh Prov area, NVN.

c. 320B Inf Div - 2500 men at ceasefire; deployed in late 1973 from Quang Tri Prov to Thanh Hoa area, NVN.

d. 166th Arty Regt - 900 men; detected in general Hanoi area late 1974; actual date of departure from Quang Tri Prov unknown, but definitely after ceasefire.

e. Four AAA Regts - the 216th, 230th, 241st, and 280th - which deployed to SVN prior to or at the ceasefire have since returned to NVN. Total strength 3800. Another AAA Regt, the 260th, with 835 men, operated in Quang Tri Prov from Sep. 1973 to Dec. 1974 before returning to NVN.

f. 675B Arty Regt - 900 men; probably deployed around Feb. 1973 from Southern Thua Thien Prov to NVN; replaced by 78th Arty Regt.

4. (S) The combined strength (35,435) of units that have deployed to South Vietnam exceeds that (18,200) of units which have returned to North Vietnam by 17,235.
FACT SHEET

28 February 1975

SUBJECT: Summary of Reports of Impact of Reduced Funding on RVNAF Morale and Aggressiveness

PURPOSE: To discuss the reports of the impact of reduced funding on RVNAF morale and aggressiveness.

FACTS:

1. The decrease in RVNAF combat effectiveness is a by-product of reductions in ammunition and fuel allocations as well as restrictions on employment of artillery and air support imposed upon field commanders as a result of reductions in US funding. The 50% reduction in flying hours (fuel conservation), the reduction in the amount of artillery (2,350 pieces - 1970, 1,550 pieces - 1975) and the concurrent limitations placed on use of ammunition (e.g., 35 rounds of 81mm mortar per month) have all added to the decrease in combat support previously provided to the infantry soldier.

2. During day to day operations, field commanders can no longer count on artillery fire to harass the enemy, neutralize opposing artillery, or conduct a pre-assault concentration. Air Force fuel limitations have reduced close air support during operations and have limited medevac operations. The material as well as psychological impact of these reductions and limitations has adversely affected the combat effectiveness of the individual soldier, one who formerly operated under the protection provided by effective artillery fire and close air support. The decrease in combat support services is reflected in the KIA ratio. In 1970 this ratio favored the RVNAF by 6 to 1, presently the ratio is 2 to 1; in essence, the RVNAF combat soldier is three times more susceptible to being killed than he was five years ago. The decrease in air medevac support is an additional cause for the drop in morale.

3. A survey of reports during the last two months may serve to illustrate some of the problems being cited by officers throughout the country.

   a. A Province Chief (Colonel) in the Delta reported that the limitations and administrative controls on ammunition expenditures have reduced artillery reaction time from immediate to 5 to 10 minutes. These restrictions have also created shortages (subjective view, relative to amounts) in
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SUBJECT: Summary of Reports of Impact of Reduced Funding on RVNAF Morale and Aggressiveness

ammunition and have caused serious morale problems among his troops as well as hindered his recruiting efforts.

b. A staff officer in the Ranger Command, prior to initiating an assault on an enemy-held hill, related that the movement of his troops, weapons, and ammunition was slow due to a shortage of helicopter transport and that if he had "just two percent" of the support received prior to the withdrawal of US forces he could easily accomplish his mission.

c. According to one division commander, restrictions on unobserved artillery fire (all impacts must be observed) allowed at least one battalion of the enemy to infiltrate through his area.

d. Interviews country-wide indicate that air medevac now takes from six hours to a day or more, vice the previous 10 minutes. This is attributed to the cut in fuel allocations, which decreased the number of medevac missions and denied gunship protection to medevac aircraft. This denial of gunship protection has resulted in medevac aircraft operating only in rear safe areas rather than near the front line fighting.

e. The high replacement cost of aircraft has all but eliminated VNAF reconnaissance over the more heavily defended enemy areas.

