CHAPTER ONE
EARLY YEARS, 1900-1925

1. Life of Ch'en Li-fu's mother, see Ch'en Kuo-fu, "Wo-ti mu-ch'ing" (My Mother), in his Ch'en Kuo-fu hsien-sheng ch'an-chi (Complete works of Mr. Ch'en Kuo-fu), V.5, pp. 1-17, 18-19.


3. Ch'en Ch'i-mei's declaration of the independence of Shanghai on July 12, 1913, see Jerome Ch'en, Y'an Shih-k'ai, 1856-1916, pp. 166-167; In the Second Revolution of 1913, Jerome Ch'en concluded that "the most obvious result of the Revolution was the breaking of the Kuomintang's control over six provinces." Also see Ch'in Hsiao-yi (ed.), Ch'en Ying-shih hsien-sheng chi-nien-chi (collected essays in commemoration of Mr. Ch'en Ying-shih [Ch'en Ch'i-mei]), Taipei, Chinese Cultural Serice, 1977, 284P.


5. The death of Ch'en Ch'i-mei, see "Ch'in Ying-shih pei-tzu an-ch'in kai-yao" (Summary of the Case of the Assassination of Ch'en Ying-shih), Ch'in Haino-yi (ed.), Ch'en Ying-shih hsien-sheng chi-min-chi (collected essays in commemoration of Mr. Ch'en Ying-shih [Ch'en Ch'i-mei]), pp. 153-156; "The Testimony of the Assassin at the Municipal Court of Shanghai," Ch'en Chieh-yü [Jean Ch'en], Ch'en Chieh-yü hui-i-lu (Memoirs of Ch'en Chieh-yu), V.1, pp. 122-123 [Author is the second wife of Chiang Kai-shek, 1921-1927].

6. About Peiyang University, see Reneville Clifton Lund, The Imperial University of Peking, Ph.D. dissertation, University
7. There are two Chihli-Fengtien Wars in China. The first was fought from April 29, to May 5, 1922, almost ten provinces were involved, ended with the defeat of Chang Tso-lin. The second was in 1924, from September 16 to November 8, ended with the defeat of Wu Pei-fu. The war touched fourteen provinces. In his study, Hsi-sheng chi, Warlord Politics in China, 1916-1928, p.168 states that the first war cost Chang Tso-lin approximately U.S. $24 million, and the second, was about U.S. $50-60 million. More analysis of the war in 1924, see U.S. Military Reports: China 1911-1941, G-2 Report, No.538, April 18, 1925. The report states that "The Fengtien Army strength was placed at 150,000 maximum. Its allied force under Feng Y©-hsiang at 58,000. The Chili Army had an immediately available strength of 225,000 and estimated reinforcements of another 200,000."

8. From 1918 to 1924, Ch'en Li-fu's elder brother Ch'en Kuo-fu was involved in business practices. He "first specialized in handling cotton stocks and later became assistant manager of a brokerage firm dealing with cotton yarn, gold, and silver." "These financial activities were designed to raise funds for political activities. In a recession in 1922, Ch'en Kuo-fu lost his business but he still managed to send his younger brother Ch'en Li-fu to the United States for further study after he graduated from the Peiyang University in 1923." See "Ch'en Kuo-fu," in Boorman, Biographical Dictionary of China, V.1, p.201-206.


10. See Sun Yat-sen, The International Development of China [translated into Chinese as Shih-yeh chi-hu], Shanghai, Public, 22, December 6, 1919, pp. 1134-35; Shanghai, Commercial Press, 1920, 165P.

CHAPTER TWO
BEFORE THE NORTHERN EXPEDITION, WINTER 1925 - SUMMER 1926

1. On May 2, 1924 Sun Yat-sen appointed Chiang Kai-shek as the Commandant of Whampoa Military Academy [Huang P'u Ch'©n-hsiao] and the Chief of Staff of Kwangtung Army [Y©eh-ch©n].

2. Eastern Campaign (or Eastern Expeditions) was aimed at the defeat of Ch'en Chiung-ming in Kwangtung. The action began on February 1, 1925--based on the strength of the Whampoa Military Academy Cadets. Chiang Kai-shek's victory coincided with the passing of Sun Yat-sen in Peking in March 12, 1925. Chiang also suppressed Yunnana and Kwangtung Armies. The victory led to the establishment of the National Government [Kuo-min-cheng-fu] in Canton on July 1, 1925 and the formation of National Revolutionary Army on August 26, 1925. The Kuomintang Central Political Committee [Chung-yang cheng-chi hui-i], on September 28, 1925, named Chiang Kai-shek as the Commander-in-Chief of Eastern Route Army [Tung-ch'en ch©n] and started Second Eastern Expedition. The episode ended on November 4, 1925 with the occupation of Swatow. Meanwhile, in the North, Feng Y©-hsiang and his Kuominch©n [National People's Army] entered the city of Tientsin on December 24, 1925. The Kuomintang Second National Congress was called in Canton on January 1, 1926. See Wilbur and How, Documents on Communism, Nationalism and Soviet Advisers in China, pp. 157, 162, 170, 212, and 504. Also James Robert Shirley, "Control of the Kuomintang after Sun Yat-sen's Death," Journal of Asian Studies, V.25, No.1, November 1965, pp. 69-82; Ch'in Hsiao-© (ed.), Tsung-tung Chiang-kung ta-shih Ch'ang-pien ch'u-k'ao (Preliminary draft of the materials gathered and arranged from various sources for the compilation by the major events of President Chiang [Kai-shek]), V.1, Leaves 91-114. One of the major results of the Victories of Chiang in 1925 was the promotion of Ho Ying-ch'in who assumed Command of the First Army of the National Revolutionary Army on December 10, 1925.

3. Kissinka's mission in China, see "Resolution Relating to the Bolshevization of China," passed by the 7th Plenary Session of the Executive Committee of the International Communist Party, Moscow, in the first part of 1927. The document was received by the Soviet Military Attache on March 28, 1927, in U.S. Military Intelligence Reports, China 1911-1914, Document No.4, G-2 Report 3020, "Soviet Activities in China," 2-2657-1-281-102, signed by John Magruder, Major, General Staff, Military Attache, 22P.

4. Chiang's temper can also be seen from the memoirs of his second wife, Ch'en Chieh-© [Jean Chen], Ch'en Chieh-© hui-i-lu, v.2, pp. 224-225, 327-329. Chiang-ch'en marriage, see Honolulu Star-Bulletin, September 2, 20, 25, 1927; San Francisco Chronicle, September 9, 1927; Examiner, September 2, 1927; New York Times, August 20, 1927; interviewed by Henry Misselwitz, New York Times, September 18, 25, 1927; Washington Post, September 26, October 1, November 26, December 2, 1927. The Memoirs of Ch'en Chieh-© (Jean Ch'en) was paid 170,000 not to be published.
See Washington Examiner, November 22-26, 1967. The original writing of this Memoir was found in H.H. Chang Papers, Hoover Institution, see "Preface," by Tong Te-kong, dated May 30, 1992, pp. 1-33. Tong is Professor of History at New York City University. The authenticity of Ch'en Chieh-y©'s Memoirs has been confirmed by Ch'en Li-fu in the oral interview with Sidney H. Chang, co-editor of this volume on August 9, 1992 in Taipei.

5. About Ch'en Li-fu's account, also see Cheng T'ien-fong, A History of Sino-Russian Relations, pp. 133-363. Ch'en Kung-po, is his K'u hsiao lu, devoted a chapter to the March 20 Chungshan Gunboat Incident. He recorded the same fact to a speech given by Ch'en Li-fu in 1928 at the Shanghai Municipal Headquarters of the Kuomintang; Li Tien-min, Chou En-lai, pp. 63-64; Chiang Kai-shek, Soviet Russia in China, pp. 37-48. Also see Wilbur and How, Missionaries in Revolutions, p. 279, from Note 99. Ch'en Chieh-y© [Jean Ch'en], ibid.; V.2, pp. 262-263.


7. In addition to the financial contribution, Ch'en Kuo-fu's dedication to the organizational aspect of Kuomintang and the building up of the National Revolutionary Army began at the recruitment of new cadets for Whampoa Military Academy, see Donald Jordan, The Northern Expedition, pp. 18, 21, reasons for the success of Northern Expedition, pp. 287-295. Also Boorman, ibid.; P. 203, especially Ch'en Kuo-fu, Ch'en Kuo-fu Ch'uan-chi (Complete works of Ch'en kuo-fu), pp. 62-70. He stated that in addition to the recruitment of cadets, Chiang Kai-shek also asked him to recruit able bodied young men to join the National Revolutionary Army, recommend talented men, provide logistical support and purchase horses. He took the responsibility from September 1924 to the end of 1925. He arrived in Canton in May 1926 to become the Chief Secretary of the Kuomintang Department of Organization and Chiang Kai-shek was his immediate superior. In July 1926 he succeeded Chiang Kai-shek as the Chief of Kuomintang's Department of Organization, see ibid.; pp. 62-83.

8. There were two Kuomintang Second National Congresses held in 1926. One convened in Canton, January 4-19, 1926. See Wilbur and How, Documents on Communism, pp. 213-215; one was called by the anti-communist Western Hills Conference Group [Hsi-shan hui-i-p'ai] on March 29, 1926. The group had a conference earlier in 1925 from November 23 -December 50. This conference consisted of 15 members of the Central Executive committee and Central Supervisory Committee and the conference was called before Sun Yat-sen's tomb in the Western Hills of Peking. See Wilbur and How, ibid; pp. 209-212.
CHAPTER THREE
THE NORTHERN EXPEDITION, SUMMER 1926 - SUMMER 1927

1. Activities of Galen, see Wilbur and How, ibid; pp. 176-80; 150, 167, and his opposition to Chiang Kai-shek's strategy of attacking the Southeast in the direction of Nanking and Shanghai, pp. 382-383, p.395; also Galen's role in Northern Expedition, see Wilbur, The Nationalist Revolution in China, 1923-1928, pp. 49-50. An estimation of the strength of various militarists in China on the eve of Northern Expedition, see Lawrence Impey, The Chinese Army Considered As A Military Force, Tientsin, Tientsin Press, Ltd., 1925, 34P.


3. The passing of Sun Lu-ch'ing [Mrs. Ch'en Li-fu], see San Francisco Shih-chieh jih-pao (World Journal), September 30, 1992; Sun Lu-ch'ing was "a talented artist from Ch'en's native district of Wu-hsing." See "Ch'en Li-fu," in Boorman (ed.), Biographical Dictionary of Republican China, p.211.