4. A document issued by the Communist Political Section of the Binh Thuan Provincial Unit (MR-2) obtained by RVNAF sources in January 1975 stated the following "...the reduction in US aid exerted a direct influence upon the enemy's military activities on the battlefield..." "Artillery ammunition supplied to the military regions (in 1974) represented from 50 to 70 percent of that in 1973. Battlefields have used their reserve stock. Our main force units are being consolidated and reinforced step by step. Our militia and guerrilla forces are being developed. Meanwhile the enemy's forces are declining. These are good conditions enabling us to satisfactorily fulfill our 1974 tasks and advance towards winning greater victories during the coming dry season."
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FACT SHEET
27 February 1975

SUBJECT: Scenario - NVA Attacks on Kontum City and RVNAF Response

PURPOSE: To provide the Congressional Delegation with a type scenario as an explanation of RVNAF capabilities and constraints.

FACTS:

1. Opposing Forces: NVA forces consisting of two infantry divisions, one artillery regiment, one AAA regiment and two battalions of armor (15,000 combat troops, 30-40 guns, 90-100 AAA weapons, and 70-80 tanks) attacks Kontum City and associated objectives. Other NVA forces within the highlands area of MR-2 and the coastal lowlands of Binh Dinh Province carry out simultaneous smaller scale attacks in an attempt to tie down other RVNAF forces and to inhibit reinforcements/resupply of Kontum. Defensive and reaction forces consist of seven ranger groups, two regional force groups, one infantry division and supporting artillery and armored units (18-20,000 combat troops, 114 guns and 17 tanks (M-41)).

2. Sequence of Attack: During the first phase enemy forces attack objectives and block LOCs around Kontum City, interdict main supply routes to the highlands, and attack the Kontum Air Field with periodic ABFs. At the onset of action, II Corps reinforces the Kontum garrison by one ranger group, one squadron of the armored brigade and two battalions of artillery. Enemy pressure forces RVNAF forces to fall back on the city abandoning forward positions. During this first phase the level of combat is at a low to moderate level and lasts for approximately 7-10 days. In the second phase, the NVA reinforces its forces in contact with fresh regiments, attempts to overrun the city defenses and forces the closure of the Air Field to resupply airlift aircraft and inhibits the resupply of besieged forces by continued interdiction of main LOCs. RVNAF reinforces its units in contact with the deployment of two regiments from Pleiku in an attempt to neutralize enemy interdiction efforts, effect resupply, and lift the siege of the city. During the second phase, level of combat remains at the high intensity level for a period of 10 to 14 days. Resupply by road into Kontum is possible during
SUBJECT: Scenario - NVA Attacks on Kontum City and RVNAF Response

seven of the days. Pleiku Air Field, despite ABFs is open to resupply aircraft and helicopters during the entire period. After the intensive phase, level of activity returns to moderate to low level.

3. Logistics Considerations: Levels of intensity of operations exceed the normal only during the 10-14 day period of the main attack. Kontum Air Field is closed to aircraft during the entire period. LOCs into Kontum City are open for a period of seven days during this high level of intensity. LOCs from the coast to Pleiku are closed. Total friendly force being resupplied is 18-20,000 troops.

a. Daily Supply Requirements at the Intensive Combat Rate:

   - Ammunition: 452.0 Short Tons per Day
   - Petroleum Products: 150.0 Short Tons per Day
   - Spare parts, combat loss: 13.4 Short Tons per Day
   - Misc (food, barrier material): 39.0 Short Tons per Day
   - Total Requirement: 654.4 Short Tons per Day

b. Total Air Lift Requirement: 654.4 Short Tons per Day

c. Supplemental Air Lift Requirement from Pleiku to Kontum:

   - Food: 17.0 Short Tons per Day

4. Air Lift Plan: VNAF supports air lift operation Qui Nhon - Pleiku with five C-130 aircraft (12 ton cargo capacity) and seven CH-47 helicopters (4 ton cargo capacity). Two C-130s operating round-the-clock fly 16 sorties into Pleiku to deliver petroleum products (in 3,000 gallon collapsible bladders). Three C-130s fly 29 sorties on a 24-hour-a-day basis to deliver 337 tons of supplies to Pleiku. Seven CH-47s fly 42 sorties into Pleiku to deliver 168 tons of supplies. Six CH-47s are assigned to Pleiku to support Kontum air lift requirements.

5. Air Support Plan: VNAF conducts close air support operations using eight A-37 aircraft from MR-I and 37 A-37 aircraft from Phu Cat Air Base (15 are TDY from Phan Rang Air Base). Aircraft fly 50 sorties per day to support the operations in Kontum.
SUBJECT: Scenario - NVA Attacks on Kontum City and RVNAF Response

6. Limitations on Use of Air: Support of the Kontum operation requires all operationally available C-130 aircraft in-country, all CH-47 helicopters in MR-II, and the commitment of roughly 65% of all TacAir aircraft in MR-II. Crews pose no problem; however sustained operations of this sort will strain maintenance and support facilities during and after the operation. Since it is unlikely that the Kontum operation would be conducted in isolation, VNAF could support this operation as presented in this paper only if it were the highest priority operation in MR-II and possibly in the MR-I and MR-II areas.

KEY ABBREVIATIONS USED:

AAA - Anti-Aircraft Artillery
ABF - Attacks by fire as opposed to ground assault
ARVN - Refers only to the Army
LOC - Lines of Communications (Roads)
NVA - North Vietnamese Army
RVNAF - Refers to Vietnamese Armed Forces
VNAF - Vietnamese Air Force
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FACT SHEET

28 February 1975

SUBJECT: Comparative Ammunition Expenditures

PURPOSE: To provide Congressional Delegation with US, RVNAF and NVA ammunition expenditures prior to Ceasefire, and RVNAF and NVA expenditures for 1974.

FACTS:

1. Because of the disparity in combat activity between US and RVNAF units, two base years - 1969 and 1972 - are used for pre-Ceasefire statistics. During 1969 US forces were heavily engaged and RVNAF was not, during 1972 only US air ordnance expenditures were significant while RVNAF assumed the primary combat role.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>US FORCES</th>
<th>RVNAF</th>
<th>NVA/VC</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tonnages</td>
<td>Monthly Average</td>
<td>Tonnages</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>907,000(G)</td>
<td>75,600(G)</td>
<td>293,200(G)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>633,560(A)</td>
<td>52,800(A)</td>
<td>25,000(A)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>1,540,560</td>
<td>128,400</td>
<td>318,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>40,000(G)</td>
<td>3,300(G)</td>
<td>798,000(G)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>551,450(A)</td>
<td>46,000(A)</td>
<td>95,000(A)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>591,450</td>
<td>49,300</td>
<td>893,900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>205,200(G)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>46,400(A)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>251,600</td>
<td>20,965</td>
<td>3,120</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

G - GROUND
A - AIR

*Expended in the RVN Only.

2. Communist ammunition stockpiles within the Republic of Vietnam are estimated at 66,000 short tons. In the event of a general offensive, Communist ammunition expenditures (tonnage-wise) would significantly increase. These expenditures could run over...
SUBJECT: Comparative Ammunition Expenditures

ten times expenditures for 1974 or monthly about six times
the amount used on the highest month last year. The increased
Communist force structure (assuming the commitment of the
North Vietnamese strategic reserve) and greater numbers of
medium artillery introduced since Ceasefire into the southern
area of the RVN (i.e., 120mm mortar, 122mm guns, 130mm guns,
140mm rockets, 57mm AA) would result in greater expenditures.
Recent Communist tactics have indicated an increased propensity
to use indirect fire. We estimate the increased artillery
assets available to the Communists would allow them to use
artillery like that used in Quang Tri in 1972. At Phuoc Binh
in Phuoc Long Province this past January, the Communists
demonstrated no reticence in using indirect fire, with about
5,000 incoming rounds reported in one day. Additionally,
 improvements in the Communists distribution system will
alleviate, somewhat, shortages and thus provide the Communists
greater staying power. In a general offensive, the current
Communist ammunition stockpiles are expected to last about one
year, assuming no new inputs.
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FACT SHEET

28 February 1975

SUBJECT: Comparative Ammunition Consumption Rates

PURPOSE: To provide Congressional Delegation with requested ammo consumption factors.