5. The role of Chang ching-chiang played in National Revolution, see Ch'en Kuo-fu, ibid.; pp. 84-91 (in commemoration of the passing of Chang Ching-chiang in the United States of America in 1950); Wilbur, Documents on Communism, Nationalism, and Soviet Advisers in China, 1918-1927, pp. 229, 230, 233. Chang Ching-chiang was elected as Chairman of the Central Executive Committee on May 19, 1926. After Chiang Kai-shek was elected as the Chairman of the Central Executive Committee Standing Committee, Chang served as his duty during the period of Northern Expedition.

6. Examination of Ch'en Pu-lei's career, see Li Ao, Lun
Chiang Chieh-shih (On Chiang Chieh-shih [Chiang Kai-shek]), V.4, pp. 257-304; Ch'en was born in 1809, as a member of Tung-meng hui, he held high positions in the Kuomintang and in the National Government. Suffered from the defeat of the Kuomintang on the Mainland, he committed suicide on November 13, 1948 at age of 59. Then he was the Secretary-General of the Central Political Committee.


10. Activities of Green Gang in the British Concession in Shanghai during the period of Northern Expedition, see The Shanghai Municipal Police Files, 1894-1944; Records of the Central Intelligence Agency, Record Group 263 have been declassified under project number NND 863055, 1927-1929.

11. Detailed history of the Kuomintang investigation units under the direction and command of Ch'en Li-fu see Hsu En-tseng, The Invisible Conflict, Hong Kong, 1956, 1958, 1962, 204P.; also see his Hsi-shuo chung-tung chén-tung (Detailed discussion on the Central Bureau of Investigation and Military Bureau of Investigation), 1992, 407P.
CHAPTER FOUR
WORKING WITH CHIANG, SPRING 1928 - WINTER 1931

1. Detailed report of the Fourth Plenary Session of Second Central Executive Committee was called in Nanking, February 2-6, 1928. The Session adopted resolutions defining the formation of National Reconstruction Commission, reorganization of the Kuomintang Central Headquarters, National Government, Military Committee of the Central Executive Committee, and the Fundamental Plan for the readjustment of Kuomintang Party Affairs. The Session also passed resolutions on the Party discipline and problems related to the completion of the Northern Expedition. During this Session Ch'en Li-fu was nominated as a member of the National Reconstruction Commission.

2. Effects of Tsinan Incident of May 3, 1928, see U.S. Military Intelligence Reports: China 1911-1941, G-2 Report No.7277, June 18, 1928, 8P.. To conclude this incident, a Sino-Japanese Agreement was signed by Dr. C. T. Wang, Minister of Foreign Affairs of National Government and Japanese Minister K. Yoshisama, see Kuo Min News Agency account, May 4, 1928; complete text in English translation, see "Sino-Japanese Agreement Settling Tsinan Incident," ibid.; G-2 Report 7485, April 10, 1929.

3. Huang Fu's role in Tsinan Incident, see Shen I-yön [Mrs. Huang Fu], I-yön hui-i (Memoirs of Shen I-yön), V.1, Chapter 18. "Pei-fa shih-chi" (Period of Northern Expedition), pp. 263-289. After the unpopular Ts'ao K'un resigned his presidency, on November 2, 1924 as the result of Feng Yö-hsiang's control of Peking, Huang Fu became acting head of the Peking government in the North. His regent cabinet lasted until November 24, 1924, totally 22 days. See Li Chien-nung, The Political History of China, 1840-1928, pp. 467-475.


5. Impression on Yen Hsi-shan, see Assistant Military Attache C. J. Kanaga's reports from Shansi Province, September 26, 1929, 4P.; October 25, 1929, 4P., in U.S. Military Intelligence Reports: China 1911-1941, 4.1/2055-674; recent work about Yen, see Ai Fei, Yen Hsi-shan, Shih-chia-chuang shih, Ho-pei jen-min ch'u-pan-she, 1984, 570P.

6. Li Tsung-jen's career, see Tong Te-kong and Li Tsung-

7. For the strength of Feng Yü-hsiang and Yen Hsi-shan during the period of the Northern Expedition and their changing relationship with Chiang, see Donald Jordan, The Northern Expedition, pp. 270-275. In the 1920's Feng's Kuomintang, or People's Army, was considered the best trained army in China. As the result of Chiang Kai-shek's forceful final drive against Feng in September 1930, the Kuomintang was forced to withdraw to the North of the Yellow River on October 6, 1930 which marked the end of Chinese Civil War. By the end of 1930, the strength of Feng's remnant Kuomintang army was about 50,000; it was reported to be located in Southwest Shansi. See U.S. Military Intelligence Reports: China 1911-1941, 9-2 Report No.7905, December 16, 1930; Reorganization of Certain Kuomintang troops into the National Government's forces, see G-2 Report No.7890, December 1, 1930. In 1931, civil war in China ended, there was no organized military opposition in the National Government, Chiang Kai-shek and Chang Hsêh-liang maintained a close relationship, and communist activities still continued throughout most of China. The defeat of Yen, then of Feng, resulting in the disintegration of the Kuomintang and the declaration of loyalty to the National Government at Nanking by Chang Hsêh-liang in the Northeast, brought great prestige and power to the Kuomintang and in particular to Chiang Kai-shek. The Fourth National Congress of the Kuomintang was therefore held from November 12, to November 23, 1931.

8. This National Government was formed on September 9, 1930 in Peking. Yen Hsi-shan was the Chairman of the National Government [Council]. Wang Ching-wei, Feng Yü-hsiang, Chang Hsêh-liang, and Li Tsung-jen all were members of the Council. This was a strong alliance of opposition forces to Chiang Kai-shek's National Government in Nanking, Kuo T'êng-i, Chung-hua min-kuo shih-shih jih-chih, V.2, pp. 619-620.


10. Analysis of the negotiations of bringing Manchurian voluntarily under the flag of National Government led by Chiang Kai-shek in July 1928, see Military Attache John Magruder's report to the War Department, in U.S. Military Intelligence Reports: China 1911-1941, G-2 Report No.7306, August 2, 1928, 14P.; and his Report No.7305. The strength of Chiang Kai-shek in 1928, see Joseph W. Stilwell [Major], "Tables of Organization of the Nationalist Revolutionary Army," January 1928, 95P.

11. Chang Hsêh-liang's attitude toward the National
Government, see "Interview with Chang Hs©eh-liang," by Parker G. Tenney, Assistant Military Attache, September 30, 1930. Tenney was sent to Mukden with a mission to find out the true conditions via personal interviews. In 1921, Tenney visited Mukden with First Sergeant Wilson of the 15th infantry, to demonstrate the Browning Automatic Rifle and the infantry pack to Chang Hs©eh-liang’s father, Marshall Chang Tso-lin, on December 10 and 11, 1930. U.S. Military Attache Nelson E. Margetts interviewed William N. Donald, an Australian by birth. Donald was in China for more than 30 years, during which period he advised practically every government since the establishment of the Republic. From 1928 to Sian Incident, Donald was the intimate adviser to Marshall Chang Hs©eh-liang. Donald told Margetts that "the Nanking delegates had approached him with an offer from Chiang Kai-shek of one million dollars for interference on the side of Nanking." "When asked what reply he had made to them he said that if Chiang Kai-shek would give him one hundred million dollars in cash, the provinces of Hopei and Shantung, half the appointments in the cabinet, and remove the Kuomintang from government affairs, he would consider the matter of intervention, and laughingly added that he did not believe Chiang Kai-shek would accept his proposition." In his report Margetts concluded that he "got the impression from Donald that the relationship between Chiang Kai-shek and the young Marshall have become very close, and that so long as these two dominating figures work together there is little danger that the peace of China will be disturbed by civil war," see U.S. Military Intelligence Reports: China 1911-1941, G-2 Report 7902, December 13, 1930, 3P.

12. There were two National Reorganization and Disbandment Conferences. The first was called on January 1-25, 1929, and the second was August 1-6, 1929. The first conference discussed a wide range of topics including the reduction of the size of armies under the command of various military leaders. The Conference had the support of Feng Y©-hsiang but not Pai ch'ung-hsi, Li Tsung-jen, and Yen Hsi-shan. The Second Conference proposed that the annual military expenditures of China should be no more than 18-19 million U.S. dollars, see Kuo T‘ing-i, ibid.; V.2, pp. 422-429, 480-481; John Magruder, U.S. Military Attache in China reported that the Second Conference had appointed a committee to carry out its pronouncements which included the reduction of the army from about 2,225,000 to 800,000, and the payment of some U.S. $30,000,000 in back pay to the soldiers. The first conference in January was also aimed at the reduction of the army to 800,000 men a year, and also appropriated millions for its purposes but the 800,000 men were increased to 2,225,000 and no concrete results were received. The Second Conference also decided to reduce the armies of China, not including Manchuria, to 65 divisions of 11,000 men each, or to a total of 715,000 men and about 50 million U.S. dollars was appropriated to bring this reduction into effect, see U.S. Military Intelligence Reports, China 1911-1941, G-2 Report No.7575, August 14, 1929, 7P.; also G-2 Report Y.1/2055.66, January 25, 1929, 15P.; also G-2 Report No.8005, April 30, 1931, 5P.
13. A complete factual record of the National Government during this period, see Min-ch’ien T. Z. Tyau (ed.), Two Years of Nationalist China, Shanghai, Kelly and Walsh, 1930, 523P.


16. List of the members and reserve members of the Central Executive Committee and Central Supervisory Committee of the Kuomintang elected at the Third National Congress, March 15-28, 1929, see U.S. Military Intelligence Reports: China 1911-1941, G-2 Report 7486, recorded by Major John Magruder, both Ch'en Kuo-fu and Ch'en Li-fu were elected to Central Executive Committee. Background and highlights of the Congress see "The Third National Congress," ibid.; G-2 Report 7478, March 29, 1929, 7P.. The 14-article of the regulations of the Congress, pp. 3-4; principles of China's foreign relations, p.6.