FACTS:

Comparison of US and RVNAF ammunition expenditures for 1972 do not realistically reflect US usage as US forces were not actively engaged in combat. Therefore US statistics for 1969 are presented as being more representative of the situation.

a. Force Structure - 1969. Calendar year 1969, was a year of heavy combat for US forces in South Vietnam. During that year, the US Army and Marine Corps fielded an average of 106 maneuver battalions per month. The South Vietnamese regular force structure (order of battle) was such that they fielded 178 maneuver battalions during an average month.


c. Force Structure - 1972. 1972 was a year in which the South Vietnamese regular ground forces were heavily engaged. During that year they fielded a monthly average of 202 South Vietnamese Army and Marine Corps maneuver battalions. 1972 was the final year of US ground forces involvement; during 1972 the US fielded a monthly average of four maneuver battalions (although none were in-country during the last five months of the year).

d. Ammunition Expenditures - 1972. During 1972, US expenditures of ground ammunition averaged 3,300 short tons per month; aviation ordnance expenditures (against targets in South Vietnam) averaged 46,000 short tons per month. The South Vietnamese expended an average of 65,700 short tons of ground ammunition and 7,991 short tons of aviation ordnance per month during the same period.
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Maneuver Battalions (Monthly Average)</th>
<th>Ammunition Expenditures (Short Tons - Monthly Average)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>US</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SVN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ground</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CY 69</td>
<td>106</td>
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<td>CY 72</td>
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<td>24,450</td>
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SECRET

FACT SHEET

27 February 1975

SUBJECT: Comparison of Mobility for Opposing Forces

PURPOSE: To provide Congressional Delegation with requested mobility data.

FACTS:

1. The NVA has significantly improved the mobility of its forces since the ceasefire by revamping its rear service system and improvement of its logistics corridors. A comparison of travel times required for NVA infiltration groups to move to the south prior to the ceasefire and the times required at present illustrates the point:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area</th>
<th>Pre-Ceasefire (On Foot)</th>
<th>Post Ceasefire (By Truck)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DMZ (NVN/SVN Border)</td>
<td>20 Days</td>
<td>5 Days</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MRTT (Northern SVN)</td>
<td>35 Days</td>
<td>8 Days</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MR-5 (Coastal MR-1,2)</td>
<td>60 Days</td>
<td>15 Days</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B-3 Front (Highlands)</td>
<td>60 Days</td>
<td>15 Days</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COSVN (MR-3,4)</td>
<td>90 Days</td>
<td>21 Days</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. These improved travel times offer the same advantages for movement of integral combat units.

3. There are seven NVA combat ready divisions currently stationed in North Vietnam that could be deployed to South Vietnam. The estimated travel times required for each to move to various areas in South Vietnam are as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Division</th>
<th>Estimated Strength</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Deployment Time-Days</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>308th</td>
<td>10,000</td>
<td>Near Hanoi</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>308B</td>
<td>10,000</td>
<td>Near Hanoi</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>312th</td>
<td>10,000</td>
<td>Central NVN</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>316th</td>
<td>10,000</td>
<td>Upper Panhandle</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>320B</td>
<td>10,000</td>
<td>Central NVN</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>338th</td>
<td>10,000</td>
<td>Central NVN</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>341st</td>
<td>10,000</td>
<td>Extreme Southern NVN</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
SUBJECT: Comparison of Mobility for Opposing Forces

3. RVNAF has superior mobility and more flexibility in relation to the NVA with its large inventory of land vehicles, aircraft and naval vessels. Generally superior roads also provide RVNAF the edge in land transport. However, it must be emphasized that RVNAF's mobility advantages are offset to a significant degree by the NVA's ability to move its forces to preselected areas for eventual attacks. As a result, the NVA's transport shortfall is not as critical as disproportionate inventories might suggest. NVA tactical operations are preplanned and transport is prioritized and directed toward specified areas. RVNAF requires a larger transport fleet and greater flexibility in order to react in those cases where the NVA has massed its troops and gained a tactical advantage. RVNAF mobility is very often a critical determinant in the outcome of NVA initiated attacks.

4. It is also noteworthy that RVNAF mobility has been degraded not only by fiscal constraints, but by improved NVA defensive tactics. A notable feature of heavy combat activity in the past six months has been the rapid NVA employment of anti-aircraft guns to support ground forces. This improved ability has been reflected in increased losses, not only of VNAF tactical aircraft, but of aircraft used for logistical support as well.