17. From 1927 to 1931 the Kuomintang-National Government relationship is best illustrated in P.M.A. Lineburger's book The China of Chiang Kai-shek, 1941;
to lay the foundation of the National Government, the Kuomintang Central Executive Committee promulgated "Organic Law of the National Government of China" on October 3, 1928 in Nanking. The law was revised and passed by the First Plenary Session of the Fourth Central Executive Committee and Supervisory Committee on December 26, 1931. Chinese text see National Government Gazette (Kuo-min cheng-fu king-pao) No.964, December 26, 1931, also in Hua-pei jih-pao (North China Daily), January 26, 1932. English translation see U.S. Military Intelligence Reports: China 1911-1941, G-2 Report 8255, April 12, 1932, 7P.; by Military Attache Lt.-Colonel W. S. Drysdale, and G-2 Report 7938, February 11, 1932, by Captain Parker G. Tenney, Assistant Military Attache and see The Organic Law of the Republic of China: The Final Draft constitution of the Republic of China, New York, Rockefeller Center, Chinese News Service, 1936, 24P.. Immediate comments on the law, see E. S. Corwin, "Some Observations on the Organic Law," China Tomorrow, V.1, No.2, 1928, pp. 17-20; Samuel S. Sung, "The Relations of the Kuomintang to the Common People," ibid.; pp. 23-24. All the resolutions and personnel charges of First Plenary Session of the Fourth Central Executive Committee and Supervisory Committee on December 26, 1931, see U.S. Military Intelligence Reports, ibid.; G-2 Report No.8179. Ch'en Kuo-fu was elected as a member of the Standing Committee. Ch'en Li-fu was elected to the Organization Committee.

18. As of May 1930, both Ch'en Kuo-fu and Ch'en Li-fu were members of the Central Executive Committee and the Central Political Committee. In addition, Ch'en Kuo-fu was on the 9-member Standing Committee of the Central Executive Committee headed by Chiang Kai-shek, and a member of the National Reconstruction Committee. Ch'en Li-fu, however, became a member of the Examination and Selection Committee with Tao Ch'i-tao the chairman. Besides, Ch'en Li-fu was appointed as the Director of the Political Training Bureau and the Secretary-General of the Central Political Committee. See "Personnel of Kuomintang Central Committees and the National Government (as of May, 1930)", U.S. Military Intelligence Reports: China 1911-1941, G-2 Report No.7769, July 7, 1930, 15P.


20. To expand Chiang Kai-shek's power, some changes in the Organic Law of the Republic of China were adopted at the Fourth Plenary Session of the Central Executive and Supervisory Committee, November 12-18, 1930. It was on November 18, 1930 that the Central Executive Committee appointed Chiang Kai-shek to serve concurrently as President of the Executive Yuan and ex officio as Chairman of the [new] Council of the National Government [Kuo-min cheng-fu hui-i]. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs immediately announced the National Government had adopted Kuo-min cheng-fu hui-i and Kuo-wu hui-i as official translations for meetings of the National Government Council and of the (new)
State Council. The National Government Council is the former State Council and the present designation of State Council replaces the designation of former meetings of the Executive Yuan. The Executive Yuan, however, retains its designation as such but when in deliberative session is now known as the State Council. In its editorial of November 19, 1930, the Kuo Min News Agency in Shanghai remarked that it should be emphasized that the President of the National Government, either under the old or the new Organic Law, does not automatically become President of the Executive Yuan. The fact that President Chiang Kai-shek had to be appointed by special resolution of the Plenary Session to serve concurrently as President of the Executive Yuan indicates that the appointment is a matter of temporary expediency due, probably, to the exigencies of the present situation. Lt. Colonel Nelson E. Margetts, U.S. Military Attache in China commented that the change with respect to the Executive Yuan is most confusing. A new organ, the New State Council, has been created. It exists, however, only as meetings of the Executive Yuan. The wording of the change [Article II, revised law] "the President of the Executive Yuan shall be Chairman of the State Council, indicates two separate bodies, yet the composition of each is the same and it is difficult to understand what difference of power, or authority (presumably intended) is delegated to them. When now reading of any decisions of the State Council, it is important to understand they are really decisions by the Executive Yuan. See U.S. Military Reports: China 1911-1941, G-2 Report No.7938, February 11, 1931. More analysis of Chiang's expansion of his power, see ibid.; G-2 Report No.7496, April 4, 1929, pp. 3-4.

21. Hu Han-min's thoughts on this particular issue, see Chiang Yung-ching (ed.), Hu Han-min haien-sheng mien-p'u (Chronological Biography of Hu Han-min), pp. 487-491; Wang Ching-wei's view, October 27, 1930, p.491; Hu Han-min's debate with Wu Chih-hui and Li Shih-tseng on November 12, 1930, pp. 492-496; Tientsin Ta Kung Pao's interview, November 20, 1930, pp. 496-497.


23. Chiang Kai-shek's opposition to Hu on the question of the Provisional Constitution dispute of 1930, see Chiang's letter to Hu dated February 28, 1930, in Ch'in Hsiao-yi (ed.), Tsung-tung Chiang-kung ta-shih Ch'ang-pien ch'u-k'ao, V.2, Leaves 91-

25. Hu Han-min, close associate of Sun Yat-sen, one of the founding fathers of the Republic, was officially taken into custody on March 1, 1931 because of his opposition to Chiang's provisional constitution. He was removed by Chiang to T'ang-shan. Immediate effects of Chiang's action, see Chiang Yung-ching, ibid.; pp. 505-508. Hu was released on October 13, 1931, ibid.; pp. 508-509. On June 8, 1935 Hu left for Italy on the S.S. Conte Verde and returned to Hong Kon on January 19, 1936. He passed away on May 12 of the same year. U.S. Military Attache Lt. Colonel W.S. Drysdale reported that Hu's departure for Europe was expected to ease the relations between Canton and Nanking and the prospects of a rapprochement between the two political parties were much brighter than they had been in years. See U.S. Military Intelligence Reports: China 1911-1941, G-2 Report No.9145, June 21, 1935.

26. Analysis of the historical background of Canton's opposition to Chiang Kai-shek, see U.S. Military Intelligence Reports: China 1911-1941, G-2 Report No.8049, July 8, 1931; No.8643, August 24, 1933; and G-2 Report No.8651, September 7, 1933.

27. Analysis of Chiang Kai-shek's failure to reorganize the military and the opposition of the Kwangtung faction caused his resignation as Chairman of the National Government [Council], Commander-in-Chief of the Land, Sea and Air Forces and as President of the Executive Yuan, on December 15, 1931, see U.S. Military Intelligence Reports: China 1911-1941, G-2 Report 8173, December 22, 1931, by Assistant Military Attache, Captain Parker G. Tenney. But the First Plenary Session of the Fourth Central Executive Committee held from December 22-29, 1931 made Chiang Kai-shek Chairman of the Military Affairs Committee [Chun-shih wei-yuan-hui] and in effect, if not in theory, his power was substantially what it was when he held the position of the Commander-in-Chief of the Land, Sea and Air Forces, see G-2 Report 8266, April 14, 1932. The official appointment of Chiang Kai-shek was materialized at the Second Plenary Session of the Fourth Central Executive Committee, March 1-6, 1932 at Loyang, see G-2 Report 3110.
CHAPTER FIVE
BETWEEN TWO JAPANESE ATTACKS, SPRING 1932 - SUMMER 1937

1. The Fourth Plenary Session of the Fourth Central Executive Committee was held January 20-25, 1934. Senior member Lin Sheng was re-elected as the Chairman of the National Government Council. Panchen Lama of Tibet became a new member of the Council, and Mongolia petitioned to be self-governed. See Kuo T'ing-i, ibid.; V.3, pp. 336-338.


3. It was the Sixth Plenary Session of the Fourth Central Executive Committee, November 1-6, 1935. The Kuomintang Fifth National Congress was convened one week later, from November 12-23, 1935.

4. Chiang Kai-shek, in his work, Soviet Russia in China, p.72 stated that "In the autumn and winter of 1935 Ch'en Li-fu reported to me that through a friend's introduction Chou En-lai had approached Tseng Yang-fu, a Government representative in Hong Kong. Chou hoped that the Government would designate someone to conduct negotiations with the communists. All Chou reportedly wanted was to stop the fighting at home and to resist Japan together. There were no other conditions. Chou wrote to Ch'en Kuo-fu and Ch'en Li-fu on September 1, reaffirming this position of the Chinese Communists."

5. Ch'en Li-fu's negotiations with Chinese Communist representative Pan Han-nien on behalf of the Kuomintang, also see Wu T'ien-wei, The Sian Incident, pp. 21-21, and Ch'en's continued negotiation with Chou En-lai, p.145. Ch'en negotiations with Chou En-lai in May, 1936, see Kai-yu Hsu, Chou En-lai: China's Gray Eminence, pp. 128-133; and Sian Incident, pp. 135-144; Li Tien-min, Chou En-lai, pp. 197-202; John McCook Roots, Chou: An Informal Biography of China's Legendary Chou En-lai, pp. 81-82.


8. On December 30, 1932, National Government announced that it had approved the appointment of Dimitri Bogomoloff, at present Counsellor of the Soviet Embassy in London, to be Soviet Ambassador to China, see U.S. Military Intelligence Reports, China 1911-1941, G-2 Report No.8476, January 5, 1933; by Major S. V. Constant, Assistant Military Attache. Bogomoloff's travels in
North China, ibid.; G-2 Report No.8638, August 10, 1933, pp. 2-3; the Transocean-Kuomin News Agency reported that his mission was to prevent a reconciliation between Japan and National China, ibid.; G-2 Report No.9514, February 8, 1937, P.7; Domei News Agency reported on the 23rd of March, 1937 that the USSR had concluded a 6-point understanding with National China, G-2 Report, No.9536, April 9, 1937, prepared by Captain David D. Barret; Havas News Agency despatch from Moscow reported that Soviet Far Eastern Commander General Blucher with the mission of concluding an agreement on arms deliveries to the National Government had been denied, G-2 Report No.9584, August 8, 1937, p.4, prepared by Military Attache Joseph W. Stilwell; arms were delivered from Turkestan through Hami and Lanchow, October 18, 1937; Stilwell misreported the date of the signing of the Non-aggression Pact, G-2 Reports 8696, 8816, and 9589, August 21, 1937.

9. The 4-article Soviet-Chinese Non-Aggression Treaty was signed on August 21, 1937 but not made known to the public until August 29, 1937. Complete text in English, see U.S. Military Intelligence Reports: China 1911-1941, G-2 Report 8964, September 2, 1937, 4P.; Japanese press reaction, pp. 2-3; statement of Chinese ambassador in Tokyo, pp. 3-4. Japanese press reported in October of its belief that a secret mutual assistance agreement had been reached between China and the USSR and that as a result of this agreement Soviet policy was to supply China with arms, ammunition, and aircraft in order to strengthen Chinese resistance in the fighting with Japan. The press even speculatively reported that Sun Po, Chiang Ch'ung-kuo, Ch'en Li-fu went secretly by plane to Moscow on September 27, 1937. The press reported that Soviet Ambassador Bogomoloff returned to Moscow September 28, 1937 by plane for the purpose of arranging loans, the supply of ammunition and 260 Soviet planes flown by Soviet pilots to China via Lanchou and Sian. See ibid.; G-2 Report 9027, October 13, 1937, 5P., by Assistant Military Attache John Weckerling. Not long after the Non-Aggression Pact was signed, Bogomoloff ended his mission in China. See ibid.; G-2 Report No.9614, November 27, 1937. Moscow announced on November 23, 1937 that [Ivan Trofimovich] Luganets-Orelsky was to succeed Bogomoloff as the new ambassador to China. He presented his credentials in Chungking on January 23, 1938, see ibid.; G-2 Report, No.9633, February 1, 1938. Soviet Embassy moved from Hankow to Chungking on July 11, 1938, G-2 Report No.9676, July 15, 1938. On April 30, 1945 A. A. Petrov succeeded Ivan Trofimovich Lugmets-Orelsky as the third ambassador of the Soviet Union to China during the World War II period, see Ta Kung Pao, Chungking edition, May 1, 1945; English translation in U.S. State Department (confidential) Central Files: China Internal Affairs, 1945-1949, Despatch No.372, May 8, 1945, 5P.

from the Archives of the German Foreign Office, pp. 321-324, "The German Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Schulenburg) to the German foreign office, April 9, 1941; April 10, 1941; April 13, 1941.

11. On April 4, 1938, Japanese Ambassador to Russia protested to the Soviet government against the presence of Russian aviators serving in the Chinese Army. One Russian aviator was captured alive, see U.S. Military Intelligence Reports: China 1911-1941, G-2 Report 9656, April 6, 1938, prepared by Major David D. Barrett, Assistant Military Attache.

12. Also see Hsu, Chou En-lai, pp. 599-601.


CHAPTER SIX
THE WAR OF RESISTANCE AGAINST JAPAN: AUTUMN 1937 - SUMMER 1945

From 1927 to 1938, Office of U.S. Military Attache made a series of reports estimating the strength of Chiang Kai-shek through intelligence gathering in China:

A) As of August 1927, The National Revolutionary Army under the command of Chiang Kai-shek in Nanking numbered 278,000; the Wuhan government, including Feng Yü-hsiang's Kuominchung had 252,000 soldiers. See U.S. Military Intelligence Reports: China 1911-1941, G-2 Report No.7063, June 6, 1927, 4P.; No.7099, August 3, 1927, 6P..

B) As of the end of 1927,
1) Chiang Kai-shek 355,000
2) Feng Yü-hsiang 90,000
3) Yen Hsi-shan 90,000
4) Chang Tso-lin 286,000
5) Chili-shantung 289,000
6) Sun Ch'üan-fang 440,000
7) Southern Provinces 30,000
See ibid.; G-2 Report No.7183, December 20, 1927, 6P.

C) As of December, 1930,
1) Chiang Kai-shek 825,600
2) Old Chiang divisions 205,000
3) Pai Ch'ung-hsi 95,000
4) Lu Chung-lin 244,000
5) Shansi-Suiyuan Forces 133,000
6) Shih Yu-san 72,000
7) Miscellaneous Anti-Chiang Forces 301,500
8) Northeastern Frontier Forces 418,100
See ibid.; G-2 Report No.7487, April 10, 1929, 7P.; No.7583, August 29, 1929, 6P.; No.7890, December 3, 1930, 13P.
D) As of April, 1935
Total Chinese forces 1,750,000
1) Loyal to Chiang 1,186,000
2) Semi-loyal to Chiang 435,000
3) Independent of control by Chiang 129,000
See ibid.; G-2 Report No.9093, April 10, 1935.

E) As of March, 1939
Total Chinese forces 200 Division Army
  5 New Divisions
  10 Reserve Divisions

3. Sheng Shih-ts'ai left his governorship in Sinkiang Province on August 29, 1945; concerning his involvement in domestic and foreign affairs, particularly with the USSR during World War II in China, see Tu Chung-y'an, Sheng Shih-ts'ai y hsìn-hsìn-chiang (Sheng shih-ts'ai and New Sinkiang), 1945; Tu was the head of Sinkiang Institute (Hsin-chiang hs@eh-y'an), and head of Sheng Shih-ts'ai's Bureau of Education; also see Martin R. Norins' Gateway to Asia: Sinkiang, John Day, 1944; the book was introduced by Owen Lattimore, entitled "Sinkiang's place in the Future of China." Norins' assertion was that in his governance of Sinkiang, Sheng was a wily, cunning, cruel and ruthless man whose only interest was the maintenance of his personal power, and who did not hesitate to use the Soviets for all that he could get out of them. Comment on the book, see Time, May 28, 1945; also see U.S. State Department (confidential) Central Files, China Internal Affairs, 1945-1949, No.127, 893.00/7-545, American Consul in Tihwa's report to the Secretary of State; and his No.8 secret report, "The Practice of Torture in the Prison of Sinkiang," March 15, 1945, 10P. Academic work see Li Tung-fang, "Are the Compatriots in the Province of Sinkiang on the Turkish Race?" Chungking Central News, October 14, 1944, the article was translated into English for the reference of Ambassador Hurley; also Allen S. Whiting and Sheng shih-ts'ai, Sinkiang: Pawn or Pivot, 1958.

4. The Kuomintang struggle for power in Sinkiang Province, see "Alleged relationship of the Political Science Clique [Cheng-hs@eh-hsi] to the situation in the Northeast." Memorandum (secret) of American Consulate in Tihwa to the Secretary of State, No.38, March 14, 1946, U.S. State Department (confidential) Central Files: China's Internal Affairs, 1945-1949, 839.00/3-1446.

5. Activities of German advisers in China in 1930, see U.S.
Military Intelligence Reports: China 1911-1941, G-2 Report No.7741, March 20, 1930, 4P., by Lt. Colonel Nelson E. Margetts in a narrative form as the result of his interview with Chiang Kai-shek's air adviser Bert Hall. Hall was a U.S. citizen by birth but a naturalized citizen of France. He was a member of the Lafayette Escadrills during World War I. Hall informed Margetts that 1) The German advisers with the National Government enjoyed unusual influence over Chiang; 2) There was evidence that enormous quantities of war supplies were purchased upon their recommendations; 3) The German advisers attempted to persuade Chiang to organize a chemical warfare service and to employ gas against his opponents, but Chiang rejected, without success. Also attending to a Reuters dispatch of the Geneva correspondent of the London Daily Herald, Germany was sending large quantities of munitions to China and was prepared to send larger amounts. In German eyes the idea of the Japanese-German Agreement was that Japan should oppose Russian penetration of China and if necessary fight the Soviets, but not in the least that Japan should try to conquer and dominate China and liquidate all European interests in China. German diplomacy in 1930 was to work persuasively to convince Chiang Kai-shek that Germany, in China's hour of trouble, was her firmest friend. Dr. Gunther von Wolff, leader of the German citizens in China, declared through Transocean News Agency that all German nationals in China had the greatest sympathy for China. He made the statement at the Congress of German Foreign Organizations in Stuttgart. See U.S. Military Intelligence Reports: China 1911-1941, G-2 Report No.9596, September 30, 1937, by Military Attachee Colonel Joseph W. Stilwell; German influence in China in general, see ibid.; G-2 Report No.8804, April 12, 1934, 7P.; by Major S. V. Constant, Assistant Military Attache.


7. In May 23, 1938, reports were circulated in Nanking that all German military advisers were ordered to return to Germany.
It was the estimation of the United States that the replacement of the German advisers was possible but in view of the purges in the ranks of the Soviet Army, it would appear that any particularly outstanding military talent could be employed to good advantage at home. See ibid.; G-2 Report 9668, June 25, 1938; the illness of Soviet Commander in the Far East General [Vassili] Blecher, G-2 Report No.9208, p.4., September 26, 1935; the removal of General [Vassili] Blecher from the command of Soviet Far Eastern Army and the difficult circumstances of 43 other generals of the Far Eastern Army due to Stalin's purge, see ibid.; G-2 Report 9687, October 12, 1938, by Assistant Military Attache David D. Barrett; more about German advisors, William C. Kirby, Germany and Republican China, pp. 102-144.


10. Concerning Chungking-Japan-Nanking puppet government relationship, see Ambassador Hurley to the Secretary of State, top secret document #238, "KMT-Communist Negotiations, for the eyes of the Secretary of State alone," unnumbered, February 17, 1945, page 6 stated that "There are at present approximately 900,000 puppet troops in China including 410,000 regulars and 490,000 local troops. During 1941 Communist forces won over 34,167 puppet soldiers (or approximately 3.8% of the local puppet strength in China) and 20,850 rifles. It is estimated that with American financial help the former figure could be increased during 1945 to 90,000 men or 10% of entire puppet force," see U.S. State Department (confidential) Central Files: China Internal Affairs, 1945-1949, 893.00/2-1745. On January 23, 1945 Communist Chu Teh, Commander of the 18th Group Army wrote to General [Albert C.] Wedemeyer requesting that the U.S. Army lend the Communist Army $20,000,000 U.S. currency for work among the puppet troops, see ibid.; top secret No.170, 893.00/2-2345, February 23, 1945, [George] Atcheson, Jr., Charge d'Affairs to the Secretay of State. Also "The Chinese Tug-of-War--prospects for settlements at Chungking--Kuomintang and Communist Suspicions;" editorial page, London Times, January 2, 1946, by a special correspondent. The article says "After the Japanese surrender the Kuomintang relied largely on the puppets and Japanese. The puppets were made responsible for maintaining order till the arrival of Kuomintang forces." Also "Communism in China: policy as expounded by Yenan, an Eastern form of

11. Full text of the letter of March 2, 1924, see Ch'in Hsiao-yi (ed.), Tsung-tung Chiang-kung ta-shih ch'ang-pien ch'u-k'ao, V.1, Leaves pp. 67-72.

12. Ch'in Hsiao-yi (ed.), Kuo-fu ch'@an-chi (complete works of the father of the Nation [Sun Yat-sen]), V.9, p.542.


14. In January 1945, U.S. Embassy in China estimated the Regular Army of National China in Shanghai to total about 85,000. Chinese Communist forces known to be stationed in adjacent areas of Anhwei and Honan Provinces numbered about 25,000, see U.S. Foreign Relations, 1945, V.VII, p.166; Chiang's greatest hope for regaining control of Central and East China area is through future cooperation with the puppets. The puppet had maintained contacts with Nanking and Peking. The Japanese knew of these relationships and approved of them because they did not wish Chiang destroyed. The Japanese believed that Chiang was essential to them; ibid.; p.161; also see ibid.; 1947, V.VII, pp. 218-219.


17. Ch'eng T'ien-fang, Chinese Ambassador to Germany from 1937 to 1939, in his book, A History of Sino-Russian Relations, p.190 writes that in the latter part of 1935, Chiang was "worried lest Japan might take a sudden thrust against China proper which would nullify his long-range policy. So he also looked to the Soviet Union for help in case of such an emergency." "Upon Chiang's instructions Ch'en Li-fu, Director of Organization in the Central headquarters of the Kuomintang approached [Dimitri] Bogomoloff for a possible secret alliance. Bogomoloff told Ch'en that he personally favored such an alliance and suggested that Ch'en go to Moscos, as Chiang's personal representative, to negotiate with Stalin."

18. The best sources for study of the Blue Shirts Society (Lan-i-she) and its relationship with the CC Clique during pre-World War II period is Iwai Eiichi (Hidakusu), Ranisha ni kansuru
chYsa (An Investigation of the Blue Shirts Society), Research Division of the Foreign Ministry, Japan, 1937, 258P. This highly secret, now unclassified document, translated into English by the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation on March 30, 1945 as The Chinese Lan-i-Society. The English translation is divided into two parts, see U.S. State Department (confidential) Central Files, China Internal Affairs, 1945-1949, 893.00/3-3045: 1) [confidential] Investigation Pertaining to the Lan-i-she (as of March 1938), published June 1937 by Section 5 of the Investigation Bureau of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 126P.; pp. 73-75, "Its Relation to the CC Band"; on page 14, the study stated that "in fact, the Lan-i-she is for Chiang a lifeless party, the central support of his political power, and the last line of defense for his political life;" on page 53, it stated that "the American Branch of the Lan-i-she was located in Washington, D.C., comprising three directors, one secretary and 33 members." 2) (confidential) rules and Regulations Pertaining to the Lan-i-she, published February 1938, by Section 3, Investigation Bureau (Department) of Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 59P. English language source, see Hsu En-tseng, the Invisible Conflict, 1956, 1958, 1962, 204P.; Academic works see Lloyd E. Eastman, Seeds of Destruction, Nationalist China in War and Revolution, 1937-1949; pp. 91, 96, 100-102, 213; The Abortive Revolution, China Under Nationalist Rule, 1927-1937, pp. 32-36, 56-60; 61-63.

19. The Whampoa Clique and the Blue Shirts, see William C. Kirby, Germany and Republican China, pp. 158-169, Eastman, the Abortive Revolution, pp. 31, 36, 56.


CHAPTER SEVEN
WARTIME EDUCATION MINISTER, JANUARY 1938 - DECEMBER 1945

1. Concerning the power of Tai-Li, see "Reported Attempt of Tai li to obtain for himself a unified control over Intelligence Operations," secret report of Edward E. Rice, Second Secretary of [U.S.] Embassy to Ambassador Patrick J. Hurley, June 25, 1945 at Sian, Shensi Province. See U.S. State Department (confidential) Central Files: China Internal Affairs, 1945-1949, 893.00/0-2545 CS/MAJ.

2. Ch'en Li-fu's wartime educational policy, see his Four

4. It is worthwhile to mention that on July 8, 1929, the Standing Committee of the Central Executive Committee adopted a resolution introducing 28 days as Revolutionary Memorial Days including 1) March 18, Punitive Expedition against Y'an Shi-k'ai by the Navy led by the gunboat Shao-ho, 2) April 12, party purgation movement, 3) Anniversary of the death of Martyr Ch'en Ch'i-mei, 4) July 9, Launching of the Northern Expedition. The two Ch'en brothers played a significant role in these four events. See U.S. Military Intelligence Reports: China 1911-1941, G-2 Report 7562, July 17, 1929, by Assistant Military Attache, Parker G. Tenney.

5. See Proclamation 6182 of September 20, 1990, National Teacher Appreciation Day, 1990, 55 F.R.38971, by the President of the United States of America [signed by George Bush]. "In grateful recognition of America's teachers, the Congress, by Senate Joint Resolution 313, has designated October 3, 1990, as "National Teacher Appreciation Day" and has authorized and requested the President to issue a proclamation in observance of this event."

6. Fairbank's view on Ch'en Li-fu's request and his policy matters, see Fairbank, Ch'inabound, pp. 198-199, p.248. Comment on Ch'en's career, p.249. Fairbank had two recorded conversations with Ch'en. One was in October 1942, and the other in the evening of November 2, 1943. Both were about the subject of using projectors for educational purposes. Fairbank's unkind words about Ch'en and CC Clique were printed in his "Memorandum for the Ambassador, November 3, 1943," see pp. 250-251. Fairbank writes that Ch'en "envisioned the installation of 80,000 "reflectorscopes" in the 80,000 villages of China, where the masses could be shown pictures of the world." He stated "My strongest impression, from this and earlier conversations with the Minister of Education, is that his interest in and understanding of education is extremely superficial, as though he seldom had found time to contemplate any of the topics which we discussed," he concluded "The CC are a type interested in powers and regimentation to preserve it. They are not capable of much innovation....To put Ch'en Li-fu in charge of education was a step toward politicizing it and was resented accordingly by the Peking liberal educators, who had seldom been enthusiastic about the KMT in any case....." In his travel to Taiwan in 1960,
Fairbank recorded (p.384) that "of the Nationalist ministers I had seen in wartime Chungking, the party organizer Ch'en Li-fu had retired to raise chickens in New Jersey, whereas the more liberal Wang Shih-chieh was still in the cabinet and responsive to my proposals for more academic contact and opening of archives." However, in his The United States and China, (4th edition, 1979), p.255, Fairbank ascknowledged that "the revival of Confucianism was most actively promoted by Ch'en Li-fu, whose uncle had been Chiang Kai-shek's patron and who became Chiang's most loyal political organizer." He stated that "The Ch'en brothers led the "CC" Clique which dominated the right wing of the Kuomintang. In general Ch'en Li-fu called for the fusion of Western technology and Confucian social values." "He [Ch'en Li'fu] urged that the dicta of famous Confucian scholars be systematically arranged and explained to the people. Confucianism belongs to no specific class, it is actually in keeping with Sun's [Sun Yat-sen] Three Principles."

7. Fairbank's view of Chinese communists can be seen from his personal letter to John Carter Vincent dated December 6, 1945. He proposed that "our positive program should continue to emphasize economic help in China, while cutting down on support of one party in the civil conflict. This can be done only if some kind of coalition government is attained." See "U.S. Policy in China," Mr. [John Carter] Vincent to Mr. [Dean] Acheson, office memorandum, United States Department of State, January 14, 1946; in U.S. State Department (confidential) Central Files: China Internal Affairs, 1945-1949, 893.00/1-1446; David Gonzalez, writing for the New York Times, September 16, 1991 stated that "three decades later [1960s], Fairbank acknowledged his earlier belief that Communism was "bad in America but good in China." "Mr. Fairbank entered a prolific period in the 1960s, with his extensive writings and active lecture schedule focused on urging the United States to recognize the People's Republic of China and to bring it into the United Nations and replace Taiwan on the Security Council."


9. Wilma Fairbank [wife of John K. Fairbank]'s harsh criticism of Ch'en Li-fu and her displeasure over National
China's education policy during World War II see Wilma Fairbank, America's Cultural Experiment in China, 1942-1949, U.S. Department of State Bureau of educational and Cultural Affairs, 1976, pp. 121-143. On page 129, she states "in Chungking Ministry of Education officials earned their pay by controlling the thoughts and deeds of students. It was the normal and expected procedure, presided over by Minister Ch'en Li-fu in the interest of the Kuomintang Party and of his patron, the Generalissimo."

10. John T. Flynn, in his book, the Lattimore Story, 1953, pp. 40-41 states that there were fourteen "poisonous books" published by the Institute of Pacific Relations during World War II period affected greatly on the China-U.S. relations. He further states that they were all reviewed by The New York Times and The New York Herald Tribune, and John K. Fairbank's work, The United States in China was one of them:

- Unfinished Revolution in China by Israel Epstein
- United States and China by John K. Fairbank
- Report from Red China by Harrison Forman
- Journey from the East by Mark Gayn
- Solution in Asia by Owen Lattimore
- New Frontiers in Asia by Philip J. Jaffe
- Making of Modern China by Owen and Eleanor Lattimore
- Situation in Asia by Owen Lattimore
- China's Wartime Politics by Lawrence K. Rosinger
- China's Crisis by Lawrence K. Rosinger
- Battle Hymn of China by Agnes Smedley
- Challenge of Red China by Guenther Stein
- Chinese Conquer China by Anna Louis Strong
- The Phoenix and the Dwarfs, a play by George E. Taylor

11. Beginning in 1944, U.S. Department of State showed its "natural concern" for the press and thought control in China. "Reports said that the Chinese government [National Government] restrictions are operating to prevent the press from giving a true and objective picture of affairs in China, and also reports of measures to control the thought of Chinese students, including those sent abroad for study," see U.S. Foreign Relations, 1944, V.V, "Memorandum Prepared in the Office of Far Eastern Affairs,"
12. Regarding the services National China’s Youth Army rendered to the China-India-Burma Theater from the winter of 1944 to the Japanese unconditional surrender, the best and complete record, see Charles F. Romanus and Riley Sanderland, United States Army in World War II: China-Burma-India Theater, Stilwell’s Mission to China, Washington, D.C. Department of the Army, Office of the Chief of Military History, Reprinted, 1968, 441P.; and their Stilwell’s Command Problems, 1955, 518P.

13. The total collection of salt revenue in 1936 was U.S. $250,433,000; and in 1937 it was U.S. $213,000,000. See U.S. Military Intelligence Reports: China 1911-1941, "Collection of the Chinese Salt Administration," Report 9650, March 24, 1938, p.17. The report stated "All foreign loan obligations [of China] secured on the salt revenue have been fully met."

CHAPTER EIGHT
FROM VICTORY TO DEFEAT, SPRING 1945 - WINTER 1949

1. Stalin’s requests see Chiang Kai-shek, Soviet Russia in China, revised, abridged edition, pp. 101-104, Stalin complimented Chiang Kai-shek as "selfless," a patriot" and said that "the Soviets in times past had befriended him," Ambassador Hurley’s telegram April 17, 1945 from Moscow, top secret and urgent for the eyes of the Secretary of State, see U.S. State Department (confidential) Central Files: China Internal Affairs, 1945-1949, 893.00/4-1745. In April 1945, Stalin decided to send a new ambassador to Chungking, see "Welcome to Ambassador [A.A.] Petrov, and the future of Sino-Soviet Relations," editorial of Chungking Ta-kung pao, May 1, 1945. Ta-kung pao was the most popular and prestigious daily in World War II China. The editorial expressed the view that to meet the challenging new international situation, the non-aggression pact signed on August 29, 1937 was not sufficient. A new Chinese-Soviet treaty of mutual assistance should be negotiated and signed. English translation of the editorial, see Despatch No.372, May 8, 1945, from the U.S. Embassy, Chungking, China.

2. Whether Outer Mongolia should be returned to China or not was an issue of debate in the high level of Soviet Union officialdom. The Tokyo Nichi Nichi reported that Bogomoloff favors cancellation of the independence of Outer Mongolia and a return of this territory to China, a move which would make it possible to use the Outer Mongolian Army to attack Manchuria. General Lepin, Soviet Military Attache, is not in favor of giving
back Outer Mongolia and is of the opinion that Soviet assistance to China should be limited to supplying munitions of war and to efforts to secure joint action on the part of the Powers concerned to restrain Japan's advance. Stalin, says the Nichi Nichi, has partially acceded to Bogomoloff's recommendations and is considering the abrogation of the Soviet-Outer Mongolian alliance, the recognition of China's suzerainty over Outer Mongolia and the placing of the Outer Mongolian Army under the control of National Government for operations on the Mongolian-Manchurian border. See U.S. Military Intelligence Reports: China 1911-1941, G-2 Report 9601, October 18, 1937.

3. T. V. Soong resigned from his premiership on March 1, 1947. Assistant Commercial Attache in China Boehringer commented that "Dr. Chen Li-fu was among those responsible for Dr. Soong's resignation on the charge that his economic policies had failed." Ch'en's proposal for economic reform was adopted by the Central Executive Committee on March 23, 1947 as an economic reform plan which, since May 25, has been under study by the National Economic Council. The plan was revised and passed by the plenary session of the National Economic Council on July 21, 1947. Boehringer commented that "there are no major changes either in content or in spirit of the original proposals. The plan contains recommendations under 15 headings: Full utilization of manpower; Increase production of goods; Stabilization of the value of the currency; Reform of the banking system; Development of industries, commerce, communications; Reforms of food administration; More reasonable collection of land tax and adoption of a granary system to stabilize grain prices; Division of the idle capital; Encouragement of foreign capital; National adjustment of treatment accorded public employees, school teachers and Army personnel; Severe punishment for persons who utilize political influence to benefit private enterprises; Strengthening of the economic organization with over-all planning of the nation's finance and economy.

Boehringer, however, did not think that "the suggestion is then valid," see his "Memorandum on Economic Situation in China," Nanking, July 23, 1947; U.S. Foreign Relations, 1947, V.VII, pp. 661-667. Instead, he listed nine unfavorable factors which led the continued economic deterioration in China including official inaction and ineptness; continued heavy unfavorable trade balance; shortage of coal; steady increase in wages; multiplicity of taxes, with discrimination in collection of taxes from foreign concerns; Chinese insistence on sovereign rights; jockeying for power in Kuomintang with CC-Clique emerging as potentially dominant group in economic and political science group, with China's ablest administrators, in eclipse; hope for loans from the United States; badly administered import trade controls. Detailed summary of the U.S. Embassy about Ch'en Li-fu's plan and comments, see ibid.; pp. 1099-1103; The Minister-counselor of Embassy in China Butterworth to the Secretary of State, April 16, 1947, Butterworth held a similar view as Brehringer stated in his memorandum of July 23, 1947, Butterworth questioned the motives
"which prompted the reactionary C-C Clique to sponsor seemingly liberal and much-needed sweeping reforms." An embassy officer had a discussion with Ch'en Li-fu on July 9, 1947. Ch'en stated that the "only defect" of the plan is that it does not take up in detail the question of land problems, see Ambassador Stuart to the Secretary of State Marshall, July 12, 1947, ibid., pp. 1157-1158; Comparisons of the plan of March 23, 1947 and the plan of July 21, 1947, see ibid., pp. 1184-1189. As to the post World War II U.S. aid and T. V. Soong's handling of financial matters, a timely report can be seen from "Insiders Got Rich on Chinese Aid," U.S. News and World Report, August 26, 1949, pp. 15-17.

4. Commenting on Chiang Kai-shek's decision March 1, 1945 to call the National Assembly on November 12, John Stewart Service writes to the Department of State that "The National Congress cannot be called while half of the country is cut off or accepted by the enemy and while all parties but the Kuomintang are denied legality. What the situation requires, and the only thing that can save it, a coalition government. We hope that America will use her influence to achieve it." U.S. Foreign Relations, 1945, V.VII, pp. 278-279; actually on October 10, 1944, Service sent a memorandum to the Department of State from Yenan, wartime capital of Chinese Communist Party, saying that the United States [1] does not need Kuomintang for military reasons; [2] need not fear Kuomintang surrender or opposition; [3] need not fear the collapse of the Kuomintang Government; [4] need not support the Kuomintang for international political reasons; and [5] need not support Chiang in the belief that he represents pro-American or democratic groups." Service states that the U.S. policy "toward China should be guided by two facts: First, we cannot hope to deal successfully with Chiang without being hard-boiled. Second, we cannot hope to solve China's problems (which are now our problems) without consideration of the opposition forces--communist, provincial and liberal."

5. "Marshall increasingly felt that the chief antagonist to all his efforts in China was a man of whom he often heard but whom he almost never saw--Ch'en Li-fu, who, with his elder brother, headed the ultra-right "CC Clique," which was powerful in the Kuomintang." See Forrest C. Pogue, George Marshall: Statesman 1945-1949, pp. 82-83; Ch'en's uncompromising position about negotiations with Chinese Communists, p. 115.

6. It was in July 1946 that Ch'en Li-fu had two conversations with Ambassador Stuart. Boorman (ed.), Biographical Dictionary of Republican China, "Ch'en Li-fu," p.210 recorded that "after the appointment of John Leighton Stuart as American Ambassador to China in July [11], 1946, Ch'en Li-fu on two occasions called on Stuart to express his point of view regarding the Communist and related problems. Ch'en held that "there was no middle road possible between communism and anti-communism." On April 17, 1947, Ch'en was appointed as the Secretary-General of the Kuomintang Political Committee of the Central Executive Committee, see U.S. Foreign relations, 1947,
V.VII, pp. 100-101; Stuart reported to Secretary of State Marshall who was in Moscow attending a meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers from March 10-April 24, 1947, ibid.; pp. 102-104. In two telegrams dated April 18 and April 19, Stuart informed Marshall that "it must be borne in mind that the CC Clique while at the moment not in the forefront, is still substantially in the control of the Kuomintang party machinery."

7. Meetings between Chou En-lai and Marshall might have affect Marshall's attitude towards Ch'en Li-fu. On July 22, 1946, Marshall reported to President Truman that Ch'en Li-fu was "the political leader of the government party [Kuomintang], and the man most opposed to my efforts." See Marshall Files, 121.893/7-2246 Telegram, Nanking, 22 July, 1946; in U.S. Foreign Relations, 1946, V.IX, pp. 1394-1395; Marshall's impression of Ch'en was also affected by T. V. Soong; on August 2, 1946, Marshall reported to President Truman that T. V. Soong was "strongly opposed to the actions, terroristic in my opinion, of Ch'en Li-fu, the politica leader of the Kuomintang and the virtual successor of Tai Li, former head of all secret police or plain-clothesmen operations in China," see Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54-D270: Telegram, U.S. Foreign Relations, 1946, V.IX, pp. 1439-1440, "General Marshall to President Truman, Nanking, August 2, 1946." The issue of requesting Chiang Kai-shek to send Ch'en Li-fu abroad was again pursued by Stuart, on August 19, 1947 Stuart reported to the Secretary of State, see U.S. Foreign relations, V.VII, 1947, No.945, pp. 254-257, that "Last week at the close of an interview with President Chiang I suggested that Dr. Ch'en [Li-fu] be sent to the United States for the observation of our political parties, pointing out that his previous experience there had been in technical and labor matters. He laughed heartily and said that he had himself been thinking of having him make a trip to Europe but that for the immediate present he could not spare him in view of the approaching elections. It was especially because of these that I had hoped to have him out of the country. Since that occasion, however, General Cheng Chieh-min has told me that it might be possible to arrange Dr. Ch'en's departure earlier." On september 12, 1947, Stuart reported to the Secretary of State again about his suggestion of sending Ch'en Li-fu abroad for the study of political party methods in democratic countries, see ibid., pp. 282-283, 893.00/9-1247, airgram. On December 6, 1947, Stuart called in premier Chang Chun about his concern: "the increasing power of the CC Clique as seen in their control of the government economic and financial institutions" and "its intimidation of liberals through the activities of the Party [Kuomintang] secret police." Chang Chun replied at length "with special reference to the place of the CC Clique as an almost inevitable feature of the process." Thus, Stuart reported that "these brothers [the two Ch'en brothers] are narrow and bigoted but their realization of the Communist danger and their courage in meeting it have not been without value to the national cause. As to "the evils" mentioned by him, Stuart "and his colleagues are quite aware of these but the situation is now so critical that any attempt to
correct them would precipitate internal disturbances which a tottering edifice could not attend." Stuart reported that "Chen Li-fu has remarked, quoting a phrase from Mencius, that those who are now denounced as reactionaries were true prophets," ibid.; pp. 395-396. However, Stuart reported to Marshall that he learned that "CC Clique was too strong for T. V. Soong to oppose," ibid.; p.294, September 27, 1947, and "also hard for liberals such as Shao Li-tze to win the CC Clique to their point of view," ibid.; September 29, 1947, ibid.; pp. 295-297. On December 2, 1947, Stuart explained to Marshall that "in a certain sense there is no CC Clique, but rather a permeation of the whole party machinery by the Ch'en brothers whose control of patronage and of the secret police gives them immense power. They are fanatical in their conviction that the Communist Party must be crushed and that its agents, disguised as KMT members or as liberals are everywhere carrying on subversive activities. There is enough evidence to justify their fears if not their methods." See Stuart to Marshall, December 2, 1947, U.S. Foreign Relations, 1947, V.VII, pp. 382-383. Stuart's respose to Chiang Kai-shek's New Years' message of 1949 announcing his intent to retire was favorable. In his report to the Secretary of State dated January 3, 1949, Stuart denounced Ch'en Li-fu as "all the evil influence of the KMT [Kuomintang]," see U.S. Foreign Relations, 1949, V.III, pp. 1-2. Tang Tsou, in his book, America's Failure in China, 1941-50, states that "The C.C. Clique and the Whampoa faction were the main obstacles to the pursuit of an effective American policy in China," p.377; therefore, to remove and/or send away Ch'en Li-fu, leader of Whampoa faction was one of the goals of the U.S. policy in China. The idea was first suggested to the Secretary of State in July, 1944, by Wm. R. Langdon, U.S. Consul General at Kunming. See Langdon's report to the Secretary of State, July 14, 1944, U.S. Foreign Relations, 1944, pp. 475-477: Langdon states "one well-placed Kuomintang liberal at Kunming describes the Generalissimo as fundamentally anti-western, Ch'en Li-fu as anti-foreign, and General Ho Ying-ch'in as anti-western and asserts that China cannot embark upon a progressive program of National Reconstruction under such leadership....In the absence of American pressure, he does not see any hope for liberalism and democracy in China."

On July 2, 1946, General Marshall cabled Acting Secretary of State Dean Acheson asking his "and [John Carter] Vincent's frank and quite informal reactions to present developments and the imperative issues that might soon and suddenly arise," John Carter Vincent then was Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs, see U.S. Foreign Affairs, 1946, V. IX, pp. 1277-1278; Acheson replied to Marshall on July 4, 1946. In a 5-page top secret confidential telegram, "Eyes alone General Marshall," he stated that "We do not believe that Chiang, as some reports indicate, has lost control over reactionary political elements surrounding him or over trigger-happy anti-communits in his army. He is in a dilemma. Neither he nor the Communists want war but he fears the consequences of peaceful agreement. He is closely tied to his reactionary political and military cronies but he is
most anxious to avoid responsibility for jeopardizing the success of your mission. Under pressure of expediency we believe he will choose to avoid war but we cannot ignore, as you do not, possibility that he may choose the other course. At this juncture it would be a particularly helpful gesture if Chiang could send Ho Ying-chin off on some innocuous tour or mission abroad and give Ch'en Li-fu a similar mission or some diplomatic post...." Acheson concluded his statement, in saying that "the foregoing are, as you will understand, our informal and personal views. Your own recommendations in the light of actual events would of course be of primary importance in reaching a decision as to this Government's policy and course of action," see U.S. State Department (confidential) Central Files, China: Internal Affairs, 1945-1949, 893.00/7-446. Also see U.S. Foreign Relations, 1946, V.IX, pp. 1295-1297. From Acheson [and vincent]'s view, in July 1946, Ch'en Li-fu must be an obstacle to Marshall's mission in China and Ch'en should be sent abroad by Chiang. Chiang, eventually sent Ch'en Li-fu abroad in the summer of 1948.

8. Sometimes Chinese Communists presented false reports to General Marshall about the actual power of Ch'en Li-fu. For example, Chou wrote to Marshall in Shanghai that "by the personal order from Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, all the forces of the Kuomintang Party, Administration, and Army are available at the command of Ch'en Li-fu to suppress opposition forces." Ch'en, in actuality, never commanded "all the forces of the Kuomintang," nor did he command the Kuomintang Army. See Chou's memorandum to Marshall, July 16, 1946; in U.S. Foreign Relations, 1946, V.IX, pp. 1362-1363. On the following day, Chou told Marshall in person that Ch'en was in Shanghai to organize the Secret Police work, see ibid.; pp. 1371-1378, Minutes of Meeting Between General Marshall and General Chou En-lai at No.5, Ning Hai Road, Nanking, July 17, 1946 at 10:45 a.m.. On July 26, 1946, Chou En-lai told Marshall that when he "went to Shanghai, Mr. Ch'en Li-fu was at the height of his acitivites. He authored a blacklist in preparation for violent actions against the liberal minded people." and Chou "therefore felt compelled to reveal his designs publicly...that means he [Ch'en Li-fu] is publicly advocating civil war....," see Minutes Meeting Between General Marshall and General Chou En-lai at No.5, Ning Hai Road, Nanking, July 26, 1946, 10:15 a.m.; in U.S. Foreign Relations, 1946, V.IX, pp. 1404-1410. After some contacts with "liberal and other circles which have been critical of Kuomintang policies," Ambassador Stuart reported to the Secretary of State on the same day that "they refer to the presence in Shanghai of Ch'en Li-fu, the recent suspension of the liberal newspaper Wen Hui Pao for one week, and special police activities including certain arrests as supporting their view." See The Ambassador in China (Stuart) to the Secretary of State, July 26, 1946, 893.00/7-2646, telegram, U.S. Foreign Relations, 1946, V.IX, pp. 1414-1416.

9. Chou En-lai stated to Marshall that Ch'en Li-fu "directed the reactionaries to oppose the Political Consultative
Conference (PCC) from behind the scene." "The CC Clique are aiming to overturn the decisions of the PCC; they deem that these decisions are to the disadvantage of their own clique." "As to the Kuomintang Central Committee meeting, their attempt is to upset all the decisions laid down by the PCC; they are opposing not only the Chinese Communist Party but also all the people within Kuomintang who are for peace, democracy and unification....in the Session of past few days the CC Clique upbraided others almost everyday." See "Statement made by General Chou En-lai to General Marshall regarding Chinese Communist position toward Manchuria, March 10, 1946," in U.S. Foreign Relations, 1946, V.IX, pp. 529-535. Also see Roman H. Myers and Donald G. Gillin (ed.), Last Chance in Manchuria, 1989, 350P.

Concerning the minor parties, Chou En-lai told Marshall that Ch'en Li-fu's view was that "the minor parties should not wait for the Communists but should participate directly in the Government and break with Communists." Chou reported that Ch'en "openly condemned General Mao Tse-tung as a traitor. He is openly sowing dissensions among the democratic elements and paving the ground for a government organization without Communist participation." Furthermore, Chou stated that the Chinese Communist Party "would never pursue the way to civil war to try to overthrow the government." See "Minutes of meeting between General Marshall, general Chou En-lai, and Dr. Stuart at No.5, Ning Hai Road, Nanking, August 10, 1946, 10:40 a.m., in U.S. Foreign Relations, 1946, V.IX, pp. 1493-1502.

10. Chiang's speech, see Ch'in Hsiao-yi (ed.), Tsung-tung chiang-kung ta-shih ch'ang-pien ch'u-k'ao, V.6, Leaves 251-253; Also see speech of Chen Cheng, secretary-General of the San Min Chu I Youth Corps, at the weekly memorial service of October 28, 1946; full text, U.S. Embassy to the department of State, 893.00/11-1546; November 15, 1946, 11P.. Also Top secret report from U.S. Embassy to the Secretary of State, ibid.; November 5, 1946; concerning the factional struggle among T. V. Soong, CC Clique, Political Science Clique and Chen Cheng's Youth Corps. The report states that "source states Generalissimo has selected General Chen Cheng as his successor and is strengthening General Ch'en's position."


13. For a study of Ch'en Li-fu's contributions to the interpretations of Three People's Principles, see Sidney H. Chang and Leonard H. D. Gordon, All Under Heaven....Sun Yat-sen and His Revolutionary Thought, pp. 125-130; Wang Tien-Shan, Ch'en Li-fu ch'uan (Biography of Ch'en Li-fu), 1993; Yeh Yu-fu, Ch'en Li-fu hsien-sheng t'i che-hs©eh ssu-hsiang yen-chiu (Study of Ch'en Li-fu's philosophical thought), 1991; Charles Ray Kitts, An Inside View of the Kuomintang: Ch'en Li-fu, 1926-1949, Ph.D. dissertation, St. John's University, 1978; Thomas J. Rasmussen, The Thought of Ch'en Li-fu: An Ideology of Modernization?, M.S. thesis, Brown University, 1969. During World War II period, China's enemy Japan highly complimented Ch'en Li-fu's work Wei-sheng lun (On Vitalism). "Japanese viewed Sun Yat-sen's ideas as only a portion of the Three People's Principles and gave equal credit to the thought of Chiang Kai-shek, based upon Ch'en Li-fu's Vitalism." In addition, "Ch'en Li-fu's Vitalism was understood [by the Japanese] to have built upon Sun's though but rationalized Chiang Kai-shek's dictatorship," ibid.; pp. 155-157.

14. Also see Te-kong Tong and Li Tsung-jen, the Memoirs of Li Tsung-jen, Chapter 44, pp. 452-467.

15. An estimate of National China's military strength can be seen from two sources: 1) The Soviet Pravda of April 7, 1947 states that since the surrender of Japan, Americans have trained and equipped 40 Kuomintang divisions and 50,000 Kuomintang police troops; that the U.S. Military advisers have established 27 military schools. During the war the U.S. trained 36 division of Chinese troops, numbering less than 400,000 men, of this total 6 which were trained in India were totally equipped by the U.S.. The remaining 30 divisions, trained in China, were partially equipped by the U.S. and largely by Chinese manufactured arms. At the time of the article, there were less than 36 division of these troops, due to mobilization and reorganization of the Chinese Army. 2) The U.S. General McConnell reported on March 21, 1947 that "the strength of the Chinese Air Force was 342 combat air craft and 152 transport air craft, comprising an air force of 494 operational aircraft. There were 430 combat air crews and 186 transport crews. It was estimated that as of January 1948 the Chinese Air Force would be reduced to one-half of its 1947 operational strength, and that by August 1947 it would be totally ineffective except for a few transport air craft. Ammunition on hand was 13,000,061 rounds of 50 caliber ammunition and 4,000 tons of U.S. bombs. There was ammunition for 10 months of operations and bombs available for 10 months' operations," see U.S. Foreign Relations, 1947, V.VII, pp. 79-80, pp. 95-96.

16. See footnote 7 of this Chapter.
17. Ch'en Li-fu's visit to the United States and his meeting with Republican Presidential candidate Governor Thomas Dewey of New York, see Tang Tsou, America's Failure in China, pp. 118-119, p.354, p.490. Tsou's source is from Charles Wertenbacker, "The Chinese Lobby," Reporter, April 15, 1952, pp. 18-19. Governor Dewey's position on the Chinese civil war see his various speeches delivered from June 1948 to the end of October 1948. Tsou states that "on returning to China he [Ch'en Li-fu] was reported to have said that, if elected, Governor Dewey would take extraordinary measures toward giving military aid to China."


19. On January 13, 1949, Ch'en Li-fu, Minister without Portfolio, was directed to seek direct approach to Communists by Chiang with Chang Chun, Military and Political Affairs Director for Southwest China; and Chang Chih-chung, Military and political affairs director for Northwest China and Government representative during the 1946 negotiations with the Chinese Communist Party. U.S. Foreign Affairs, 1949, V.III, The Ambassador in China (Stuart) to the Secretary of State, January 15, 1949, pp. 50-51. On January 20, 1949, Ch'en Li-fu had a conversation with John Leighton Stuart, U.S. Ambassador in China about Senator Sol Bloom, Chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations Committee's public demand of January 17, 1947 for removal of Chiang Kai-shek. See U.S. Foreign Relations, 1949, V.VIII, pp. 67-69, Senator Bloom's statement, see Congressional Record, Appendix, V.95, pt.12, p.A272. Ch'en states that "if the United States did not desire a Communist regime in China dominated and directed from Moscow" he felt "the United States should support any elements in China resisting Communism and hoped the United States would do so." On February 21, 1949, Ch'en inquired whether U.S. China policy remained unchanged. Ch'en states two points 1)"We non-Commuits must stick together," 2)"We must find some way to continue the cooperation at present existing between Li Tsung-jen and Sun Fo." See "Ch'en's conversation with U.S. Minister Counselor Clark," at Canton, February 21, 1949, U.S. Foreign Relations, 1949, V.VIII, pp. 140-141.

20. Ch'en Li-fu's view on the situation in Canton, see U.S. Minister-Counselor Clark to the Secretary of State, May 17, 1949, U.S. Foreign Relations, 1949, V.III, p.324. "Ch'en thinks neither Li nor Gimo [Chiang Kai-shek] can save situation alone and is making strenuous efforts to bring things together. He is suggesting that Gimo come to Canton as head party and that he with Li as head of government would determine policy, Li executing policies." Clark commented that "This of course just what Li has so far refused flatly to do." More about Ch'en's views on possible Chiang-Li cooperation, see Clark to the Secretary of State, May 23, 1949, ibid.; pp. 340-341.
21. Ch'en Li-fu's role in the Kuomintang elders' plan of inviting Chiang Kai-shek back to Canton from Tainan, May 27, 1949, see Clark to the Secretary of State, May 28, 1949, U.S. Foreign Relations, 1949, V.III, p.351. The letter was carried to Taiwan where Chiang then was on May 27th by a group including Yen Hsi-shan, Yu Yen-jen, Ch'en Li-fu and Chu Chih-hua. The group returned to Canton May 28, 1949; also see Kuo T'ing-i, Chung-hua min-kuo shih-shih jih-chih, p.873; more about Chiang's return to Canton and his possible meeting with Li Tsung-jen in July 1949 see Clark to Secretary of State, July 8, 1949, ibid.; pp. 411-412. Chiang Kai-shek's view on the situation in China in July, 1949, see his interview with Scripps-Harvard correspondent Clyde Farnsworth, July 4, 1949, full text, ibid.; pp. 412-417.

22. In June, 1949, Cheou En-lai felt that "USA should aid China for reconstruction and he did not favor coalition with elements Ho Ying-Ch'in and ch'en Li-fu type but felt that without coalition reconstruction might be so delayed that the party [Chinese Communist party] would lose the support of the people." See Consul General Clubb to the Secretary of State, June 1, 1949, in U.S. Foreign Relations, 1949, V.VIII, pp. 357-360, "The Question of Possible Aid to the New Regime."

23. Chiang Kai-shek returned to Canton from Taiwan on July 14, 1949 and Chung-yang fei-ch'ang wei-yuan hui (Extraordinary Committee of the Central Executive Committee) was immediately formed. Chiang was elected as the Chairman of the Committee, and Li Tsung-jen, Vice Chairman, see Kuo T'ing-i, Chung-hua min-kuo shih-shih jih-chih, V.4, P.885; Ch'en Li-fu, on July 22, 1949 had a two-hour conversation with U.S. Minister-Counselor Clark. "Ch'en maintained that economic aid must come before military victory" and Clark "taking the other side of the argument. "Although he repeated more than once that he had insisted to Generalissimo that Nationalist Government must itself demonstrate its ability to do something before expecting aid from the U.S., he kept coming back with expression hope we would in some way reconsider and provide at least stabilization loan or grant." Clark commented that "it was a question of which came first, the hen or egg," see U.S. Foreign Relations, 1949, V.III, pp. 450-451; The Minister-Counselor of Embassy in China (Clark) to the Secretary of State, July 22, 1949.


25. As of November 30, 1992, the three are Madame Chiang Kai-shek, Hsueh Yüeh, and Ch'en Li-fu.

CHAPTER NINE

1. Chiang Kai-shek's assessment of the failure in China, see his report of October 16, 1949. Text see Ch'en Hsiao-yi (ed.), Tsung-tung Chiang-kung ta-shih ch'ang-pien ch'u-k'ao, V.8, Leaves 392-400. However, after his withdrawal to Taiwan, one of the most serious problems the National Government had to face was the ideological crisis. High officials such as Chu Chia-hua, successor of Ch'en Li-fu as the Minister of Education in 1944 said that "the San Min Chu I [Three People's Principles] was hopeless as an instrument of political or psychological appeal to the Chinese people." Chiang Mon-lin, former president of Peking University and K. Y. Yin, head of China trust, told Robert W. Barnett, who was in Taiwan in late August and early September, 1951 on an information-gathering mission, that "the San Min Chu I had no dynamic appeal whatever to the Chinese people." Barnett, however suggested that, "a [new] ideology, perhaps based upon the Chinese tradition, might serve as an alternative to Communist ideology." See Memorandum of Barnett to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs Rusk, October 3, 1951, in U.S. Foreign Affairs, 1951, V.VII, pp. 1816-1827. Barnett's thoughts in 1951 coincided with Ch'en Li-fu's thinking.


3. The name Mary E. Ferguson is the suggestion of Martin Heijdra, Chinese/East Asian bibliographer of Princeton University Gest Oriental Library and East Asian collections. In his letter dated October 23, 1992 to Ms. Jean Tempesta, Interlibrary loan assistant at Henry Madden Library of California State University, Fresno states that "the most likely candidate is Mary E. Ferguson." She is the author of China Medical Board and Peking Union Medical College; a chronicle of fruitful collaboration, 1914-1951, New York, China Medical Board of New York, 1970, 263P.

4. All the letters see Chiang Ching-kuo, Chiang Ching-kuo ch'an-chi (complete works of Chiang Chiang-kuo), V.15, and V.16.

6. In his New Year's message of January 1, 1990, Lee states that he saw "Traditional Chinese culture, the achievements of the Taiwan experience, and Sun Yat-sen's principles as the proper guide for reunification." He predicted that China might be reunified within six years, see China Post, January 1, 1990; Sidney H. Chang and Leonard H. D. Gordon, All Under Heaven...Sun Yat-sen and His Revolutionary Thought, pp. 165-166. Also, "Lee sees communism dying on Mainland," China Post, January 1, 1990; "Lee sees reunification of China within six years," China Post, March 13, 1990. On October 17, 1992, Lee reiterated his opposition to Taiwan independence movement and his insistence that there is only one China; on the Double Tenth Celebration of 1992, Lee told the Chinese citizens that "the struggles of entire Chinese people for national independence unity, and modernization under the guidance of the Three People's Principles has laid an unmovable foundation for cultural development and national resurgence today." Full text, see China Post, September 10, 1992.

7. After Chiang Ching-kuo's return to China from the Soviet Union in March, 1937, his first appointment was Deputy Director of the Peace Preservation Headquarters for the Province of Kiangsi [Kiangsi-sheng pao-an-ch'u fu-ch'u-ch'ang]. He took the office on January 5, 1938; see U.S. Military Intelligence Reports: China 1911-1941, Report No.9623, p.4, January 12, 1938; detailed record of Chiang Ching-kuo's study in the Soviet Union and his return, see Ch'en Chieh-y©, Ch'en Chieh-y© hui-i-lu, V.2, Chapter 21, pp. 239-252; and Chiang Ching-kuo, "Wo-tsai Su-lien ti sheng-ho, Decemeber 3, 1925 - March 25, 1937," (My Life in the Soviet Union, December 3, 1925-March 25, 1937" in his Ch'©an-chi (complete works), V.1, pp. 1-90.


9. As to the future of Chinese Communism, in addition to Robert W. Barnett (see footnote 1, this chapter) Ch'en's view is similar to the view of Ross Terrill. In his China in Our Time: the Epic of the People's Republic of China from the Communist Victory to Tiananmen Square and Beyond, 1992, 366P., Terrill writes that "in a way it is a good thing that Marxism fails," and "China is on an open sea before the winds and currents of universal values" (p.330). He further states, "it is not just that human rights abuses exist in China--the entire system is a fundamental denial of human rights, Communism will end in China." On October 28, 1992, in a news conference at Democracy for China Foundation in Newton, Mass., Ross Terrill said "Chinese society is evolving in ways similar to Eastern Europe before the fall of Communism there." "Communism is a dead shell, waiting to be swept away," see Boston Globe, October 29, 1992; however, Donald S. Zagoria argues that "although this dire assessment of China's future could be right, it is not the only possibility. Communism could gradually wither away and be replaced by a looser, more
pragmatic but still authoritarian system devoted to economic modernizations. This is what is already happening in southern China," see Foreign Affairs, Fall 1992, p.216; Robert Scalapino, on the other hand, states that "the most likely future for Asian Communism [mainly Chinese Communism] might take a move toward authorization pluralism on the model followed by South Korea and Taiwan, see his The Last Leninists: The Uncertain Future of Asia's Communist States, 1992, 104P.; also see China Post, editorial "Beginning of the end of Communist Rule in Mainland China," October 19, 1992.


11. See Ch'en Li-fu, Eastern and Western Cultures: Confrontation or Conciliation, 1941, 79P.